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Cornell University 2008 
My thesis challenges the central bank independence literature by demonstrating that 
the delegation of regulatory authority to an independent government agency can 
lead to asset price inflation and the outbreak of banking crisis.  I argue that the 
central bank independence hypothesis ignores the monetary and fiscal consequences 
of financial regulation and is therefore conceptually incomplete.  Instead of 
focusing on institutional optimality, I propose that we explain both monetary 
stability and instability in terms of social iniquities generated by regulatory actions. 
I develop a game theoretic model that explains the outbreak of banking crisis in 
terms of strategic conflict between central bank regulators and bank managers.  My 
thesis argues that regulatory actions often generate monetary and fiscal 
consequences that privilege some members of society and discriminate against 
others, and thus delegating regulatory authority to an independent central bank may 
not eliminate the conflict between the interests of bank managers, shareholders and 
taxpayers.   
The substantive chapters of my thesis consist of an empirical investigation of 
regulatory politics in Thailand and Taiwan.  My research is based upon extensive 
interviews that I conducted at 4 Thai commercial banks, 10 Taiwanese commercial 
banks.  As a result, my research not only offers a new explanation for financial 
system stability and instability, but uses never before published information in order 
to reconstruct the decision-making environment of bank managers and financial 
regulators.
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PREFACE 
 
Political Science is obsessed with how things work.  The literature is 
dominated by illustrations of how the legislative committee system stabilizes the 
U.S. Congress, how international institutions reduce transaction costs and 
encourage international cooperation, how American leadership promotes global 
stability, and how institutional delegation enhances democratic government.  Rarely 
if ever, does anyone ask questions regarding why institutions, governments, or 
regimes fail to work as intended, and when these questions are raised, the failed 
institutions are inevitably compared to examples of well-functioning institutions, or 
parties, or regimes that are believed to exist in the United States, Europe or 
countries that have adopted Euro-American ideas and institutional solutions.  
However, we can presume that Euro-American ideas and solutions are 
superior only if we ignore the many examples of constitutional failure, of mass 
murder and genocide committed by European nations, and by the United States, in 
various regions of the world, and only if we ignore the inherent weakness of 
democratic institutions in the United States, where two similar parties and a handful 
of interest groups dominate political life, and where various Presidents have waged 
aggressive war, ostensibly in the name of freedom and democracy, only to bring 
death and destruction to the regions of the world where freedom was supposed to 
take root.   
Discussions regarding political reality are taboo in political science 
primarily because white-liberal Americans dominate the discipline, and as a 
consequence, political science often consists of variations of white-American self-
congratulations.  In order to transcend the parochialism of political science, I 
investigate the case when institutional delegation, which is at the heart of modern 
political science, fails to work as intended.  In particular, I investigate the 
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hypothesis that the delegation of regulatory authority to an independent central bank 
can lead to financial crisis and economic catastrophe.  
My primary insight is that central bank independence is a useful fiction that 
obscures the distributional realities of financial regulation.  I further claim that 
regulatory systems that distribute the monetary outputs of the banking system 
iniquitously are more likely to cause debilitating financial crises.  The Euro-
American system of financial regulation is designed to promote financial 
innovation, because weakly regulated financial innovation is believed to maximize 
the rate of economic growth in the long run, even at the cost of recurring and 
increasingly destabilizing financial crises.  And when financial crisis does occur, 
the historical record suggests that countries that have adopted central bank 
independence engage in massive bailouts designed to minimize the costs imposed 
upon the bankers who created the crisis in the first instance.   
In truth, financial liberalization and innovation induce a period of 
accelerated monetary growth, which lowers the cost of corporate financing and 
engenders a sense of economic euphoria among shareholders, but even if we 
presume that everyone gains from the period of financial expansion, not everyone 
gains equally, and so the distribution of benefits is central to regulatory policies and 
financial outcomes.  Financially induced recessions also have distributional effects, 
for they raise unemployment and exclude the most vulnerable members of society 
from access to financing.  The fiscal costs of financial crises can also be distributed 
regressively, so that minority shareholders and the poorest members of society pay 
a disproportionate share of the post-crisis rehabilitation costs.  And finally, although 
poorly managed banks are at the heart of every financial crisis, the managers 
responsible for the crisis often escape accountability.  This was true during the S & 
L crisis of the 1980s, and the same is true in 2008, during which the Federal 
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Reserve injected billions of dollars of liquidity into the financial system in order to 
relieve the banks that were most responsible for the credit crisis.  
So although the U.S. is not discussed in my thesis, I believe the institutional 
failure observed in the American financial sector is the result of delegating too 
much power to the Federal government, to the extent that republican government in 
the United States has collapsed or will soon collapse irrevocably, if indeed such a 
principle ever truly existed.  If we are to transcend the limitations of political 
science and Euro-American parochialism, then we must be willing to imagine 
viable alternatives, and it is my hope that my thesis represents a first step in this 
direction.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Regulatory Failure and Credit Cycles 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Bank failures are at the center of historys greatest economic crises.  In 1873 
for instance, a banking crisis in Europe caused the largest bank in the United States to 
collapse, ending the post-Civil War economic recovery.  The year 1873 also 
witnessed the collapse of the Vienna Stock Exchange, which set off a cascade of 
international bank failures that culminated in the long depression, of 1873-1896.  
Bank failures also precipitated or intensified economic crisis in 1893, 1907, the 
hyperinflation of the inter-war period, and of course; bank failures propagated the 
great depression throughout the world between 1929 and 1939.1  The Bretton Woods 
monetary system dampened, but by no means eliminated bank failures, and between 
the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, there 
have been 168 balance of payments crises among the developing economies, over half 
of which were caused by or were concurrent with domestic banking crises.2   
Despite the severity of credit-driven economic cycles in recent years, the 
boom-bust pattern that distinguishes the developing economies is hardly a new 
phenomenon.  As early as 1925, Nikolai Kondratiev observed that the capitalist 
economies followed a cyclical pattern of development.  Building upon this insight, 
Hyman Minsky proposed that financial fragility and financial crises were inherent 
properties of capitalist economies, while the neo-Marxist economist Michal Kalecki 
argued that business cycles and financial instability were politically induced 
phenomena.3   
                                                
1 Kindleberger, Charles, 1994.  Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, (J. 
Wiley) 
2 I.M.F.  1998.  World Economic Outlook.  (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., October). pg. 33 
3 Kondratiev, Nikolai, 1935. "The Long Waves in Economic Life," Review of Economic Statistics. 
Nov. 17(6); Minsky, Hyman, 1982. "The Financial-Instability Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and 
the Behavior of the Economy", in Charles Kindleberger and Laffargue, eds., Financial Crises; 
(Cambridge University Press);  Kalecki, Michal, 1935.  "A Macrodynamic Theory of Business 
Cycles", Econometrica 
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While national systems of financial regulation have evolved far beyond the 
level that existed when Kondratiev first noticed the boom-bust pattern; the early 21st 
century is similar to the 1930s in that banking crises have again become so frequent 
that they threaten the stability of the international financial system.  Because of the 
link between bank failures and wider economic crisis, financial instability has severe 
welfare implications for the millions of people who must adjust to the deterioration of 
domestic economic conditions that ultimately follow a systemic crisis.  During a 
financial boom, bankers can amass extraordinary wealth, investors benefit from rising 
equity prices, workers gain from expanded employment opportunities, and fiscal 
surpluses can even lead to tax breaks for the average citizen.  Following a financial 
crisis, labor markets contract, and younger workers in particular must adjust to the 
new reality of diminished prospects, and taxpayers must endure the significant fiscal 
costs implied by post crisis rehabilitation.  Yet despite the clearly observable 
relationship between social equity and financial stability, as well as the relationship 
between social inequity and financial instability, there has been little academic 
research that investigates the link between social equity and financial dynamics. 
Because of welfare effects of bank failures upon society, financial instability 
and fragility pose several important questions for scholars of international relations 
and comparative politics.  Most notably, banking and currency crises are often 
preceded by a period of credit expansion, which is then followed by a period of 
severe recession.  This boom-bust pattern is clearly observed among countries that 
differ in terms of their form of government, and even the degree to which they have 
undergone financial liberalization and opening.  Right wing regimes espousing 
moneterist theories of economic reform such as Chile prior to the 1982-84 crisis seem 
just as susceptible to the crippling effects of boom-bust cycles as countries following 
more heterodox and corporatist policies such as the Mexican PACTO, that was 
upheld until the 1994 peso crisis.   
  
 
 
4
The Asian and Latin American countries that have experienced boom-bust 
cycles display a daunting variety of regime types and macroeconomic orientations.  In 
Latin America for instance, credit-induced banking crises are often preceded by 
periods of rising inflationary pressure and consumption-driven current account 
deficits, both of which played only minor roles during the pre-crisis period in Asia.  
Within region and across region comparisons prove similarly puzzling.  Thailand, 
which contained a nascent democracy and had a long tradition of responsible 
macroeconomic management was just as devastated by financial crisis in 1997 as 
Indonesia, which had neither a democratic form of government nor as impressive a 
record of macroeconomic management.  The Philippines and S. Korea were also 
democracies during the 1997 crisis, while Chile was far from democratic during the 
1978-82 period of liberalization that also ended in devastating banking and currency 
crisis.  During its bouts of systemic financial crisis, in 1982 and again in 1994, the 
Mexican political system was more comparable to that of Malaysia or Taiwan in 
1997, in that one party still dominated the political life of each country.4 
According to the Thai economist Ammar Siamwalla, the Asian financial crisis 
belongs to a family of crises wherein high levels of capital inflows, a fixed 
exchange rate and inadequate regulation and supervision translate into crippling 
                                                
4 Developing economies also display a high degree of diversity in terms of the size and composition 
of their credit markets.  For instance, the total assets managed by the Thai banking sector are roughly 
the same as Indonesia, and only slightly larger than that of Singapore or Malaysia.   Yet in 
comparison, the diminutive Filipino banking sector does not even reach the size of the single DBS 
Bank of Singapore.  The banking sector of Hong Kong is much larger by regional standards, roughly 
attaining the size of the Singaporean and Malaysian systems combined.  However, one would have 
to add the banking sectors of Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia in order to approach the size of 
the Taiwanese credit market.  And in turn, the Korean banking sector is nearly as large as the 
combined total of the other four largest regional credit markets.4  In terms of composition, regional 
credit markets range from the highly concentrated banking sector of Singapore (five banks in total) 
and S. Korea (eight commercial banks), to the much more diffuse Taiwanese credit market which to 
date contains 43 commercial banks.  A cursory analysis of the banking sectors of Latin American 
countries reveals a similar degree of diversity.  The banking sector of Brazil is by far the largest in 
the region, with Mexico, Argentina and Chile registering at a distant second, third and fourth place 
respectively.  Delhaise, Phillipe. Asia in Crisis: The Implosion of the Banking and Finance Systems.  
(New York: J. Wiley and Sons) pg. 11 
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balance of payments crisis.5  Currency crisis, in turn, serves only to exacerbate 
insolvency within the financial sector of an afflicted economy.  Yet any family 
resemblance between financial crises in Asia and Latin America is confounded by 
differences both within each region, as well as across regions, in terms of every other 
factor imaginable.  How then, can we make sense out of the sheer variety of 
governmental forms and macroeconomic histories among developing countries that 
have been equally struck by systemic bank failures?   
Furthermore, why does there seem to be such a high degree of correlation 
between banking crisis and balance of payments crisis among the economies of Asia 
and Latin America?  The variation in domestic conditions within countries that 
experience financial crisis suggest geostrategic shocks; such as unstable capital flows 
or the threat of military conflict are more likely to be responsible for the recurrence of 
financial crisis throughout the world? 
Regional differences are also reflected in the academic political economy 
literature.  The Asian political economy literature is virtually state-centric, and is 
primarily concerned with the degree to which state autonomy contributed to Asias 
impressive economic development.6  Recent arguments challenge the state-centric 
assumption, but we have yet to fully confront the reality that the theoretical core of 
the Asian development literature has abruptly collapsed.7  In sharp contrast, the Latin 
                                                
5 Interview, Thailand Development and Research Institute (TDRI), September, 2000; see also: Aaron 
Tornell and Frank Westermann, 2005.  Boom-Bust Cycles and Financial Liberalization, (Cambridge: 
M.I.T. Press) 
6 Wade, Robert. 1993. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization, (Princeton: Princeton University Press). pp. 22; See also: Alice Amsden. 
1989.  
S. Korea: Asias Next Giant. South Korea and Late Industrialization. (New York: Oxford University 
Press); and Peter Evans. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.  
(Princeton: Princeton University Press); Tun-Jen Cheng. 1993. Guarding the Commanding Heights:  
The State as Banker in Taiwan, In Stephan Haggard, et. al., editors: The Politics of Finance in 
Developing Countries, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press);  Jung-en Woo.  1991. Race to the Swift: 
State and Finance in Korean Industrialization, (New York: Columbia University Press). 
7 Robert Wade compares alternative hypotheses to explain state failure including systemic variables 
as well as domestic firm centered arguments.  Others have built upon interest group theories to 
explain why the Asian economies experienced financial crisis. Robert Wade.  1998.  From 
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American political economy literature is framed in terms of interest group analysis.  
Institutional capture by powerful groups, class conflict, or interest group pressure 
upon policymakers are analytically privileged in order to explain the economic crisis 
that is so familiar to scholars of Latin America.8   
Although Asia and Latin America differ in terms of their trading and 
investment relations, their political organization, and in just about every other way 
conceivable, the underlying similarity of the two regions in terms of their experience 
with financial crisis is undeniable.  How can regional episodes of banking crisis 
display so many underlying similarities, yet be explained in terms that are 
diametrically opposite?  The Latin American sociological approach suggests that even 
in the purportedly state-dominated countries of Asia, close relationships between 
bankers and public officials can corrupt the regulation and supervision process, 
leading to a mismanaged financial sector.  Yet rarely do interest group theories reveal 
the reasons why organized political interests can penetrate the policy making process 
so easily in some countries, while government bureaucracies in other countries seem 
to be largely impervious to capture by powerful domestic interest groups. 
In order to redress these shortcomings, another strand of institutionalism 
focuses upon the agency problem between the Executive branch of government and 
the central bank.  In this case, the Executive branch may desire banking stability, but 
the central bank governor conceals any negative information about the health of the 
banking sector from the countrys political leadership.9  While this argument provides 
                                                                                                                                   
miracle to cronyism: explaining the Great Asian Slump.  Cambridge Journal of Economics.  22, 
pp. 693-706; Robert Wade and F. Verneso.  1998.  The Asian Crisis: the high debt model vs. The 
Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex.  New Left Review, No. 228, (March-April) 
8 ODonnell, Guillermo. 1988. Bureacratic Authoritarianism: Argentina: 1966-73, in Comparative 
Perspective. (Berkeley: University of California Press); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, eds., 
1995 The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions, (Princeton University Press); Slvyia 
Maxfield.  1990.  Governing Capital: International Finance and Mexican Politics.  (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press);  Eduardo Silva.  1996.  The State and Capital in Chile: Business Elites, 
Technocrats, and Market Economics.  (Boulder: Westview Press). 
9 Satayanth, Shanker, 2005.  Globalization, Politics, and Financial Turmoil: Asias Banking Crisis, 
(Cambridge University Press) 
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an explanation for regulatory failure, it presumes that the Executive is naïve and that 
the central bank is a dictator over the banking sector. Consequently, there is no 
possibility that bank managers can contradict the regulatory policies announced by 
the central bank.  In other words, the latest form of institutionalism overlooks the 
relationship between financial regulators and bank managers, which lies at the heart 
of the financial system.  Without insuring that banks will actually adopt the 
announced regulatory policy however, there is no way to insure the credibility or 
time-consistency of prudential regulatory standards.  
 
1.2 The Problem of Regulatory Failure 
 
The prevailing explanations for the boom-bust cycles that are observed across 
the developing economies can be grouped into two categories.  Arguments in the first 
category explain economic outcomes in terms of geo-strategic events, including the 
occurrence of regional wars and international price or credit shocks.  According to the 
geo-strategic approach, interstate shocks play a similar role to technological 
innovation or productivity shocks in real business cycle theories.10  In either case, 
external shocks or sudden shifts in a countrys terms of trade can induce an unstable 
economic cycle, particularly among export oriented developing economies.   
Arguments of the second category are institutionally centered, and explain 
credit cycles as the result of the central banks capture by local capitalists, which 
allegedly contributed to the occurrence of the Asian financial crisis.  Recent literature 
has also applied the political business cycle hypothesis to Latin America, but these  
                                                
10 Plosser, Charles. 1989. Understanding real business cycles. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
3, 51-77 
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9
arguments apply only to democracies and largely ignore financial regulation and the 
importance of the banking sector for explaining monetary and fiscal outcomes.11  
However, my own field research in Thailand and Taiwan, presented in chapters four 
and five, strongly supports the hypothesis that electoral reform amplifies the effects 
of credit cycles, both as a result of the governing regimes desire to stimulate the 
economy prior to an election, and also because banks and other financial institutions 
are a primary source of campaign financing in most of the developing economies.    
To these dominant approaches, I have added a third, which is based upon the 
theory of distributional conflict.  I begin with the premise that financial regulation 
can produce iniquitous distributions of the monetary and fiscal outputs generated by 
the banking sector.  To clarify the argument, we should distinguish clearly between 
inequity and inequality.  Inequality, as a matter of principle, is justified in market 
economies because well-managed banks contribute significantly to economic growth 
and prosperity, and so bankers may deserve a larger share of the national income 
than the average worker.  Equity, by contrast, implies that every participant in the 
banking system is afforded their rights and honors their obligations.  As a 
consequence, inequity will arise when financial system participants are denied their 
rights or fail to honor their obligations.   
Hence, a financial outcome is iniquitous if bankers benefit disproportionately 
from financial expansions, but can avoid responsibility for any misdeeds detected 
during the expansion phase or following the occurrence of a crisis.  Inequity can also 
arise if post crisis rehabilitation costs are distributed regressively, so that minority 
shareholders and the poorer members of society are required to pay a 
disproportionate share of their income in order to bail out the banking system.  
                                                
11 Alesina, Alberto, 1988.  "Macroeconomics and Politics" NBER Macroeconomics Annuals.  
Cambridge MIT Press: 13-52.  Hector E. Schamis,  "Political Cycles and Exchange-Rate-
BasedStabilization" World Politics - Volume 56, Number 1, October 2003, pp. 43-78 
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While some degree of inequality is expected in market economies, iniquitous 
economic outcomes create incentives for social conflict to emerge over the 
distribution of the costs and benefits generated by the banking sector, and I 
hypothesize that conflict over control of the banking system is sufficient to explain 
the boom-bust cycles that overwhelm so many of the developing economies. 
Most theories of political economy focus upon central bank independence, 
and so presumably, the lack of central bank independence explains the monetary 
instability from which so many developing countries suffer.  However, my own field 
research in Thailand and Taiwan suggests that external geo-strategic events, and 
domestic conflict over the control of the banking sector, are far more important for 
explaining economic outcomes.  Furthermore, and as I will argue throughout, 
institutional arrangements, whether regime type or the formal relationship between 
the central bank and the Executive branch, are significant for explaining financial 
market outcomes only when institutional constraints can effectively alter the 
underlying distribution of costs and benefits created by the financial sector.   
The most obvious cross-country institutional distinction with regards to 
financial governance is the delegation of monetary and regulatory authority to 
separate institutions in some countries, and to a single institution (the central bank) 
in other countries.  However, Charles Goodharts exhaustive research regarding 
institutional separation between monetary policy and banking regulation concludes 
that institutional separation or unification of monetary and regulatory authority has 
no measurable effect upon either monetary or regulatory outcomes.12  Nor are 
stronger regulations necessarily a panacea, because financial repression can create 
inefficiencies, such as informal credit markets and loan sharking, which can expand 
to the point that threaten the stability of the entire economy.   
                                                
Goodhart, Charles and Dirk Schoenmaker, Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking 
Supervision be Separated? Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 47, no. 4 (October 1995), 539-60 
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Institutional design, no matter how elaborate, is largely irrelevant unless the 
instruments of monetary and regulatory control can distribute the outputs of the 
banking system in an equitable manner among the effected sectors of society.  This 
fundamental point remains unrecognized by the political economy literature because 
institution--centered arguments are obsessed with formal rules and the formal 
organization of government, but seem largely uninterested in the link between the 
government and the actual distribution of power within the banking sector or within 
the broader society.  Institution-centered arguments are theoretically sanitized; there 
is little discussion of coercion, violence, or oppression, and only technical 
arguments about credibility are permitted.  But the ultimate effect of regulatory 
policies upon public welfare, and the political struggles over control of the banking 
system are conveniently ignored.13   
Instead, I argue that equity and fairness must be at the center of any 
discussion of regulatory credibility, primarily because regulatory policies that create 
social conflict over the distribution of monetary and fiscal outputs of the banking 
sector undermine the stability of the financial sector and render any consistent 
government policy unsustainable.  Consequently, my findings support the 
hypothesis that regulatory or monetary policy trajectories are credible only when 
they are premised upon an equitable social distribution of the costs and benefits 
generated by that policy.   
From this perspective, Asian state-centric theories that focus squarely upon 
the question of bureaucratic independence are simply too blunt of an analytical 
instrument to comprehend the often subtle dynamics of financial markets.  
                                                
13 Jeffry Friedens work focuses explicitly upon the relationship between monetary regimes and  
the welfare distribution, but he ignores the distributional consequences of financial regulation, as 
well as the effects of financial regulation upon monetary and fiscal stability.  See: Jeffry Frieden, 
1994. "Exchange Rate Politics: Contemporary Lessons from American History." Review of 
International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (Spring); and: Jeffry Frieden, 1997. "The Politics of Exchange 
Rates." In Mexico, 1994: Anatomy of an Emerging Market Crash, edited by Sebastian Edwards and 
Moises Naim. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). 
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In fact, the state-business relationship that was ostensibly responsible for the high 
growth rates of the Asian economies until 1997 are the very same relationships that 
are now being described as crony capitalism.  Furthermore, state-business theories 
often assume that the government will always be able to coerce dissident social groups 
into submission.  But the most devastating weakness of state-business interface as an 
explanation of the Asian financial crisis is that this approach ignores the internal 
organization of banks, which are viewed simply as black box financial 
intermediaries.14  At best, banks are conceived to be nothing more than the creatures 
of powerful business interests, despite the fact that poorly designed systems of internal 
bank governance are at the heart of every financial crisis.15  I argue that the legal 
independence of countrys central bank is in fact epiphenomenal to financial market 
outcomes, and that further, state-business theories are incapable of encompassing the 
actual dynamics of financial markets.   
However, the same cannot be said about geo-strategic shocks, to which 
developing countries are particularly vulnerable.  For instance, the decade-long 
recession that afflicted Japan from the early 1990s had a dampening effect upon 
regional banking systems, and was more significant to the outbreak of the Asian 
financial crisis than any legal or institutional features of the Asian economies.  
Furthermore, the financial fallout from the cross-straits crisis between Taiwan and 
mainland China in 1994-95 destabilized financial markets in Taiwan, and only a 
massive government bailout kept the crisis from spreading to the real sector of the 
Taiwanese economy.  Consequently, my research strongly suggests that geo-strategic 
events have profound effects upon the stability of financial systems, because external 
                                                
14 Haggard, Stephan, et al.  1997. Theories of Business and Business-State Relations, In Sylvia  
Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, editors: Business and the State in Developing Countries,  
(Ithaca:  Cornell University Press), pp. 36-60 
15 Matthew I. Saal.  1996. Internal Governance, Market Discipline, and Regulatory Restraint, in: 
Rethinking Bank Regulation, proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and 
Competition, May (Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago) 
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shocks can alter the manner in which costs and benefits are distributed between the 
managers who govern the regions most important banks, and the taxpayers who must 
pay the costs associated with bank failures, as well as the banks shareholders, whose 
fate is tied to the banks franchise value.   
 
1.3 Credit Cycles and Social Conflict 
 
My thesis is based upon the premise, which is outlined in Table 1.2, that 
regulatory actions can induce credit cycles, which thereby create incentives for social 
conflict to emerge over the monetary and fiscal outputs of the banking sector.  During 
a boom, interest rates fall, making it easier for business and the public to access credit 
markets.  Politicians, whether democratically elected or autocratic rulers can then take 
credit for the favorable economic conditions.  Taxpayers may benefit from lower 
fiscal deficits or surpluses, and shareholders benefit from higher share prices.  In a 
credit-induced recession, the public and shareholders lose, since a credit crunch 
reduces access to financing and imposes constraints upon the real sector.  Credit-
induced recessions also raise unemployment as well as interest rates, but it may be 
possible for bank managers to benefit from the recession due to their ability to pursue 
selective credit policies, from which they can extract an economic rent.   
So even if we were to assume that everyone may benefit from a boom, and 
everyone suffers from a bust, this by no means implies that everyone benefits or 
suffers equally.  During a boom, bank managers can make super-normal profits, while 
in a bust, bank managers can often successfully shift the costs created by their 
irresponsible behavior to taxpayers and to minority shareholders, who are then left 
with the cost of cleaning up the crisis.  Financial liberalization can also prove a 
bonanza for political parties who can then more easily finance political campaigns, 
using both legal and illegal means to do so.  This phenomenon was particularly 
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pronounced in Thailand and Taiwans provincial and legislative elections.  Financial 
repression, by contrast, is bad for depositors but maybe good for bureaucrats because 
a repressed financial market can fund military spending and large-scale development 
projects.  
These features of a financial cycle are inexplicable from the viewpoint of 
institutional arguments, which focus instead focus upon the political independence of 
the central bank and the autonomy regulatory agencies.  While superficially 
attractive, the central bank independence hypothesis ignores the realities of banking 
in the developing economies.  The Bank of Thailand for instance contains a large 
number of officials who were awarded economics PhDs from the many of the worlds 
most respected academic institutions.  Hence, whatever the Bank of Thailands 
problems, the intellectual competence of its technical staff is not in question.  
Officials at Taiwans Central Bank of China and its Bureau of Monetary Affairs, by 
contrast, give the outside observer an impression that Taiwanese regulators approach 
their profession with a discipline and determination that is comparable to a military 
organization, and it is not an exaggeration to state that financial regulation in Taiwan 
is a question of national survival. 
Rather than explain outcomes in terms of government type or sociological 
relationships between government and business, I will instead analyze outcomes in 
terms of the incentives that underlie each countrys regulatory apparatus and the 
strategic decisions of both bankers and bureaucrats.  I will proceed by reconstructing 
the decision-making environment of regulators and bank managers, and then by 
analyzing how each actor responds to challenges posed by the dynamics of their 
respective strategic environments.  The decision-making environment within which 
both banks and regulatory agencies operate is normally ignored by theories of 
financial politics, but as I shall argue systematically throughout, such an analysis 
opens up previously unexplored dimensions of bureaucratic politics.   
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The fit between government regulations and the actual management of banks 
can be described as a contract, through which the regulatory agencies govern the 
credit market by specifying the responsibilities and privileges of both bank managers 
and public regulators.  The contract metaphor is also useful because it makes possible 
the distinction between bargaining over the substance of the contract and bargaining 
over the enforcement of a contract that has been successfully negotiated between 
bankers and regulators.  For instance, through legislative institutions, electoral 
politics can affect the substance of the regulatory agreement, but electoral politics can 
also affect the extent to which each party will fulfill their contractual obligations.   
The contract-theoretic approach is also sufficiently general to encompass 
similar regulatory problems in non-democratic systems.  Within autocracies, or 
governments that are in a transitional phase, effective regulation can be weakened by 
an expansion of the decision making process to include representatives of the banking 
community.  Regulatory credibility and prudence can also be compromised by the 
desire of public authorities to promote their respective financial sectors 
internationally, which thereby create a potential conflict of interest between the logic 
of political expediency and the demands of prudent financial regulation.  In either 
case, regulatory action or inaction can induce a credit driven cycle that alters the 
social distribution of the monetary and fiscal outputs of the banking sector.   
 
1.4 Dissertation Outline 
 
My thesis challenges the central bank independence literature by presenting 
evidence that the delegation of regulatory authority to an independent central bank 
can lead to the outbreak of banking crisis.  I argue that the central bank independence 
hypothesis ignores the monetary and fiscal consequences of financial regulation and 
thus is at best conceptually incomplete.  Instead of focusing on institutional 
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optimality, I propose that we explain both monetary stability and instability as a result 
of the underlying social conflict over the distribution of the costs and benefits of 
financial regulation.   
In chapter two, I develop a perfect information non-cooperative model that 
explores the relationship between social equity and financial stability, and that further 
explains financial system outcomes in terms of strategic conflict between central bank 
regulators and bank managers.  I hypothesize that every regulatory action generates 
monetary and fiscal consequences that privilege some members of society and 
discriminate against others, and thus, distributional conflict is endemic to financial 
regulation and cannot be eliminated by delegating regulatory authority to an 
independent central bank. 
I begin by assuming that the executive branch delegates regulatory authority 
to an independent central bank.   The central bank regulates the financial sector, 
which is composed of a single bank, whose balance sheet decisions are fully observed 
by the central bank.  I then find that for a range of parameter values, there exists a set 
of pure strategy Nash equilibria that support the hypothesis that social conflict is 
endemic to financial regulation and cannot be easily eliminated by institutional 
delegation.   
Employing the contract theory paradigm, I generate three conceptual 
categories: regulatory failure, regulatory discipline and regulatory prejudice, which 
can then be used to analyze the spectrum of crisis and non-crisis countries, and which 
illustrate how the monetary and fiscal costs and benefits generated by the banking 
sector can be re-distributed by regulatory action.  For convenience, I have divided 
society into three relevant categories; bank managers, taxpayers, and minority 
shareholders, among whom regulatory officials through their action or inaction 
distribute the monetary and fiscal outputs of the banking sector.  Ultimately, the 
purpose of employing game-theoretic techniques is to reduce the relationship between 
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the posited variables and observed outcomes to manageable theoretical proportions, 
and to generate specific and testable hypotheses.  
Chapter three discusses the exogenous factors, such as a countrys external 
environment and the corporate organization of the banking sector, that impinge upon 
the internal dynamics of the model, and thereby provides a conceptual bridge between 
the theoretical chapter and the empirical chapters.  Chapters four and five consist of 
empirical investigations of regulatory politics in Thailand and Taiwan.  My research 
not only offers and a new explanation for financial system stability and instability, but 
uses never before published information to reconstruct the decision-making 
environment of bank managers and financial regulators.   
As a result of extensive interviews that I conducted at 6 Thai commercial 
banks, and 10 Taiwanese commercial banks as well as each countrys monetary and 
regulatory authorities, I have focused my case studies upon the distribution of 
regulatory costs and benefits between three social groups: taxpayers, bank owners, 
and minority shareholders.  The two case study chapters are also the result of internal 
surveys and interviews conducted at various departments of the Bank of Thailand, the 
Central Bank of China, and the other government agencies responsible for regulation 
and supervision in Thailand and Taiwan.16   
Thailand experienced an extended period of financial system stability during 
the 1950s-60s, that minimized the need for taxpayer sponsored bail outs, but came at 
                                                
16 Bank of Thailand: Legal Dept., Monetary Policy Division, Economic Research Dept.,  
Supervision Policy Dept., Bank Examination Dept., and Human Resources Dept.; Ministry of Finance: 
Legal Dept., Special Committee on Financial Policy; Thailand Stock Exchange Listing Department, 
Market Surveillance Dept.; Financial Sector Restructuring Authority; Asset Management Corporation; 
Thailand Institute for Research and Development: Office of the President, Financial Policy Division.   
 
Central Bank of China: Legal Dept., Monetary Policy Dept. (Banking Dept.), Economic Research 
Division, Personnel Dept., Bank Examination Dept., Foreign Exchange Dept.; Ministry of Finance: 
Bureau of Monetary Affairs, Bank Examination Dept.; Central Depository Insurance Corporation: 
Financial Distress and Rehabilitation Division, Bank Examination Division; Taiwan Stock Exchange: 
Listing Dept.; Market Surveillance Dept.; Executive Yuan: Office of the Prime Minister, Committee 
for Economic Planning and Development. 
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a cost of military control of the banking system that stifled financial innovation and 
growth.  During the 1980s and 1990s by contrast, Thai commercial banks 
reconfigured their internal organization to take advantage of the period of financial 
liberalization.  The transformation of Thai bank management helped initiate the boom 
of the 1990s, but came at a cost of large-scale fraud within the banking system that 
precipitated the financial crisis of 1997 and was ultimately paid for by taxpayers and 
the poorest members of Thai society.   
Because of Taiwans precarious geo-strategic position, the government 
initially resolved the conflict between taxpayers, bank managers and shareholders by 
forbidding private ownership of banks and by imposing severe limitations upon bank 
managers.  However, financial system stability was threatened during the 1990s by 
financial liberalization, the fallout of the cross-straits diplomatic crisis, the regulatory 
consequences of electoral fraud and vote buying, as well as the macroeconomic 
deterioration that followed the Asian financial crisis.  To maintain control over bank 
managers, Taiwan has had to engage in constant and pre-emptive institutional 
innovation, and following the ascent of the Democratic Peoples Party (DPP) to 
power in 1999, Taiwan initiated a large-scale purge of the financial system from 
corrupt bank managers who were associated with the previous regime.  Chapter six 
consists of a discussion of the weaknesses inherent in my approach as well as 
suggestions about how to improve my model and test its predictions empirically. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The dominant school of political economy presumes that a government can 
make a credible commitment to monetary stability by delegating control of monetary 
policy to an independent central bank.  According to this scenario, the independent 
central bank would then select a rate of inflation that maximizes social welfare.  
Monetary stability is assured by tying the inflation-prone hands of politicians with a 
politically neutral and independent central bank, which thereby acts as a binding 
mechanism.  However, the banking sector, which is arguably the main source of 
monetary and fiscal instability in the developing countries, is left out of this picture.   
Once the banking sector is incorporated theoretically into the institutional 
delegation argument, it becomes evident that institutional delegation can produce a 
range of macro-outcomes, including outcomes that imply an iniquitous distribution of 
monetary and fiscal costs and benefits, which will inevitably undermine the stability 
of the banking sector by leading to episodes of asset price inflation/deflation and 
systemic banking crisis.  The regulatory channel of monetary policy thus provides a 
new perspective for understanding the sources of inflation and deflation, as well as 
the distributional consequences of financial regulation more broadly.  In summation, I 
argue that the central bank independence hypothesis can only provide an incomplete 
causal explanation for inflation or deflation, and is further incapable of explaining the 
type of system-wide banking crisis that has become so commonplace among the 
developing economies.  
I develop a formal model that challenges the central bank independence 
literature by explaining inflation as well as deflation in terms of a strategic bargaining 
process between central bank regulators and domestic bank managers.  My model 
also goes beyond the central bank independence literature by explaining the outbreak 
of banking crisis in terms of social iniquities, which lead to strategic conflict between 
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the different sectors of society, over the distribution of the costs and benefits of 
financial regulation.  Conflict between the sectors of society is institutionalized in 
terms of a regulatory contract that is negotiated between bank managers and public 
regulators, on behalf of the banks minority shareholders and on behalf of the 
taxpayers respectively.  The purpose of the regulatory contract is to distribute the 
costs and benefits of financial regulation equitably among the members of society.  
My primary finding is that because every regulatory action generates monetary and 
fiscal consequences that privilege some members of society and discriminate against 
others, distributional conflict is endemic to financial regulation and cannot be 
eliminated by delegating regulatory authority to an independent government agency. 
Methodologically, I argue that contract theory provides a superior analytical 
framework for explaining the distributional conflicts that are inherent to financial 
regulation.  Instead of viewing the outbreak of banking crisis retrospectively, as 
causally over-determined by macroeconomic conditions or institutional corruption, I 
have developed a new theoretical devise, the regulatory contract, that explains 
monetary and fiscal outcomes in terms of a set of forward looking decisions regarding 
the inter-temporal distribution of the costs and benefits of financial regulation.  
Unlike the central bank independence hypothesis, which explains monetary outcomes 
in terms of the central banks tolerance for inflation, the contract theoretic approach 
to financial regulation acknowledges the possibility that bank managers can 
contradict the central banks announced policy, and so even an independent central 
bank may be forced to negotiate an inter-temporal trade-off between current output 
and future debt.  The determination of monetary outcomes according to the central 
bank independence hypothesis is compared to the regulatory channel of monetary 
policy in Figure 2.1 below. 
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Central Bank Independence Hypothesis Distributional Conflict Hypothesis 
 
 
Executive delegates monetary authority  Executive delegates regulatory 
to an independent central bank  authority to independent central bank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Central bank selects   Central bank negotiates 
inflation-unemployment level  monetary outcome with bank managers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Inflation level is realized     Boom-Bust    Monetary Stability Deflation 
         Cycle    Cycle 
 
Figure 2.1   An Alternative Approach to Monetary Outcomes 
 
 Following the logic of the delegation hypothesis, I begin by assuming that the 
executive branch of government delegates regulatory authority to an independent 
central bank.  However, as is illustrated in Figure 2.1, I then proceed to demonstrate 
that a range of monetary and fiscal outcomes is possible given this institutional set-
up, including the possibility of regulatory failure and the outbreak of system-wide 
banking crisis.  In order to overcome the deficiencies of current theories of 
institutional delegation, I propose that we conceive of macro-outcomes, which 
include both instances of monetary stability as well as cases of monetary instability, 
as the result of a contractual negotiation between the central bank and the bank 
manager over the distribution of the costs and benefits of financial regulation.   
 According to this scenario, political constituents would then lobby the public 
regulator to adopt the policy that is favored by the constituents, with the 
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understanding that any action taken by the regulator would result in fiscal and 
monetary externalities for the remaining members of society.  If the resulting 
distribution is iniquitous, then inter-temporal conflict over the distribution of the 
monetary and fiscal externalities of the banking sector becomes inevitable, because 
iniquitous regulatory actions privilege some members of society and discriminate 
against others. 
The substance of the contract consists of a complete specification of the inter-
temporal distribution of monetary and fiscal consequences of each regulatory action.  
According to the terms of the regulatory contract, monetary acceleration in the 
current period is paid for by the accumulation of debt, which must be paid at a future 
date, and thus, while the government will benefit from presiding over a booming 
economy, the monetary expansion comes at a cost of future debt that must be borne 
by taxpayers.  By contrast, a monetary contraction, that must often be endured in 
order to stabilize an economy, reduces the rate of monetary expansion, but benefits 
taxpayers by lowering the rate of debt accumulation, thereby generating a fiscal 
windfall at a future date. 
Monetary expansion and contractions will also impinge upon the utility of 
bank managers and bank shareholders, whose profit margins and returns will expand 
or contract in proportion to the prevailing monetary conditions.  As a consequence, 
the purpose of the regulatory contract is to inter-temporally distribute the monetary 
and fiscal consequences of regulatory actions equitably among the members of 
society.  
 The model predicts that the bank manager will obey the governments 
prescribed regulatory standards (i.e. bank capital requirements will be binding) only if 
the manager is certain that failure to do so would result in corrective regulatory 
action.  The model also predicts that the threat to intervene will insure compliance, if 
and only if, the post-crisis bankruptcy resolution process forces the bank manager to 
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bear the costs of financial rehabilitation as well as personal liability for any 
wrongdoing.  Moreover, the model predicts that at the macro-level, the central bank 
will tolerate poorly managed banks in order to accelerate the rate of monetary 
expansion, which allows the government to selectively allocate credit to its political 
constituents, and which would also benefit the delinquent bank manager, who earns 
super-normal profits.  However, the expansionary credit policy generates a future cost 
to the public treasury (i.e. for the taxpayers) and to the banks minority shareholders, 
who must absorb the costs that result from the eventual failure of the poorly managed 
bank. Most significantly however, the model demonstrates that the distributional 
conflicts that surround financial regulation are endemic, and thus, there is no ideal 
institutional design or political configuration that can fully resolve the policy 
dilemmas that are implied by the model.  Instead, regulators confront a set of trade-
offs between the current and future consequences of regulatory action, and thus, 
rather than maximizing social welfare, an independent central bank can only achieve 
a set of second-best outcomes.   
 The intractability of the institutional design problem raises a potentially 
devastating theoretical criticism for arguments predicated upon the conceptual 
significance of central bank independence, as well as for other institutional solutions 
that imply Pareto optimality, but ignore social equity (the monetary and fiscal 
consequences of regulatory policy).17    
 In accordance with the credit view of monetary policy, the model assumes 
that the credit allocation decisions of banks have a distinct and independent effect 
upon overall economic output.18  Consequently, at the macro level, the public 
regulator may face a trade-off between the monetary benefits of accelerating the rate 
                                                
17 The relationship between banking regulation and monetary policy is a largely unexplored region  
of economic theory.  See: Blum, J. and M. Hellwig, The Macroeconomic Implications of Capital 
Adequacy Requirements for Banks, European Economic Review, 39 (3-4), 739-49 
18 For a theoretical assessment of the credit view of monetary policy, see: Walsh, Carl E., Monetary 
Theory and Policy, Second Edition, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), Chapter 7 
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of credit expansion and the regulatory costs of tolerating poorly managed banks.  The 
potential conflict between the governments monetary commitments and its 
regulatory obligations suggests that the notion of institutional optimality presumed by 
the central bank independence literature is conceptually incomplete. More generally, 
if regulatory policy is fully delegated to an independent agency or central bank, the 
regulatory trajectory adopted by the central bank will generate monetary and fiscal 
incentives for distributional conflict to emerge between the different sectors of 
society.     
 The model simplifies society into three sectors, which are: (i) the bank 
manager, (iii) the taxpayers, and (iv) the banks minority shareholders.  The models 
results support the hypothesis that each regulatory action generates costs and benefits 
that must be distributed among the various sectors of society, and therefore, social 
conflict can emerge between the members of society over the consequences of 
regulatory action.   
 The model begins with a stylized description of the internal organization of a 
bank, in terms of the rights and obligations of the bank manager as well as those of 
the banks minority shareholders.  Although minority shareholders take no further 
action beyond delegating decision making authority to the bank manager, the 
decisions of the bank manager have a direct impact upon the welfare of the banks 
shareholders, which creates a potential conflict between the interests of the bank 
manager and those of the minority shareholders.  The bank managers decisions also 
affect taxpayers and the government, who are represented in the model by the public 
regulator.   
 Constitutionally, we can assume that the central bank is granted authority over 
the banking system, which is populated by the single bank, in order to maintain a 
constant rate of monetary expansion under regulatory constraints that preserve the 
solvency of the banking system.  However, the government may also make a 
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commitment to provide its political allies and clients with easy access to credit, which 
is represented in the model as an acceleration of the rate of credit expansion.  The 
relaxation of the credit constraint would thus enrich the governments political 
constituents, but would also directly contradict the central banks constitutionally 
mandated prudential obligations.  In summation, the model represents the conflict of 
interest between the bank manager and the banks minority shareholders, and also 
incorporates the potential conflict between the bank manager and the central bank 
over the macro-consequences of the bank managers credit allocation decisions. 
If we assume that the bank managers credit allocation decisions are common 
knowledge, then the solution of this simple model of financial authority would 
require the derivation of the parameter values under which the regulatory contract is 
incentive compatible.   
The solution proceeds first by identifying all strategy profiles that satisfy the 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions.  Strategy profiles that satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
form candidate solutions that are locally optimal.  The global optimality of any 
candidate solution is guaranteed by comparing the utility derived from the candidate 
solution to all pure strategy permutations of the game.  Employing the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions and global optimality procedure, we can identify all pure strategy Nash 
equilibria that satisfy the terms of the regulatory contract as well as Nash equilibria 
that entail strategies (adopted by either the bank manager or the central bank) that are 
in violation of the terms of the regulatory contract.   
The social distribution of the consequences of regulatory actions is illustrated 
in Table 2.2 below.  The distribution of Nash equilibria can then be used to construct 
a comparative statics framework.  For theoretical purposes, I have divided the set of 
equilibrium strategy profiles into three categories: (i) an equilibrium that satisfies the 
conditions of the regulatory contract, (ii) an equilibrium that represents unwarranted 
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forbearance, and (iii) an equilibrium that represents regulatory intervention, which can 
be interpreted as prompt and corrective action.   
The solution to the regulatory contract generates six pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium sets which I have interpreted in terms of the bank managers behavior, the 
central banks regulatory response, and finally, in terms of the ultimate distribution of 
the costs and benefits of the governments regulatory actions.  Conceptually, and in 
accordance with Table 2.2, I have organized the models solution into three substantive 
categories.   
(I) Regulatory failure is represented by scenario (1), and describes the trade-off 
between monetary acceleration in the current period and the future debt that must be 
borne by taxpayers as a result of accelerated monetary growth.  Scenario (1) can 
therefore explain the conditions under which regulatory inaction can precipitate a 
banking crisis.   
(II) Regulatory discipline is represented by scenarios (2)  (5), and analyzes the 
parameter values under which the bank managers credit allocation decisions obey the 
terms of the prudential regulatory contract.  Scenarios (3) and (4) fulfill the bank 
managers contractual obligations, and also Pareto dominate the intervention scenarios, 
(2) and (5), which demonstrates that the regulatory contract is incentive compatible.   
(III) Regulatory prejudice is represented by scenario (6), and describes the 
distribution of the costs and benefits of monetary deflation.  The internal content of 
each regulatory scenario can then be analyzed in terms of bank management strategy, 
the overall macro consequences, and the post-crisis distribution of bankruptcy costs and 
executive control rights. Finally, the solution to the model allows for a precise analysis 
of the inter-temporal distribution of the monetary and fiscal consequences of regulation 
actions, including the pre-crisis enforcement of prudential standards, as well as the 
conflicts that also arise during the post-crisis allocation of bankruptcy costs and 
executive control rights.  The final interpretive section of the essay, analyzes the 
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conceptual significance of the inter-temporal trade-offs implied by the model for the 
institutional delegation hypothesis. 
 
2.2 The Model 
 
The architectural design of a countrys regulatory system can be modeled as a 
contractual relationship between the central bank (CB), who is the principal, and the 
bank manager (BM), who adopts the role of the agent.  Within the contract theoretic 
paradigm, a set of constrained optima can be obtained by maximizing the utility of the 
principal while the utility of the agent is held to a given utility level.  So if we are 
interested in common properties of the optima and not in one particular optimum, this 
approach brings no loss of generality.   
Part one presents a simple decision-theoretic representation of the bank 
managers credit allocation decisions.  The bank managers credit allocation decisions 
are analyzed; first in a permissive regulatory environment and then in an environment of 
regulatory activism.  In part two, the powers of the central bank are defined by a 
regulatory contract, in which the rights and obligations of both the central bank and the 
bank manager are specified.  Finally, in part three, the results generated by the model 
are interpreted within a generalized comparative statics framework, which provides a 
complete specification of the endogenous parameters that can explain the causes of 
regulatory success as well as the underlying reasons of regulatory failure.    
 
2.21 Governing Banks 
 
Section one presents a stylized decision-theoretic representation of the bank 
managers credit allocation decisions upon which the entire model is founded.  Bank 
governance is defined in terms of the bank managers two most important management 
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decisions; which are decisions regarding credit expansion (loan approval), and 
decisions concerning the appropriate level of the banks capital reserves.  By 
assumption, the BMs goal is to maximize personal income, which is a linear function 
of the BMs asset and capitalization decisions.  From the perspective of the BM, the 
banks optimal balance-sheet decisions are dependent upon the prevailing regulatory 
environment; or more precisely, on whether the bank manager faces a regulator that is 
predisposed towards forbearance or intervention.   
The intuition behind the model is simple.  The bank is composed of a group of 
shareholders, who delegate all management decisions to the BM.  The BM extends a 
loan, a = {ai}; which enters into the BMs financial statement as an asset, and which is 
illustrated in Table 2.1 below.  The BM then raises a level of loan loss reserves, k = 
{kj}, which is meant to cushion the bank from the possible failure of the loan.  The 
BMs actions can be stated formally as; BM = {ai, kj}, i = 0, 1 and j = 0, 1.  By 
assumption, there are two types of assets; a1 = a high quality asset and a0 = a low 
quality asset, which yield a discounted present value for the bank of: a1 ≥ 0 > a0, 
respectively.  Also by assumption, there are two levels of loan loss reserves; k0 = a low 
level of reserves, and k1 = a high level of reserves, and so: k1 > k0 ≥ 0.  Since reserves 
are scarce, each reserve level, kj, is associated with a corresponding cost cj which can be 
stated as, c1 > c0 > 0. 
 The banks balance sheet is composed of two components: assets and liabilities, 
which by construction, must equal to zero.  The banks liabilities consist of deposits 
accepted by the bank as well as the banks equity capital.  By contrast, the banks asset 
balance, (ai + kj), is composed of the discounted present value of the loans extended by 
the bank ai, as well as the banks reserves, kj.  Loan loss reserves are defined actuarially 
as provisions that are set aside by the banks management in order to offset any losses 
caused by failed loans.   Hence, if we assume that there is no exogenous variation in the 
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banks liabilities, then the banks asset balance, (ai + kj), will determine any change in 
the banks net worth.19   
Each asset type also generates a revenue stream for the BM.  Asset type a1 
represents a loan to a viable firm or a well-managed investment project that yields a 
return to the BM of G1.  By way of contrast, assume that a0 represents a loan that 
becomes non-performing and must then be listed as a loss on the banks balance sheet.  
However, if we further assume that a0 is a self-loan (i.e. a loan from the bank to the 
bank manager), or that a0 represents a loan to a related firm, then even if the bank is 
never repaid, the BM personally gains G0.  The parameter G0 can therefore be 
interpreted as the benefit obtained by the BM from a relationship loan, and if we 
assume that G0 > G1 > 0, then the BM has an obvious incentive to extend a loan to a 
related firm or to engage in a self-loan.    
Assume however, that as the banks chief executive officer, the BM is obligated 
to personally assume the cost, cj, of raising loan loss reserves, kj, and so the BMs 
actions are not wholly unconstrained.  Hence, the BM personally gains an income, Gi  
cj, for governing the bank; and the BMs management decisions further alter the banks 
net worth by (ai + kj), which is then distributed as dividends among the banks minority 
shareholders.  By assumption, (ai + kj) enters into the BMs utility in order to capture 
the BMs fiduciary responsibility to protect the interests of the banks shareholders.  
However, should the BM choose to behave opportunistically and select {a0, k0}, then 
without any outside liquidity support or regulatory intervention, the minority 
shareholders would be forced to absorb the resulting deficit in the banks net worth.  
                                                
19 William D. Miller, Commercial Bank Valuation, (New York: J. Wiley and Sons, 1995), 100,  
108, 117, 119, 134-35; Oliver G. Good and Robert J. Porter, Analysis of Bank Financial Statements, 
(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1979), 13.  The provision for loan losses is a reserve account 
held by the bank in order to cover unanticipated losses on loans and leases.  The provision for loan losses 
is an expense item, in that it is treated as a charge against the banks current income.  Hence, loan loss 
expenses are subtracted from the income generated by the banks asset portfolio, and furthermore, any 
subsequent actual loan loss that is experienced by the bank will be applied against the loan loss reserve.  
Consequently, the banks loan portfolio, net the banks loan loss reserve, yields the net asset balance.   
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Finally, we will assume that any variation of the banks net worth is determined in a 
non-stochastic manner, and so the management decisions that leave the bank 
undercapitalized, overcapitalized or optimally capitalized are common knowledge: 
 
Table 2.2: Bank Managers Financial Statement 
 
Managers Asset Loan Loss ∆ in Banks Regulatory 
Income Value Reserves Net Worth Status 
 
G0  c0 a0 k0  (a0 + k0) < 0 Bankrupt 
G0  c1 a0 k1 (a0 + k1) ≤ 0 Optimal Capitalization 
G1  c0 a1 k0  (a1 + k0) ≥ 0 Optimal Capitalization 
G1 c1 a1 k1 (a1 + k1) > 0    Wealthy 
 
The CB is constitutionally invested with financial authority in order to maintain 
a constant rate of credit expansion while safeguarding the solvency of the financial 
sector.  Legally, the CB should therefore prefer that the BM select either (a0 + k1), or 
(a1 + k0); both of which expand the credit supply at a constant rate, and as indicated 
above, do so under regulatory constraints that leave the banking sector adequately 
capitalized.20   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 In case of a deficit in the asset balance, (ai + kj) ≤ 0, the deficit must be covered by the banks  
equity capital, which is held by the banks shareholders and which would reduce the level of the banks 
capitalization.  In contrast, a asset balance surplus, (ai + kj) ≥ 0, could be treated as retained earnings and 
subordinated into the banks Tier-2 capital, which accords with BIS procedures regarding loan loss 
reserves.  See: Miller, Commercial Bank Valuation, 100 
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2.21 (A) Optimality Conditions 
 
Assuming that the BM accepts the governments regulatory standards, optimal 
capital-asset decisions must fulfill two sets of conditions: 
 
(i) The Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and  
(ii) The incentive compatibility constraint. 
 
i) Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 
 
The BMs utility function may be represented as:  
 
UBM (a, k) = U (Gi  cj + (ai + kj))   (2.2) 
 
The BMs utility function is additively separable in the components; revenue Gi, 
cost of capital c, and net capital-asset position (ai + kj).  The assumption that the BMs 
preferences are described as an additively separable function implies that risk neutrality 
does not vary with the asset type and level of capital reserves selected by the BM.  The 
BMs utility function is assumed to be weakly concave in its arguments and the BMs 
marginal disutility increases with a higher cost of reserves, which can be stated 
formally: 
 
UBM ( . ) > 0, UBM ( . ) ≤ 0   
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ii) Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
 
The incentive compatibility constraints require that the BM will prefer the 
capital/asset combination that is also preferred by the CB.  The BM should therefore 
self-select the appropriate level of capital as defined by the CBs statutory 
pronouncement.   
 
UBM (G0  c1 + (a0 + k1))   ≥    UBM (G0  c0 + (a0 + k0))  (2.31) 
UBM (G1  c0 + (a1 + k0))   ≥    UBM (G1  c1 + (a1 + k1))  (2.32) 
 
The incentive compatibility conditions do not hold simultaneously, because the 
BM can select only one set of asset-reserves combinations.  Hence, equation 2.31 
corresponds to {a0, k1}, and equation 2.32 corresponds to {a1, k0).  For now, we are 
only considering the BMs management decisions in isolation, but in section 2.2 we 
will re-state the entire optimization problem in a much more general manner.   
 
2.21 (B) Regulatory Action 
 
Regulatory action refers to the consequences of the central banks decision to 
intervene, as well as the consequences of the governments decision to practice 
forbearance.  Regulatory action can have three distinct effects upon the BMs utility, (i) 
The allocation of executive control rights, (ii) The distribution of bankruptcy costs, (iii) 
Lender of last resort effects. 
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(i) The Lender of Last Resort 
 
The CB is legally bound to provide lender of last resort facilities to the bank that 
selects {a0}, by absorbing any balance sheet deficit (i.e. when (ai + kj) ≤ 0).  However, 
the CBs legal obligation applies only if the BM selects an optimal capitalization level 
{a0, k1}.  Hence, if the BM selects {a0, k0}, the CB is granted the power to adjust the 
banks capital level to {a0, k1}, in accordance with prudential regulatory standards.  
Note that intervention imposes a double indemnity of revenue seizure and balance 
sheet correction.   
 
(ii) The Social Distribution of Bankruptcy Costs 
 
The social distribution of bankruptcy costs between the bank manager and 
taxpayers is determined formally by balance sheet corrections that are made following 
intervention.  By assumption, the CB will correct any balance sheet under-capitalization 
(a0 + k0) or overcapitalization (a1 + k1), by forcing the BM to adopt an optimal loan loss 
reserve level; (a0 + k1) and (a1 + k0), respectively.  In the case of under-capitalization, 
the CBs balance sheet correction represents a shifting of the burden of post-crisis 
bankruptcy costs upon the delinquent bank manager.   
 
(iii) The Allocation of Executive Control Rights 
 
The most direct way for the CB to affect the bank managers utility is for the 
CB to seize the BMs revenue and to redistribute the banks revenue to the minority 
shareholders, which can be interpreted as the loss of the BMs executive control rights 
over the banks future decisions, or as the removal of the BM from their executive 
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position. 21  In section 2.21, we assumed that the banks minority shareholders must 
absorb any balance sheet deficits, which translates into an erosion of the banks equity 
base, thereby causing bankruptcy.  Hence, if the CB intervenes in a bank that is 
undercapitalized (a0 + k0), or overcapitalized (a1 + k1), then the CB will seize the 
entirety of the BMs revenue stream, Gi; and will redistribute a fraction of that revenue, 
vii, to the banks minority shareholders.  By assumption, vii enters into the BMs utility 
in order to represent the managers fiduciary responsibility to the minority 
shareholders, and so the portion of revenue that remains following intervention can be 
represented as Gi  vii ≥ 0.  Thus, if the entirety of the BMs revenue is redistributed to 
minority parties, then Gi = vii. 
 
2.22    The Regulatory Contract 
 
Section two explores the consequences of delegating authority over financial 
regulation to an independent public regulator.  Assuming that the regulator can observe 
the bank managers capital-asset decisions, the public regulator must then decide 
whether to engage in a costly intervention in the banks operations.  As previously 
stated, the purpose of the regulatory contract is to publicly specify the balance sheet 
conditions under which the CB will practice forbearance, as well as the conditions 
under which the PR will intervene in a banks operations.  Therefore, the central bank 
must balance the costs and benefits of intervention against the costs and potential 
benefits of adopting a lenient regulatory attitude.  Constitutionally, the central banks 
                                                
21 Dewatripont, M., and J. Tirole, The Prudential Regulation of Banks, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1994), 31-35.  The representation hypothesis applies only to the protection of 
depositors, who are especially vulnerable because their interests are diffused and because 
depositors are un-represented on the banks board of directors.  However, if the bank manager 
is also the majority shareholder, as is the case with commercial banks in the developing 
economies, then failure would hurt the interests of the minority shareholders as well as 
depositors.  Furthermore, since the banks equity is subordinate to the banks deposits, the 
interests of minority shareholders are also vulnerable to financial mismanagement.     
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primary responsibility is to enforce the governments statutory limitations upon bank 
governance.  Hence, the regulatory contract is written in a manner that fully specifies 
the capital-asset combinations that fulfill the governments publicly announced goal; 
which is a constant rate of credit expansion under regulatory constraints that preserve 
the stability of the financial sector. 
Within the legal environment created by the regulatory contracts, forbearance is 
deemed unwarranted when the CB refuses to intervene in a BMs activities despite 
evidence of sub-optimal bank governance decisions.  However, the public cost of 
regulatory activism is an interruption of the credit supply, and thus intervention would 
be especially costly if public authorities interfere unnecessarily with the management of 
a solvent financial institution.  An interruption of the credit supply could conflict 
directly with a governments wider political goals, such as the coherence of a 
parliamentary coalition or the consolidation of an authoritarian rulers relationship with 
their political clients.  Consequently, the trade-off between banking regulation and a 
governments credit commitments may be an unavoidable political reality that can 
prove decisive for a governments hold on power.   
Because taxpayers must absorb the costs of unwarranted regulatory lenience, the 
governments regulatory decisions have several distinct implications for the social 
distribution of bankruptcy costs.  Regulatory intervention may be the only way to force 
the bank manager to bear responsibility for the ultimate social costs of their 
management decisions.  Otherwise, in the case of unwarranted forbearance, the bank 
manager can gain privately from violating prudential standards, while the public must 
pay the cost of the bank managers malfeasance.  The final sub-section of the regulatory 
contract publicly announces the consequences of regulatory intervention for the banks 
executive board members.  According to the terms of the regulatory contract, should the 
bank manager violate the governments regulatory statutes, the managers revenue 
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share will be seized by the regulator and re-distributed to the banks minority 
shareholders, thereby terminating the managers executive position.   
The description of the contract theoretic model proceeds first by outlining the 
timing of each actors moves, and then by fully specifying the terms of the regulatory 
contract. The extensive-form of the contractual relationship is presented, and 
employing the necessary optimality conditions, the models solution can then be 
analyzed in terms of the hypothetical expectations of the theory of financial authority.  
The model is thus sufficiently powerful to provide a simple but nuanced representation 
of the regulatory relationship between a publicly minded central banker and a self-
concerned bank manager. 
 
2.22 (A) Timing 
 
 The timing of the model begins when the CB offers the BM a set of 
regulatory contracts that specify the capital-asset combinations that expand credit at a 
constant rate and that preserve the solvency of the banking sector.  If the BM accepts 
the terms of the regulatory contract, the BM chooses an asset, ai, from the set of 
possible asset types: a = {ai} and a level of loan loss reserves: k = {kj}.  Once the BM 
has selected a asset-reserves combination, the CB observes the actions and responds by 
selecting a regulatory action from its action space; r = {ri, 1  ri} where ri = forbearance 
and (1  ri) = intervention.  Each players resulting utility is given by the utility 
functions UBM = (a, k, r) and UCB = (a, k, r). 
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2.22 (B) Contract Theory and Regulatory Design 
 
 The explicit specification of the regulatory contract must include a full 
consideration of the constraints upon the bank managers decisions as well as all 
limitations upon the central banks decision-making environment.  Given that the BMs 
asset and reserves decisions are common knowledge, what follows is a specification of 
a perfect information regulatory contract between the BM and the CB. 
 
(i) The Bank Managers Rights:  The BM controls the banks credit allocation decisions 
ai, and the banks loan loss provisions, kj, which corresponds to the cost of capital, cj.  
By approving a loan ai, the BM gains a share of the revenue stream Gi and pays  
a cost cj.   
 
(ii) The Bank Managers Obligations:  The BMs should select either {a0, k1} or {a1, 
k0}.  Should the BM behave accordingly, then the BM will retain their executive 
control rights and the CB should practice regulatory forbearance. 
 
(iii) The Central Banks Rights:  The CB sets the prudential standards by which the BM 
must abide.  Should the BM fail to obey the CBs regulatory statutes, the CB has the 
right to intervene in the banks operations in order to correct any balance sheet sub-
optimality.  Should the BM select either {a0, k0} or {a1, k1}, the banks balance sheet 
will be corrected to {a0, k1} and {a1, k0} respectively.  Furthermore, should the BM 
violate the terms of the regulatory contract, the CB is empowered to re-distribute the 
BMs revenue share, vii ≤ Gi, to minority shareholders.  
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(iv) Central Banks Obligations:  The CB is constitutionally invested with multiple 
obligations, which includes enforcement of prudential regulatory statutes.  The CB is 
also responsible for monetary policy and is thus ostensibly committed to achieving the 
governments publicly announced credit target; x (ai, ki) = 0.  The CB is also politically 
bound to fulfill the governments monetary obligations, which could force the CB to 
diverge from its constitutionally mandated responsibility to maintain a constant rate of 
credit expansion.  Finally, the CB is required to provide lender of last resort facilities, 
by absorbing (ai + ki) ≤ 0 should the BM obey the governments regulatory statutes.  
 
2.22 (C) Bank Managers Strategy 
 
The bank managers goal is to maximize their personal income within a 
regulatory environment that is circumscribed by the central banks possible actions.   
The constraints imposed upon the bank managers governance decisions by the 
regulatory contract can be more precisely described in terms of the bank managers 
incentive compatibility constraint.   
 
(i) Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
 
{a, k} = arg max {Gi  cj + (ai + kj)}    (2.41) 
 
The incentive compatibility conditions yields the parameter values under which 
bank manager will abide by the capital-asset decisions implied by the terms of the 
prudential regulatory contracts.  The bank managers decisions are also constrained by 
the central banks possible actions; a full description of which requires the specification 
of the central banks decision-making environment 
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(ii) The Central Banks Dilemma 
 
The potential conflict between monetary expansion and banking regulation is 
captured formally by defining the CBs utility in terms of the consequences of the 
monetary and fiscal consequences of regulatory action.  An expansion of the domestic 
credit supply enters the CBs utility function as x (ai, ki).  Furthermore, regulatory 
intervention into a bankrupt institutions affairs implies that CB will impose a penalty 
of (ai + kj) ≤ 0 upon the BM (which is the banks net worth position).  Alternatively, 
forbearance implies that CB will grant the BM lender of last resort facilities by 
absorbing (ai + kj) ≤ 0 should the BM behave in accordance with the terms of the 
regulatory contract.  Formally the CBs utility function can be represented as follows: 
 
UCB (a, k) = x (ai, kj) + (ai + kj)  zk      (2.43) 
Where x (a0, k0) > 0, x (a0, k1) = x (a1, k0) = 0, and x (a1, k1) < 0. 
   
The cost of intervention, zk, is distributed such that the CB will incur z1 if the 
CBs intervention is warranted, and z0 is incurred if the CBs intervention is 
unwarranted, and z0 > z1 > 0.  Note that x (a0, k0) > 0 represents an acceleration in the 
rate of credit expansion, and that by contrast, x (a1, k1) < 0 represents a deceleration in 
the rate of credit expansion (i.e. a credit contraction), while x (a0, k1) and x (a1, k0) 
achieve the statutory target of a constant rate of monetary expansion, such that x (ai, kj) 
= 0.  Because the governments domestic constituents prefer an acceleration of 
monetary expansion, x (a0, k0) > 0, the CB has an incentive to diverge from its 
commitment to maintain a constant rate of credit expansion, x (ai, kj) = 0.  Therefore, 
the CBs mandate to expand the money supply at a constant rate is not necessarily 
incentive compatible with the governments regulatory commitments.  And as 
consequence of the components of equation 2.43, the CB now faces a potential  
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trade-off between the benefits of monetary expansion and the requirements of 
prudential financial regulation. 
 
(iii) The Monetary Consequences of Regulatory Action 
 
The full statement of the CBs optimal regulatory behavior would thus include a 
statement of the central banks mandated policy goals as well as the bank managers 
strategic governance decisions: 
 
 max  UCB (a, k) = x (ai, kj) + (ai + kj)  zk     (2.44) 
[{ai, kj}]      
 s. t.  {ai, kj} = arg max {Gi  cj + (ai, kj)}   (2.45) 
 
Equations 2.44  2.45 complete the specification of the prudential regulatory contract, 
which is represented formally as a constrained optimization problem.  The solution to 
the optimization problem proceeds by applying the Kuhn Tucker conditions as well as 
the global optimization condition, which compares candidate solutions to all possible 
permutations of the regulatory contract.  Now that the actors incentives have been 
fully specified, the extensive form of the contractual relationship between the bank 
manager and the central bank can be represented in Fig 2.3 above: 
 
2.3 Interpreting Financial Authority  
 
The solution to the perfect information regulatory contract is organized 
conceptually in terms of six distinct Nash equilibria.  Each equilibrium corresponds to 
a regulatory scenario that illustrates the parameter values that are necessary to enforce 
the terms of the regulatory contract, as well as the parameter values under which one, 
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or both, of the contracting parties will violate the terms of the regulatory agreement.  
More precisely, the regulatory scenarios illustrated in Table 2.4 summarize all six 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria that can be realized by the model, given the contractual 
limitations imposed upon the decisions of the bank manager and the central bank.   
Each equilibrium scenario is organized conceptually in terms of the actors 
strategic decisions as well as the consequences of those decisions for the stylized 
regulatory system represented by the model.  Accordingly, the six Nash equilibria can 
be divided into three categories; (i) regulatory failure, in which the bank managers 
governance decisions result in crisis level inflation or deflation, (ii) regulatory 
discipline, wherein both parties meet their respective contractual obligations, and (iii) 
regulatory prejudice, which analyzes the condition under which the central bank is 
willing to intervene in the operations of the banking system.  
 
2.4 Solution 
 
I. Expected Utility Functions: 
 
UBM = U {ai, kj, gi (ai), c (kj), v (ai,kj)}; where i,j = 0,1   (A.1) 
UCB = U {ai, kj, x (ai,kj), z (ai,kj)}, where i,j = 0,1    (A.2) 
 
The following constraints and definitions are exogenously imposed upon the 
parameters: 
x00 ≥ 0;  Monetary expansion 
x11 ≤ 0;  Monetary contraction 
a0 ≤ 0;   Value of a failed asset 
a1 ≥ 0;   An asset with a positive value 
k0 ≥ 0;   Low level of regulatory capital 
  
 
  
 
46
k1 ≥ 0;  High level of regulatory capital 
c0 ≥ 0;   Cost of low level capital 
c1 ≥ 0;   Cost of high level capital 
g0  ≥ 0;  BMs profit from failed asset 
g1 ≥ 0;   BMs profit from a positive valued asset 
v00 ≥ 0;  BMs remaining profit from a failed asset following  
regulatory intervention 
v11 ≥ 0;  BMs remaining  profit from the good asset following 
regulatory intervention 
z0 ≥ 0;   CBs low cost of intervention 
z1 ≥ 0;   CBs high cost of intervention 
 
Further exogenous constraints: 
 
k0c0 ≥ 0  
k1c1 ≥ 0 
g0c0 ≥ 0 
a1a0 ≥ 0 
k1  k0 ≥ 0 
z1  z0 ≥ 0 
g0  g1≥ 0 
x00  x11≥ 0 
c1  c0 ≥ 0 
 
The parameter values are associated with the decisions of the BM and CB in the 
following manner: 
 
p = 0; BM selects a0 
p = 1; BM selects a1 
q0 = 0, BM selects k0c0 
q0 = 1; BM selects k1c1 
q1 = 0; BM selects k0c0 
q1 = 1; BM selects k1c1 
r0 = 0; CB selects intervention 
r0 = 1; CB selects forbearance 
r1 = 0; CB selects intervention 
r1 =1; CB selects forbearance 
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The BMs problem translates into a selection of values of ai and kj that maximize: 
 
EUBM = {p*q1*r0*[g0-c0+a1+k0]} + {p*q1*(1-r0) *[g1-c0+a1+k0]}  
+ {(1-p)*q0* r0 *[g0-c0]} + {(1-p) *q*(1-r0)*[-c1+a0+k1+v00]}  
+ {p*(1-q1) *r1[g1-c1+a1+k1]} + {p*(1-q1)*(1-r1)*[-c0+a1+k0+v11]} 
 + {(1-p) *(1-q0) *r1*[g0-c1]} + {(1-p) *(1-q0)*(1-r1)*[g0-c1]}   (A.3) 
 
The CBs problem is to select a best response that maximizes: 
 
EUCB = {p*q1*r0*[0]} + {p*q1*(1-r0) *[-z0]}  
+ {(1-p)*q0*r0*[x00+a0+k0]} + {(1-p)*q0*(1-r0) *[-z1]}  
+ {p*(1-q1) *r1*[x11]} + {p*(1-q1)*(1-r1)*[-z1]}  
+ {(1-p)*(1-q0) *r1*[a0+k1]} + {(1-p)*(1-q0)*(1-r1) *[a0+k1-z0]}  (A.4) 
 
II. Lagrange Multipliers: 
 
The action space of the CB is defined by the set {r0, r1}0 [0,1], and the action space 
of the BM is defined by the set {p, q0, q1} 0 [0,1].  The equilibrium strategy space of 
each player is subject to the following constraints.   
 
L CB = 81 (1-r1) + 82 (1-r0)       (A.5) 
L BM = 83 (1-p) + 84 (1-q1) + 85 (1-q0),      (A.6) 
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Objective functions for the players then become: 
 
CB = EU CB (v) + 81 (1-r1) + 82 (1-r0)      (A.7) 
BM = EU BM (w) + 83 (1-p) + 84 (1-q1) + 85 (1-q0)    (A.8) 
 
III. First Order Conditions and Slackness Conditions: 
 
First order conditions and the necessary conditions for an optimum are given by: 
 
[MEUCB / Mr1] *r1 =  r1[p(1-q0)(x00)-p(1-q1)(x11-z1)  
+(1-p)(1-q0)(x00+a0+k1) 
-(1p)(1-q0)(x00+a0+k0-z0)-81] = 0     (A.9) 
 
[MEUCB / Mr0] * r0 = r0[pq1 (x11)-pq1(x11-z0)+(1-p)q0(x00+a0+k0) 
-(1-p)q0(x00-z1)-82] = 0      (A.10) 
 
[MEUBM / Mp]*p = p[(qr0(g0-c0+a1+k0)+q(1-r0)(g1-c0+a1+k0) -q0 r0 (g0-c0)  
-q0(1-r0)(-1+r1+a0+k1+v00) + (1-q1) r1 (g1-1+r+a1+k1) -(1-q1)(1-r1)(-c0+a1+k0+v11) 
-(1-q0) r1 (g01+r1)(1-q0)(1-r1)(g0-1+r1)- 83] = 0     (A.11) 
 
[MEUBM / Mq1]*q1 =  q1[(pr0 (g1-c0+a1+k0)+p(1-r0)(g1-c0+a1+k0) 
-pr1(g1-1+r1+a1+k1)-p(1-r1)(-c0+a1+k0+v11)- 84] = 0   (A.12) 
 
[MEUBM / Mq0]*q0=  q0[(1-p)r0(g0-c0)+(1-p)(1-r0)(-1+r1+a0+k1+v00) 
-(1-p)r1(g0-1+r1)-(1-p)(1-r1)(g0-1+r1)-85] = 0    (A.13) 
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F1 = 81(1-r1) = 0        (A.14) 
F2 = 82(1-r0) = 0        (A.15) 
F3 = 83(1-p)  = 0        (A.16) 
F4 = 84(1-q1)  = 0        (A.17) 
F5 = 85(1-q0) = 0        (A.18) 
 
Since the constraints are inequality constraints, the Kuhn-Tucker theorem applies, and 
for each constraint, either the multiplier will be zero or the constraint will be slack. 
 
IV. Global Optimality Conditions 
 
The action space of each player can be defined by: 
CB00 = (r1=0, r0=0); 
CB01 = (r1=0, r0=1); 
CB10 = (r1=1, r0=0); 
CB11 = (r1=1, r0=1); 
BM000 = (q1=0, q0=0, p=0); 
BM001 = (q1=0, q0=0, p=1); 
BM010 = (q1=0, q0=1, p=0); 
BM011 = (q1=0, q0=1, p=1); 
BM100= (q1=1, q0=0, p=0); 
BM101 = (q1=1, q0=0, p=1); 
BM110 = (q1=1, q0=1, p=0); 
BM111 = (q1=1, q0=1, p=1); 
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The global optimum is determined by comparing equilibrium strategies that satisfy 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, with every other permutation of the game.   
 
Let EUCB and EUBM designate equilibrium strategies that satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions.  Then, the CBs equilibrium strategy will be a global optimum only if it 
satisfies: 
i, j (EUCB  CBij) ≥ 0, where: i,j = 0,1; 
 
Similarly, the BMs equilibrium strategy will be a global optimum only if it satisfies:  
i, j, k (EUBM  BMijk) ≥ 0, where: i,j,k = 0,1. 
 
V. Nash Equilibria 
 
The solution space for contract Г is defined by six pure strategy Nash Equilibria. 
 
(1) The BM selects {p = 0; q0 = 1}, while the CB responds by {r0 = 1} 
From the Kuhn Tucker conditions: g1 > v11     (A.19) 
EUCB  CB00 = EUCB  CB10 = a0 + k0 +z1 ≥ 0    (A.20) 
EUBM  BM000 = 1  c0 ≥ 0       (A.21) 
EUBM  BM001 = g0  v11  (a1 + k0) ≥ 0     (A.22) 
 
(2) The BM selects {p = 0; q0 = 1}, and the CB responds by {r0 = 0}. 
From the Kuhn Tucker conditions: (a0 + k0) + z0 ≤ 0    (A.23) 
EUCB  CB01 = EUCB  CB11 = (a0 + k0) + z0 ≤ 0    (A.24) 
EUBM  BM000 = EUBM  BM100 = {a0 + k1  g0 + v00} ≥ 0  (A.25) 
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(3) The BM selects {p = 0; q0 = 0}, while the CB responds by {r1 = 1} 
EUCB  CB01 = z0 ≥ 0       (A.26) 
EUBM  BM001 = EUBM  BM011 = g0-g1- (a1+k1) ≥ 0   (A.27) 
EUBM  BM101 = EUBM  BM111 = g0-g1+c0 -(a0+k1) ≥ 0   (A.28) 
 
(4) The BM selects {p = 1; q1 = 1}, while the CBs best response is {r0 = 1} 
EUCB  CB01 = z0 ≥ 0       (A.29) 
EUBM  BM000 = EUBM  BM100 = a1 + k0  (g0  g1) + 1  c0 ≥ 0  (A.30) 
EUBM  BM001 = EUBM  BM011 = g1  v11 ≥ 0    (A.31) 
EUBM  BM010 = EUBM  BM110 = a0 + k1 (g0  g1) ≥ 0   (A.32) 
 
(5) The BM selects {p = 1; q1 = 0}, while the CB responds by {r1 = 0}. 
From the Kuhn Tucker conditions: x11 + z1 = 0    (A.33) 
EUCB  CB00 = EUCB  CB01 = x11 + z1 = 0    (A.34) 
EUBM  BM000 = EUBM  BM100 = 1  c0 + a1 + k0  g0 + v11 ≥ 0  (A.35) 
EUBM  BM101 = EUBM  BM111 = g1  v11 ≥ 0    (A.36) 
 
(6) The BM selects {p = 1; q1 = 0}, while the CB responds by {r1 = 1}. 
From the Kuhn Tucker conditions: (a1 + k1 + c0  a1 + k0) = 0  (A.37) 
EUCB  CB00 = EUCB  CB01 = (x11 + z1) ≥ 0    (A.38) 
EUBM  BM000 = EUBM  BM100 = (g1  g0 + a1 + k1) ≥ 0   (A.39) 
EUBM  BM101 = EUBM  BM111 = (a1 + k1 + c0  a1 + k0) ≥ 0  (A.40) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
52
VI. Remarks and Proofs 
 
Remark 1:  Regulatory Failure.  The CB causes a boom-bust cycle, equilibrium (1); 
or a bust-boom cycle, equilibrium (6); when the BM selects bankruptcy (a0, k0) or 
selects over-capitalization (a1, k1) respectively, and the CB responds with regulatory 
forbearance.   
 
By corollary, the CB thereby induces monetary and fiscal instability, which privileges 
the BMs preferences and forces the CB to absorb the costs of the resulting inflation 
or deflation.   
 
Proof:  From the global optimality conditions, the BM will select bankruptcy as long 
as the cost under-capitalization is sufficiently low, c0 ≤ 1 (condition A.21), and as 
long as the BMs payoff will be superior to abiding by the contract: g0  v11 ≥ a1 + k0 
(condition A. 22).  From the KT condition g0 > v11 (condition A.19) that implies that 
the BMs utility gain from bankruptcy is greater than the compensation that the BM 
receives from regulatory intervention. 
 
The CBs commitment to enforce the contract will be incredible if the costs of 
enforcing the contract are higher than the costs of failing to do so: a0 + k0 ≥ - z1 
(condition A.20).  Alternatively, the BM will select over-capitalization as long as the 
resulting portfolio yields: a1 + k1 = k0  c0 ≥ g0  g1 (conditions A.37-39).  The CBs 
contract enforcement will also be incredible if the resulting deflation is generates less 
social cost than intervention: x11 ≥ -z1. 
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Remark 2:  Regulatory Prejudice.  The CBs intervention promotes monetary and 
fiscal stability, equilibrium (2) and equilibrium (5), when the costs of intervention are 
outweighed by the social cost of practicing forbearance, and the BM is compensated 
following intervention. 
 
Proof:  If the BM violates the regulatory contract by selecting bankruptcy (a0, k0), and 
the CB intervenes, the resulting outcome for the CB only if the social cost of 
intervention is less the cost of forbearance: a0 + k0 ≥ g0 - v00; (conditions A.23-24)  
 
The value of the BMs post-intervention portfolio must also compensate the BM for 
profits seized by the CB: a0 + k1 ≥ g0 - v00 (condition A.25).  
 
If the BM violates the contract by selecting an inefficiently high level of capital (a1, 
k1), and the CB intervenes, the outcome will be stable only if the cost of intervention 
is outweighed by the social cost of the deflation that would have resulted had the CB 
practiced forbearance: x11 = -z1: (conditions A.33-34) 
 
The BM will accept intervention if he is at least partially compensated for the seizure 
of his assets: (a1 + k0) ≥ g0  v11 + c0 1 (condition A.35) 
Remark 3:  Regulatory Discipline. The regulatory contract is credible, equilibrium 3 
and equilibrium 4, when the BM voluntarily selects optimal capitalization, and the 
CB practices forbearance. 
 
Proof: The regulatory contract will be incentive compatible for the BM, equilibrium 
(3) and equilibrium (4), only if the resulting portfolio (a0, k1) and (a1, k0) respectively 
generate a utility that is superior to violating the contract. 
  
 
  
 
54
Hence, incentive compatibility is guaranteed in equilibrium (3), only if the BMs 
utility yields: a0 + k1 ≥ g0  g1 + c0 (condition A.28).  Incentive compatibility is 
similarly guaranteed in equilibrium (4) only if the BMs utility yields: a1 + k0 ≥ g0  
g1 + c0  1 (condition A.30) 
 
Regulatory forbearance is incentive compatible for the CB in both cases as long as 
intervention is costly: z0 ≥ 0 (conditions A.26 and A.29). 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
 The model of financial authority presented in chapter two presumes an 
exogenous set of the political and institutional dimensions that define each actors 
utility function.   The public regulator and bank managers strategic decisions are 
made with the boundaries of a regulatory contract, the terms of which are negotiated 
within the broader political, economic, and social constraints that prevail within each 
country.  Each economy exists within a specific geopolitical context and each country 
contains unique institutional features.  These dimensions are pre-determined by a 
countrys location on the surface of the Earth and the historical development of the 
banking system.  Consequently, any hypotheses generated by the model can be 
evaluated only in the context of a more general framework that systematically 
incorporates each actors decision-making environment. 
 Accordingly, the models exogenous dimensions can be divided into four 
conceptual categories; 1) the corporate organization of the banking system, which 
substantively defines the bank managers utility function, 2) the constraints that 
inform the trade-off between the governments monetary and regulatory 
commitments, 3) the institutional conditions that circumscribe the post-crisis 
distribution of bankruptcy costs, and, 4) the exogenous institutional factors which 
determine the post-crisis allocation of executive control rights.   Once the exogenous 
dimensions of the model have been fully specified, I will then use the Mundell-
Fleming macroeconomic framework in order to analyze the challenges of preserving 
financial authority in the monetary environment of the open economy.   In particular, 
I will evaluate the distributional conflicts that arise in the special case of an open 
capital account with a fixed exchange rate regime, which completes the substantive 
interpretation of the models results.   
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3.2 Financial Authority and Government 
 
The bank manager utility and central banks utility are defined by an 
exogenous set of political and institutional dimensions, that also explain the 
distribution of the pure strategy Nash equilibria illustrated in Table 2.4 of the 
previous chapter.  The exogenous dimensions of financial authority are displayed in 
Table 3.1 below, which is organized conceptually in order to explain the institutional 
and political changes that are necessary to move empirically from one regulatory 
scenario to another. The contents of Table 3.1 would then represent a mapping, from 
the range of parameter values implied by the regulatory scenarios, into the domain of 
financial system dynamics that are more fully explored in the ensuing empirical 
chapters.    
Table 3.1 is divided into four exogenous dimensions that, in principle, can fully 
account for the variance of parameter values across the regulatory scenarios.  Each 
exogenous dimension is further divided into two substantive categories.  The first 
category, which is designated as authority, identifies the relevant actor or branch of 
government in which decision making authority over each of the exogenous 
dimensions is invested.  The second substantive category, designated as decision 
making environment, describes the broader institutional configuration and political 
relationships that define each actors decision-making environment.  Most 
importantly however, Table 3.1 is organized in terms of pre-crisis and post-crisis 
contexts, and it is the alteration of the exogenous dimensions, between the pre and 
post crisis contexts, that is ultimately responsible for the variance of the parameter 
values that occurs when we move empirically from one regulatory scenario to 
another.   
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Table 3.1:  Exogenous Dimensions of Financial Authority 
 
  Pre-Crisis   Post-Crisis 
 
A. Bank Governance 
 
1. Authority - Board of Governors  MoF/Central Bank 
 
2. Decision making - Corporate Organization - Risk Management Reform  
    Environment of the Banking System - Governance Reforms 
-Accounting and 
  Disclosure Reforms    
  
B.    Macro trade-off 
 
1. Authority  - Central Bank   - Prime Minister/President 
   - Ministry of Finance     (extraordinary powers) 
   - Other Regulators 
 
2. Decision making - Exchange rate Constraint - Exchange rate Reform 
    Environment - Monetary Constraint  - Monetary Reform 
   - Natl. Security Constraint - Regulatory Reform 
   - Executive Branch Action - Political Reform 
     
 
C.    Bankruptcy Costs 
 
1. Authority  - Ministry of Finance  - Prime Minister/President 
         (extraordinary powers) 
2. Decision making    
    Environment - No Clear Framework - Institutional Innovation  
 
 
D.    Executive Control Rights 
 
1. Authority  - Ministry of Finance  - Prime Minister/President 
             - Outside/Foreign Ownership  
2. Decision making - No Clear Framework   
    Environment   (Banking Law)  - Institutional Innovation 
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A. The Corporate Organization of the Banking System 
 
The first exogenous dimension corresponds to the bank managers credit 
allocation and the capital reserves decisions.  In any economy, credit allocation 
decisions are the province of each banks board of governors, which is represented by 
the bank manager in the model.  In a pre-crisis context, the bank managers incentives 
are represented by the payoff that the manager receives in regulatory scenario (1) and 
(5).  However, once a crisis has occurred or corrective regulatory action becomes 
necessary, the ministry of finance and central bank normally assume control over the 
banks future decisions, which includes the correction of the banks balance sheet in 
the manner predicted by regulatory scenarios (2) and (5).  Empirically, and beyond 
the confines of the model, the scope of the public intervention depends on the extent 
to which a countrys banking laws have been violated, and hence, the governments 
remedies could range anywhere from nominal fines to the temporary nationalization 
of a failed bank.22   
The realization of the bank managers utility is also determined by the 
managers decision-making environment, which translates substantively into the 
corporate organization of the banking system.  For instance, the bank managers 
incentive to extend a bad loan is empirically plausible because in many countries, 
commercial banks are either family owned businesses or government owned financial 
institutions.  Moreover, banks are often at the center of larger holding companies or 
corporate conglomerates, which creates opportunities for insider lending, on terms 
that would otherwise be unacceptable in a competitive credit market.  The bank-
holding company structure that characterizes the Thai economy and the grupo 
conglomerates that dominated the Chilean economy in the 1970s and 1980s are 
                                                
22 Goodhart, Charles, E., et. al., Financial Regulation: Why, How, and Where Now?, (New York: 
Routledge Press, 1998), 61-72 
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examples of bank-business relationships that encouraged insider lending and self-
loans.23  Furthermore, the widespread preferential credit links between government 
banks and state-owned enterprises, or between private banks and larger corporate 
affiliates, will almost always lead to a higher level of failed loans.  Finally, in order to 
gain access to political privileges, banks in many countries will often provide 
campaign financing for political candidates, and may even extend bribes to high-level 
government officials, which would also lead to a higher level of non-performing 
loans.24  
 Reforming the corporate organization of the banking sector is a necessary pre-
condition for any post-crisis solution to flaws in the national system of financial 
governance. Radical or socialist or revolutionary groups (grupos) can be broken up or 
banks can be separated from conglomerates, Taiwan following the 1939 financial 
crisis.  Less disruptive of the property rights of the equity holders is introduction of 
outside investors to the board of governors.  Foreign ownership is supposed to play 
the role that the state or military once played, which is to moderate the loan behavior 
of the primary shareholder, who is represented by the bank managers utility.  
Decision making behavior of the bank manager will be altered significantly, because 
there is another powerful counter-balance to the managers discretion.  Given the 
manner in which corporate reform will have upon the property rights of individuals, 
family ownership of domestic financial institutions, and the pattern of ownership in 
domestic banks, financial governance reforms.  Creating the mechanism by which the 
corporate-bank is inherently political.  Whether through personal relations between 
the business owners and prominent political figures, such as the monarchy in 
                                                
23 Richard Doner and Daniel Unger, The Politics of Finance in Thai Economic Development, In 
Stephan Haggard, et. al., editors: The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994), 93-122; Laura A. Hastings, Regulatory Revenge: The Politics of Free-Market 
Financial Reforms in Chile, In Stephan Haggard, et. al., The Politics of Finance in Developing 
Countries., 201-229 
24 See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
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Thailand or between the government and bank owners as in Mexico between 1950 
and 1982 and 1989 and 1994.   
 Across the developing world, governments have maintained control over the 
banking sector since modern banks first started appearing in the developing world in 
the late 19th century.  The corporate organization of the banking sector is thus 
determined by broader political imperatives, such as national industrial policies and 
geopolitical objectives.  These factors are exogenous to the model presented in 
chapter two, but are critical for understanding the distribution of power both within 
government, and the outcome of the struggle between governments and native 
capitalists over control of the banking sector.   
  
B. The Dilemmas of Financial Authority 
 
The link between a governments broader political goals and the control over 
the banking sector can only be established if we can connect bank lending and 
monetary policy.  In order to clarify this link, I built the model in the model presented 
in chapter two upon the credit view of monetary policy.  The credit view of 
monetary policy argues that an expansion of the domestic money supply stimulates 
the credit allocation activities of banks, which has an independent positive effect 
upon investment levels and upon overall economic output.  As a result, the macro 
dynamics described by the model are empirically plausible.25  Since banks provide 
                                                
25 The credit view of monetary policy is founded upon three Neo-Keynesian assumptions: 1) prices 
will not adjust instantaneously to changes in the quantity of money, 2) the central bank can directly 
influence the volume of credit by adjusting bank reserves, and, 3) loans and securities are imperfect 
substitutes for borrowers and for banks.  See: Bernanke, B. S. and A. S. Blinder, Credit, Money and 
Aggregate Demand, American Economic Review, 78, no. 2 (May 1988): 435-439; B. S. Bernanke and 
M. Gertler, Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 9, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 27-48; A. N. Kashyap, et. al., Monetary Policy and 
Credit Conditions: Evidence from the Composition of External Finance, American Economic Review, 
83, no. 1 (March 1994): 78-79 
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between 60 to 90 percent of all financing in developing countries, regulatory action 
will have definite distributional consequences upon the different sectors of society.   
The trade-off that the central bank must face in the model, between credit expansion 
and banking regulation, will then reflect the wider balance of power between the 
domestic actors who populate the central banks exogenous decision-making 
environment. 
 
Table 3.2:  The Distribution of the Costs and Benefits of Regulatory Action 
 
       Central Bank  
       Bank Manager Taxpayers Minority Shareholders 
 
Scenario (1)       x00 > 0 G0  c0  (a0 + k0) < 0  0 
 
Scenario (2)       x01 = 0   c1              z1              (a0 + k1) ≤ 0;  v00 ≤ G00 
            
Scenario (3)       x01 = 0 G0  c1   (a0 + k1) ≤ 0  0  
 
Scenario (4)       x10 = 0 G1  c0         0  (a1 + k0) ≥ 0 
 
Scenario (5)       x10 = 0  c0    z1             (a1 + k0) ≥ 0;  v11 ≤ G11 
 
Scenario (6)       x11 < 0 G1  c1      0  (a1 + k1) > 0 
 
The change in the magnitude of the models macro parameters across 
regulatory scenarios is explained empirically by the variation of the exogenous 
dimensions illustrated in Table 3.1.  The exogenous macro-level constraints are 
indeterminate with regards to the trade-off between credit expansion and (future debt) 
banking regulation, in that macro-constraints can impose either a minimum or a 
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maximum level of credit expansion upon the government.   At the most general level, 
the models solution generated three categories of macro-outcomes; i) a credit boom, 
associated with the acceleration of the rate of credit expansion implied by scenario 
(1); (ii) a credit contraction, which is represented in the model by the deceleration of 
the rate of credit expansion illustrated in regulatory scenario (6); and iii) credit market 
stability, which is illustrated by regulatory scenarios (3) and (4).  A simplified version 
of the distributive consequences of regulatory action is depicted in Table 3.2 below.26 
Substantively, a central bank may accelerate the rate of credit expansion, 
represented by regulatory scenario (1), in order to provide wage supports for labor 
unions, or subsidies for the agricultural sector, or selective credit outlays to high 
profile firms and government connected industries.  Much of the developmental 
state literature, is in fact premised upon the powers of selective credit allocation that 
Asian governments exercised during the high growth phase of economic 
development.27  However, according to the regulatory consequences of scenario (1), 
in order to accelerate the credit supply, the government must tolerate a higher 
incidence of bad loans and bankruptcy.  Supplying state-owned enterprises or large 
private conglomerates with selective access to credit would then come at a 
distributional cost to taxpayers and to the minority shareholders of the banking 
system, who must ultimately pay the cost for the central banks credit largesse.28 
By contrast, macroeconomic and political constraints can also force a central 
bank to decelerate the rate of domestic credit expansion, which is illustrated in 
regulatory scenario (6).  For instance, the literature on financial repression has long 
                                                
26 Table 3.6 is a simplified version of Table 2.3, which I have constructed in order to illustrate the 
distributive consequences of regulatory action that are implied by the model. 
27 Wade, Robert, Governing the Market (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), and, Alice 
Amsden, Asias Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1989) 
28 Haggard, Stephan, Chung H. Lee, and Sylvia Maxfield, The Politics of Finance in Developing 
Countries, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) 
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documented cases wherein the government intentionally limits the growth of the 
domestic credit supply as a way of compelling depositors to finance government 
related projects, or in order to deny political opposition groups access to financial 
resources.29   
Governments may also be forced to commit to a contraction of the domestic 
credit supply by the International Monetary Fund, which normally provides 
emergency credit facilities only as part of a broader stabilization policy.30   Credit 
deceleration also imposes a distributive cost upon the economy, in terms of a 
slowdown in economic activity or even a prolonged recession, which is often 
associated with I.M.F. sponsored stabilization programs.31  As is illustrated in 
scenario (6), monetary contraction forces domestic banks to reduce the amount of 
credit that they provide to the economy, which would leave domestic banks well 
capitalized, but would also produce an inefficient outcome for the economy as a 
whole.   
Finally, a government may commit to a constant rate of credit growth, which 
is depicted in regulatory scenarios (3) and (4), as part of a larger development plan 
that considers both the requirements of economic growth and financial sector 
stability.  Regulatory concerns may also be given priority over credit acceleration for 
more fundamental reasons.  Since banks are the primary source of financing in most 
countries, the banking system can be a source of economic and political instability, 
and thus, a government facing an external crisis such as a long-term military conflict 
                                                
29 Fry, Max, Money, Interest, and Banking in Economic Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 2nd Edition, 1997); for the relationship between financial regulation and national security, see 
Chapter 4 
30 The monetary approach to the balance of payments serves as the analytical foundations of the 
I.M.F.s stabilization policies. See: Polak, R.J., Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and 
Payments Problems, IMF Staff Papers, 6 (1), 1957, 1-50, and, Mordechai Kreinin and Lawrence H. 
Officer, The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments: A Survey,  Princeton Studies in 
International Finance no. 43, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, November, 1978) 
31 Agenor, Pierre-Richard and Peter J. Montiel, Development Macroeconomics, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 265-293 
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will enforce prudential regulations rather than permit banks to expand credit 
uncontrollably.   As a consequence, in countries that are militarily vulnerable, the 
control of the banking system by regulatory authorities will be considered an essential 
element of national security.32  The relative importance of banking regulation as 
opposed to the governments monetary commitments will thus vary systematically 
with a shift in the exogenous dimensions of the public regulators decision-making 
environment. 
The empirical movement from the forbearance scenarios to the intervention 
scenarios can be explained in terms of institutional substance of pre-crisis and post-
crisis decision contexts.  Within the pre-crisis scenarios, decision-making authority 
regarding the macro-tradeoff is ostensibly the administrative prerogative of each 
countrys ministry of finance, central bank, and the other branches of the economic 
bureaucracy.  However, the post-crisis context is a period of extraordinary politics 
during which only the executive branch of government will have the legal and 
political status that is sufficient to authorize fundamental macroeconomic and macro-
political reforms.  The extraordinary powers of the executive branch are also 
necessary during the post-crisis phase in order to override the distributional concerns 
of bank managers and owners, which are depicted in scenarios (2) and (5). 
The critical role that the executive branch plays during the post-crisis 
settlement process raises the deeper question of the most effective statutory 
relationship between the central bank and the other branches of government.  In fact, 
the degree to which political constraints circumscribe effective regulatory action is a 
function of the relative position of the public regulator within the wider economic 
bureaucracy, and more specifically, depends upon the relationship between the central 
bank and the executive branch of government.  Empirically, the relationship between 
                                                
32 See Chapter 5 
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the institutional prestige of the central bank and the efficacy of the regulatory system 
holds across government types, since the powers of regulatory enforcement reside in 
the executive branch of government in democracies as well as in one-party 
autocracies.33   
The importance of a close relationship between the executive branch and the 
public regulator contradicts the primary insight of the literature devoted to the 
significance of central bank independence.  According to the independence 
hypothesis, the legal independence of a countrys central bank is statistically 
significant for explaining the reduction of inflation within the OECD countries.34   
However, in many countries, the central bank is responsible for the management of 
monetary policy as well as the enforcement of prudential regulatory standards, and 
yet the regulatory consequences of monetary policy remain largely ignored by the 
central bank independence literature.35  
More generally, even in countries where monetary policy and financial 
regulation are conducted by separate institutions, in times of political or economic 
stress, any decisions of national importance regarding macro-tradeoffs are inevitably 
refocused at the highest level of government.  Indeed, the assumption that the 
political leaders of developing economies would fully delegate either banking 
regulation or monetary policy to the economic bureaucracy stretches credulity, and 
contradicts much of the available evidence regarding the politics of central banking.36  
                                                
33 The distribution of political authority is reflected in the organization of the political system as well 
as the manner in which political interests are represented institutionally.    
34 Cuikerman, Alex, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1992); Cuikerman addresses the relationship between monetary policy and banking supervision in 
Chapter 7, in which he argues that the potential conflict of interest between monetary policy and 
banking regulation justifies the institutional separation of the two duties.   
35 Goodhart, Charles and Dirk Schoenmaker, Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking 
Supervision be Separated? Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 47, no. 4 (October 1995), 539-60;  
In contradiction to Cuikermans claims, Goodhart and Schoenmaker find little empirical correlation 
between the separation of duties and the incidence of regulatory failure.   
36 See Chapters 4, 5, and 7 
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And in fact, the observed reality central banking politics in developing countries has 
led some to conclude that, central banking may be too important to be left to 
bankers.37   
In response to the political complexities that surround central banking, many 
models have been developed that conceive of monetary policy outcomes in terms of 
the strategic interaction between central bankers, legislators, and cabinet ministers.  In 
principle, legal restrictions can be placed upon the ability of legislators and cabinet 
ministers to intervene in the monetary operations of a central bank.  Conversely, 
legislators and cabinet ministers may also possess powerful instruments, such as 
budgetary powers and the ability to dismiss an uncooperative central bank governor, 
which increase the likelihood of political interference in the formulation and 
implementation of monetary policy.  Overall however, there is no universally 
accepted institutional configuration that can insure the formal or policy independence 
of central bank authorities.   
Another flaw of the literature is that the entire theoretical debate is primarily 
focused upon central banking within democracies, which omits a large number of all 
existing central banks from the discussion.38  By focusing primarily upon the OECD 
economies, the independence literature is also guilty of selection bias, in that the 
                                                
37 See: Independence for Central Banks?  Its Debatable, International Herald Tribune, February, 16, 
2001.  The author writes: That central banks should be independent of governments has become a 
shibboleth.  But experience in Asia, as elsewhere, suggests that central banking may be too important 
to be left to bankers.   
     See also: Strum, Jan-Egbert, and Jakob de Haan, Inflation in Developing Countries: Does Central 
Bank Independence Matter? New Evidence Based on a New Data Set, (Unpublished paper: 
Department of Economics: University of Groningen, Netherlands, 2001), and, Temple, J., Central 
Bank Independence and Inflation: Good News and Bad News, Economics Letters, Vol. 61, 215-219.  
The authors data set differs from that of Cuikerman by including high inflation non-OECD developing 
economies, as well as central banking data from the 1990s, which doubles the number of observations 
in the data set.   Once the data set is expanded accordingly, the statistical significance of central bank 
independence disappears.   
38 To my knowledge, there is no research that has been conducted which incorporates the political 
distinction between central banking in democracies as compared to central banking experiences in a 
non-democracy. 
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literature only admits countries that, for exogenous and long term structural reasons, 
may be pre-disposed to low inflation in the first instance.39  Once the full range of 
central bank experiences is admitted into the debate however, it becomes clear that 
the legal independence of a central bank can be overwhelmed by the ideological and 
political commitments of the dominant party, the specific political traditions that 
prevail within each country, as well as a host of other institutional and political 
realities.40   
Not only does the independence hypothesis required that the central bank 
remain immune or insulated from executive branch or legislative pressures, but the 
independence hypothesis further requires that the central bank remain indifferent 
regarding to the regulatory implications of monetary policy.  Hence, in order for the 
independence of monetary institutions to function in the manner consistent with the 
independence hypothesis, presumes the central banks hyper-neutrality with regards 
to the distributional consequences of its monetary policy trajectory.  However, as the 
model of financial authority demonstrates, regulatory action has distinct distributive 
consequences for the different sectors of society, and hence, once the full implications 
of financial regulation have been incorporated into the governments monetary policy 
decisions, the conceptual significance of central bank independence becomes highly 
questionable.  As a consequence, the relationship between the legal status of a central 
bank and monetary policy outcomes is at best indeterminate, and furthermore, linear 
generalizations regarding the relationship between institutional design and 
macroeconomic outcomes difficult to defend theoretically as well as empirically.41   
                                                
39 See footnote 14 
40 A countrys international security position, as in the case of Taiwan or other countries involved in 
long term military conflicts, is sufficient to make discretion over monetary policy far more important 
than price stability.  However, to the extent that price instability could undermine a governments 
security, low inflation could also be a priority, regardless of the institutional status of the central bank. 
41 The central bank independence literature draws a distinction between goal independence and 
instrument independence.  While goal independence refers to the ability of central bankers to 
autonomously set the central banks policy target (i.e. such as low inflation), instrument independence 
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The social consequences of banking regulation create incentives for political 
conflicts over the distribution of the costs and benefits of government actions.  Within 
a democracy, or in a country undergoing democratic reforms, distributional struggles 
are expressed through electoral competition that involves candidates who represent 
the banking sector, as well as through parliamentary battles over financial sector 
legislation.42  Furthermore, as more interest groups and political parties gain access to 
power, the domestic political pressures to accelerate the expansion of the credit 
supply beyond the confines of prudential standards will increase proportionately.  
Hence, in order to safeguard the stability of banking system, the government must 
establish countervailing regulatory guarantees against the corruptive influence of 
money politics upon legislative institutions.  Campaign financing and lobbying 
initiatives connected to representatives of the banking sector must be strictly 
monitored and supervised, and there must also be limits upon the movement of 
former regulatory officials to positions in the private financial sector.  
Although the integrity of regulatory institutions can only be preserved if there 
are limitations upon the pressures that may be exerted by elected officials or 
dictatorial rulers, a close and clearly defined relationship between the executive 
branch of government and the public regulator enhances the prestige of regulatory 
institutions and thereby protects them from corruption.  And in fact, the financial 
regulators of Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, who preside over three of the 
worlds most stable banking systems, are directly beholden to, and under the direction 
                                                                                                                                      
considers the possibility that central bankers may not have control over the policy goal but retain 
independence with regards to the instruments (i.e. short terms interest rates versus monetary quantities) 
selected to achieve the stated goal.   For an overview of variants of central bank independence, see: 
Bernard, William, Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the 
Industrial Democracies, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2001), 19-25  
42 Kroszner, Randall S., On the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform in 
Emerging Markets, (unpublished paper: University of Chicago School of Business, 1998), and, 
Randall S. Kroszner and Thomas Stratmann, Interest Group Competition and the Organization of 
Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services Political Action Committees, American 
Economic Review (forthcoming). 
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of, the executive branch of their respective governments.  Consequently, the formal 
legal independence of the regulatory agency seems to be far less important for 
effective financial regulation than the institutional prestige of regulatory officials and 
the stability of the relationship between regulators and the highest levels of the 
executive branch.    
Another possible solution to the problem of institutional design involves the 
modulation of the number of distinct regulatory agencies.  The power to monitor 
banks and financial transactions could thus be divided among many institutions, or all 
regulatory powers may be alternatively delegated to a unified super-institution.  
However, while each institutional arrangement possesses desirable characteristics, 
each solution also suffers from potential flaws.  For instance, dividing the powers of 
regulatory intervention would thereby increase the number of active agencies in a 
single regulatory system.  Multiple supervisory institutions can serve as fire alarms, 
which alert government ministries empowered to engage in regulatory intervention to 
any problems in the banking system.  Multiple regulatory agencies can also more 
effectively notify law enforcement agencies of illegal and fraudulent transactions, and 
so the greater the number of monitors and agencies with some form of sanctioning 
power, the less likely that bank managers will engage in risky lending behavior. 43  
However, a clear line of authority is required for decisive action, as well as for post-
crisis accountability, and so the powers of direct intervention and bank closure should 
more properly lie in the hands of only a few government officials.  The officials who 
administer the multiple regulatory agencies could answer directly to the executive 
branch, which would then coordinate the activities of the entire regulatory system.   
At one institutional extreme, the number of regulatory veto gates could be 
very large (i.e. infinite), which would presumably make any decisive action 
                                                
43 McCubbins, Mathew D., and Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols vs. Fire Alarms, American Journal of Political Science, 28, (1984), 165-79 
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impossible, but would also make regulatory capture impossible.  The other end of the 
institutional spectrum would invest all regulatory authority into the hands of a single 
public official, which would enhance the decisiveness of regulatory enforcement but 
would also make regulatory bias more probable.  There would then seem to be an 
institutional trade-off between administrative decisiveness and regulatory 
incorruptibility.44  In summary, there is no clearly optimal institutional arrangement 
that would unconditionally guarantee the stability of a countrys financial sector.  
Instead, the most that can be done in order to guard the integrity of the regulatory 
system is to establish multiple channels of accountability, to engage in continuous 
public scrutiny of the regulators job performance, and to devise effective methods of 
regular and accurate dispersal of information regarding the health of the financial 
sector.  Should these conditions be fulfilled, then even in the case of regulatory 
failure, the reasons for regulatory dysfunction and financial mismanagement would 
be much easier to identify and correct.   
 
C.  The Social Distribution of Bankruptcy Costs 
 
The full consequences of regulatory action cannot be understood without an 
empirical analysis of the post-crisis distribution of bankruptcy costs, which are 
summarized in Table 3.2.   In the context of regulatory scenario (1), the costs of 
bankruptcy are completely absorbed by the taxpayers (i.e. the public treasury).  By 
contrast, in regulatory scenario (2), corrective regulatory intervention forces the bank 
to increase its level of loan loss reserves, which corresponds to a replenishment of the 
failed banks equity base.   Consequently, as part of the corrective regulatory actions 
                                                
44 Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy 
Outcomes, In Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, editors: Presidents, Parliaments, and 
Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 21-63; Cox and McCubbins make a similar 
point regarding the trade-off between policy credibility and policy decisiveness. 
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depicted in scenario (2), the costs of bankruptcy are imposed upon the bank manager 
as well as the banks minority shareholders. The allocation of bankruptcy costs would 
then depend completely upon the willingness of the public regulator to initiate 
regulatory action, which was discussed in the previous section.   
According to Table 3.1, in the pre-crisis context, decisions regarding the re-
capitalization of a distressed bank are formally the prerogative a countrys minister of 
finance, but unfortunately, few developing economies possess a clear framework for 
resolving bankruptcy claims.  Few if any legal provisions exist in most countries that 
would insure that banks that engage in irresponsible lending would pay the full cost 
of their misbehavior.  Moreover, few countries possess laws that perform the task of 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy measures, which would protect a failed bank from its 
creditors during the rehabilitation phase.  Bankruptcy is an extremely rare occurrence 
in the developing countries, primarily because in relatively small financial sectors, 
any large firms or banks are too big to fail, and so, banks are generally not 
permitted to declare bankruptcy by the government.  As a result, public bailouts are 
the primary method of rehabilitating an illiquid or an insolvent bank, which does little 
to deter other banks from engaging in risky or irresponsible lending.  The credibility 
of the governments threat to intervene will thus be nullified if the conditions of 
regulatory scenario (2) are not fulfilled, and without the credible threat of 
intervention, bank managers will always prefer to behave in a manner that is 
consistent with regulatory scenario (1).   
As indicated by Table 3.1, only a countrys prime minister or president can 
direct the post-crisis resolution process.  Only the prime minister or president has the 
prestige and political authority necessary to force bank managers and corporate 
executives to bear the costs of bankruptcy and financial rehabilitation.   Furthermore, 
since there is no clear pre-crisis framework for allocating bankruptcy costs in the 
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post-crisis environment, the executive branch of government must use its 
constitutionally granted extraordinary powers in order to articulate a new set of 
institutions which are specifically designed for the purpose of distributing bankruptcy 
costs equitably.  New institutions may include the establishment of bankruptcy courts 
and legal provisions that would permit minority shareholders and investors to bring 
suit against delinquent financial institutions.  Given the legal ambiguity and political 
uncertainty that are involved whenever new institutions are developed, the final 
distribution of bankruptcy costs will inevitably be constrained by the political 
conflicts that arise during the post-crisis settlement process. 
 
D.  Executive Control Rights and Legal Accountability 
 
The credibility of a central banks threat to intervene into the affairs of a 
mismanaged bank is also dependent upon the governments ability to re-distribute the 
rights of executive control, which is the final component of the central banks 
decision-making authority.   Executive control rights are represented in the model by 
the bank managers revenue share, which is re-distributed to the banks minority 
shareholders (in the post-crisis context) should the bank manager be found guilty of 
violating the governments regulatory statutes.  Thus, once intervention has occurred, 
the financial rehabilitation process may introduce new shareholders, who would then 
exercise their newly acquired rights on the banks governing board.    
The re-distribution of executive control rights occurs in regulatory scenarios 
(2) and (5), which are summarized in Table 3.2.  Control rights are issued in the pre-
crisis context by a countrys ministry of finance, which along with the central bank 
makes licensing decisions that control entry into the banking system.   The ministry 
of finance also sets restrictions upon the percentage of a banks equity that can be 
  
 
  
 
74
held by a single shareholder.  However, in the post-crisis environment, the executive 
branch must once again use its extraordinary powers in order to terminate the 
executive position of any delinquent managers.  Furthermore, in an autocracy, only 
the executive branch has the power to permit foreign investors access to the banking 
sector, and in case of a democracy, the executive branch normally must encourage the 
legislature to pass new financial legislation that would enable a re-distribution of the 
executive control rights within the banking system.  
Because few developing economies have clearly established laws that would 
permit the easy re-distribution of executive control rights, the executive branch of 
government will often engage in a period of institutional innovation during the post-
crisis resolution process, in order to create a legal and political framework that 
facilitates the smooth re-allocation of bank ownership to new shareholders.  Given the 
highly charged and politically contentious nature of post-crisis rehabilitation 
however, any attempt to re-distribute bank ownership rights or to revoke a banks 
license will usually be met with stiff resistance.  The political conflicts that are 
inherent to credit expansion and financial regulation are not limited to the closed 
economy, and in fact, the distributional problems that plague the government in the 
closed economy will only be exacerbated by the challenges posed by the open 
economy. 
 
3.3  Financial Authority in the Open Economy 
 
Once a country opens its banking system to international capital flows, the 
regulatory authorities that supervise the financial sector must face a new set of 
difficulties.  In terms of the theory of financial authority, the trade-off between 
monetary policy and banking regulation is extended to the financial environment of 
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the open economy as a trade-off between a governments exchange rate commitment 
and a governments regulatory obligations.   
Although a full treatment of the relationship between financial regulation and 
exchange rate management is beyond the scope of this chapter, there seems to be a 
high correlation between the incidence of banking crisis in the developing economies 
and the combination of an open capital account and a fixed exchange rate.  The 
distributional conflicts that were explored in the preceding sections can thus be 
analyzed in the special case of an open economy with a fixed exchange rate regime, 
which is depicted in Table 3.3 below.  
 
 
Table 3.3   An Open Capital Account with a Fixed Exchange Rate System 
 
 
               Asset Quality of Banking System  
 
 Asset (a0) Asset (a1) 
 
 x00 > 0 x10 = 0 
  
   Regulatory Failure   Regulatory Discipline (w/Deficit) 
k0  Political Incentive   Politically Neutral 
   Asset Market Inflation  Monetary Stability 
 Over-valued Exchange rate Stable Exchange rate 
  Decline of FX Reserves Constant FX Reserves 
        
 Bank 
Capitalization 
 
 
 x01 = 0 x11 < 0 
 
 Regulatory Discipline Regulatory Prejudice 
 k1 Politically Neutral Political Disincentive 
  Monetary Stability Asset Market Deflation 
 Stable Exchange rate Under-valued Exchange rate 
 Constant FX Reserves Accumulation of FX reserves 
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The economic and political implications of the open economy can be divided 
into four quadrants.  The upper left hand quadrant represents the case of unqualified 
forbearance in the context of the open economy.  Because the exchange rate is fixed, 
domestic constituents can access international credit markets without worrying about 
exchange rate risk, which makes everyone happy including the government, which 
presides over a booming economy.  The inflow of international credit would then 
enrich the ruling partys political allies, who gain access to cheap credit, as well as 
the consumer, who benefits from overall improvement in economic growth.  Hence, a 
fixed exchange rate can magnify the dilemma between a central banks monetary 
commitments and the requirements of prudential financial regulation.   
The long-term economic consequences of capital inflows are more problematic 
however.  As Table 3.3 indicates, unwarranted forbearance in the context of an open 
economy causes an expansion of the domestic money supply, (x00 > 0), which leads 
to asset price inflation.  Furthermore, in accordance with the Mundell-Fleming model 
of the open economy, the combination of monetary expansion and a fixed exchange 
rate will cause an over-valuation of the exchange rate.  In response, the central bank 
will be forced to absorb the excess liquidity by purchasing the domestic currency with 
the central banks foreign exchange reserves, which depletes those reserves 
proportionately.  Consequently, although the government may gain short run political 
benefits from practicing forbearance, the uncontrolled expansion of the credit supply 
will eventually undermine both the exchange rate regime as well as the overall 
stability of the banking system.45   
                                                
45 For a full technical discussion of the application of Mundell-Fleming to the developing economies, 
see: Jha, Raghbendra., Macroeconomics for Developing Countries, (New York: Routledge Press, 
1994), Chapters 6  9.  For a discussion of the effects of uncontrolled credit expansion upon the 
maintenance of a fixed exchange rate, see: Paul Krugman, A Model of Balance of Payments Crises, 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 11 (August, 1979), 311-25 
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The relationship between the banking sector and the central bank can also 
become predatory, whereby the government permits capital owners to hold the central 
bank hostage.  Regulatory capture would then allow capital owners to use the central 
banks foreign exchange reserves as a form of institutional collateral, in order to 
leverage their access to international credit.  The distributive consequences of such 
predatory behavior follow from the simple fact that foreign exchange reserves 
represent the savings of the taxpayers.  Hence, the use of foreign exchange reserves as 
a form of political guarantee allows domestic capital owners to extract a rent from 
their enhanced access to international capital markets; a condition which was made 
possible only by their strategic hold upon the central banks foreign exchange 
reserves.  Furthermore, if multinational lenders declare the equivalent of foreclosure 
upon a countrys banking system, then public savings (i.e. foreign exchange reserves) 
will be used to bail out domestic banks, thereby magnifying the distributional 
distortions caused by an open capital account. 
By contrast, the upper left quadrant of Table 3.3 represents the case wherein 
banks are sufficiently capitalized, which leads to economic and political outcomes 
that differ significantly from the case of unwarranted forbearance.  When the banking 
sector holds high quality assets and is sufficiently capitalized, the rate of credit 
expansion is constant (x10 = 0), which also leads to stable asset prices and has no 
negative effects for the management of the fixed exchange rate.  Similarly, monetary 
stability would result if the banking sector holds poor quality assets but is well 
capitalized, (x01 = 0).  In fact, the only substantive difference between the case of (x10 
= 0), and the case of (x01 = 0), is that in the latter case, the government is forced to 
bear the costs of the banking systems balance sheet deficits, (a0 + k0) ≤ 0, which was 
a consequences of regulatory scenario (2).  Politically however, monetary stability 
may not be popular among the governments domestic constituents, who would prefer 
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a credit boom and all of the benefits that would ensue.  Domestic constituents may 
then lobby the government to permit the banking sector to reduce its level of 
capitalization (x00 > 0), which would lead to the consequences depicted in the upper 
right hand quadrant. 
The final permutation of the open economy framework is depicted in the lower 
right hand quadrant of Table 3.3.  In an open economy with a fixed exchange rate, if 
the government decelerates the rate of credit expansion, (x11 < 0), then the 
consequences would be deflationary for the asset market, and furthermore, the 
nominal exchange rate would become under-valued.  In response, the central bank 
would have to accumulate foreign exchange reserves (i.e. sell the domestic currency) 
and thereby expand the domestic money supply in order to reverse the movement of 
the exchange rate.  Politically, the deflationary effects would make the governments 
policy extremely unpopular domestically, and so enormous political pressures would 
be brought to bear in order to re-expand the credit supply.  Such economic and 
political dynamics are typical of countries that are involved in I.M.F. stabilization 
programs.46  In particular, countries that initiate stabilization policies, in which the 
exchange rate is used as a nominal anchor, are vulnerable to the economic and 
political pressures described in the deceleration scenario.  Finally, countries that have 
experienced a banking crisis would also fall into the deceleration category, and must 
unfortunately face both the demands of the I.M.F. as well as the political pressures 
anticipated by the open economy extension of the model. 
 The theory of financial authority has generated a set of specific expectations 
regarding the empirical relationship between monetary policy and banking regulation.  
In a closed economy, expanding the credit supply in order to selectively benefit a 
                                                
46 Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman, The Politics of Stabilization and Structural Adjustment, 
In Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, edited by Jeffrey D. Sachs, (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press); Henry S. Bienen and Mark Gersovitz, Economic Stabilization, Conditionality, and 
Political Stability, International Organization, 39, 4, (Autumn, 1995), 729-54 
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governments political constituents will undermine the solvency of the banking 
system.  At a micro-level, in a poorly regulated credit market, bank managers can 
benefit privately by engaging in self-loans or related party loans, but minority 
shareholders will suffer as a result of the bank managers predatory lending policy.  
Furthermore, if regulators tolerate poorly managed banks in order to accelerate the 
domestic credit supply, then taxpayers must be willing to bear the costs of 
bankruptcy.  Hence, an acceleration of the rate of credit expansion generates private 
benefits for bank managers and for the governments political constituents, but forces 
the public treasury and the banks minority shareholders to bear the costs of the 
governments credit policy.   
By contrast, if the government adopts a policy of credit deceleration, the 
banking sector must maintain a level of capitalization that is so high as to be 
suboptimal, in that overcapitalization slows the rate of credit expansion, the costs of 
which must be borne by the governments political constituents.  Furthermore, in the 
case of credit deceleration, the banks minority shareholders benefit from the higher 
level of capitalization imposed by the credit limitations, but the bank manager makes 
only moderate income compared to the credit acceleration scenario. 
 Alternatively, if the government adopts policies that maintain a constant rate 
of credit expansion, the associated regulatory action would reduce private benefits for 
bank managers and eliminates any preferential credit that is received by the 
governments constituents.  However, preserving a steady state of credit expansion 
guarantees the solvency of the banking system and protects the rights of minority 
shareholders.  Regulators can maintain a stable credit policy either by inducing bank 
managers to self-select the appropriate level of capitalization, or by intervening in the 
affairs of bank managers who fail to abide by the central banks prescribed 
capitalization levels.  In the case of intervention, the public regulator must allocate 
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the costs and benefits of prompt corrective action.  When the regulator intervenes in 
the case of credit acceleration, the rate of credit expansion stabilizes, but the 
governments constituents loose their access to selective credit allocation and the 
bank manager loses their revenue, which is redistributed to the banks minority 
shareholders.  By contrast, if the central bank intervenes in the case of credit 
deceleration, the rate of credit expansion returns to the steady state, but the bank 
manager would lose their income and the minority shareholders would receive a 
lower return on their investment. 
 Once a country opens its credit market to international capital flows, the 
distributional conflict observed in the closed economy case is extended to the 
dilemmas imposed by the open economy.  In particular, the public regulator will now 
face a trade-off between preserving the solvency of the banking system, with all of 
the distributional implications observed in the case of the closed economy, and 
modulating the rate of credit expansion, which has its own inevitable distributional 
consequences.  In the worst case, the attempts to simultaneously protect a fixed 
exchange rate and practice regulatory forbearance towards a deteriorating banking 
system will undermine both the exchange rate regime and the ultimate health of the 
banking system. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Over the past half century, Thailand has experienced a series of boom-bust 
cycles, wherein periods of accelerated economic growth are followed by extended 
periods of financial crisis.  As illustrated in Figure 4.1, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Thailand experienced a period of economic expansion that was followed by a system-
wide financial crisis in the 1980s.  In the 1990s, Thailand once again experienced a 
period of economic boom, only to face an even more severe crisis in 1997.   
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Figure 4.1: Real GDP Growth Rates, 1965-99
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The prevailing explanations for the clearly observable cyclical pattern can be 
grouped into two categories.  Arguments in the first category explain domestic 
economic outcomes in terms of geo-strategic events, including the occurrence of 
regional wars and international price or credit shocks, and arguments of the second 
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category are institutional, and revolve around capture of the central bank by local 
capitalists, which allegedly contributed to the occurrence of the Asian financial crisis.  
To these dominant approaches, I have added the theory of distributional conflict, 
which hypothesizes that conflict over control of the banking sector is significant for 
explaining the cyclical patterns of Thailands economic history.   
The competing explanations for the cyclical pattern of Thailands 
development are detailed in Table 4.1.  As illustrated in Table 4.1, Thailands 
dynamic geo-strategic position has always informed the formulation of its domestic 
economic policies.  The financial sector was created in the early 20th century in large 
part in order to strengthen Thailands position relative to its regional competitors and 
relative to the dominant European banks.  Geo-strategic realities intruded once again 
during WWII, when the Japanese seized Thailand.  The Japanese imposed their 
control upon Thailands monetary system by tying the Thai currency to the yen-gold 
standard, and it was further under Japanese auspices that the Bank of Thailand was 
founded in 1942.   
The national security imperative was resurrected as Thailands development 
strategy between 1957 and 1973, during which Thailand was governed by three 
distinct military regimes.  The primary strategic goal of the military regimes was to 
strengthen Thailands alliance with the United States, and this required that the 
regime crushing any domestic political resistance to their pro-American policies.  
While socially repressive, Thailands geo-strategic alliance with the United States had 
an important financial dimension that took the form of American aid and investment 
in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as Americas assistance in the development of a 
modern system of financial regulation.  
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Exogenous geo-strategic shocks have also precipitated economic instability.  
When the Vietnam War ended for instance, the exit of American forces in 1973 
precipitated a wave of capital flight that forced the devaluation of the Thai baht.  
Furthermore, Thailand endured a second set of crises following the oil shocks of 1973 
and 1979.  The oil shocks not only caused the fiscal and trade deficits of the late 
1970s but undoubtedly contributed to the bank failures of the mid-1980s.  .   
Electoral and regulatory reforms of the 1980s and 1990s also had an effect 
upon the growth and stability of Thailands banking system.  Most importantly, the 
financial and political liberalization that occurred in the 1980s played an obvious role 
in explaining the rise of the business oligarchy that still dominates Thailands 
political system.  Theories of institutional reform and interest group formation have 
also been used to explain central bank failure in the 1990s, during which the central 
bank lost control of domestic financial markets.  These arguments presume that it was 
the regulatory capture of the Bank of Thailand by business-dominated political parties 
caused the financial turmoil of 1997.  
While both geo-strategic and institution based arguments identify possible 
causes of banking crisis, they also suffer from obvious deficiencies.  Theories based 
upon external events presume that the government has little control over its own 
economy, and sociological theories do not specify any precise mechanism for 
explaining how interest groups cause a financial crisis.  In order to redress these 
theoretical shortcomings, another strand of institutionalism focuses upon the agency 
problem between the Prime Ministers office and the central bank.  In this case, the 
prime minister may desire banking stability, but he may be unable to control the 
central bank governor, who could conceal information about the health of the banking 
sector from the countrys political leadership.   
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As mentioned in chapter one, this argument presumes that the prime minister 
is naïve and often innocent of wrongdoing and that the central bank has complete 
control over the banking sector.  Because this argument conceives of the central bank 
as a dictator over the banking sector, this point of view is unable to conceive of a 
possibility that bank managers can contradict the regulatory policies announced by 
the central bank.  In other words, institutionalism overlooks the relationship between 
financial regulators and bank managers, which lies at the heart of the financial 
system.   
Without insuring that banks will actually adopt the announced regulatory 
policy however, there is no way to insure the long-term credibility of prudential 
regulatory standards.  Furthermore, it is a fact that the reforms that followed t he 1997 
crisis contained no amendments to the relationship between the prime ministers 
office and the central bank, which would be expected had the pre-crisis relationship 
between the political leadership and the central bank been somehow fundamentally 
flawed.     
As an alternative approach, I have proposed that financial regulation should be 
understood as a contractual negotiation between the central bank and bank managers, 
over the social distribution of the costs and benefits of regulatory actions.  This model 
is based upon the intuition that exogenous shifts in regulatory policy have distinct and 
measurable monetary and fiscal consequences.  Because of the distributional 
consequences of financial regulation, I have hypothesized that regulatory actions 
create incentives for conflict to emerge between bank managers, shareholders and 
taxpayers.  According to this view, the cyclical pattern of Thai economic 
development can be explained by the often violent and politically calamitous struggle 
over the control of regulatory policies.  Finally, I discuss the possibility that conflict 
over regulatory policy may be endemic to the financial system, and so there may be 
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no optimal institutional configuration that can insure the stability of regulatory 
outcomes over time. 
Empirically, even the cursory evidence presented in Table 4.1 supports the 
view that each phase of Thailands economic history corresponds to a distinct 
distributional configuration, that often included the military and the Crown, that 
regulated the banking system and controlled access to the credit market.  Finally, the 
distributional approach suggests that financial stability is possible only if regulatory 
actions distribute the costs and benefits generated by the banking sector equitably 
among the members of society.  While no institutional arrangement can guarantee the 
equitable allocation of costs and benefits, dictatorial systems are no worse than 
democratic systems in this regard. 
 
4.2 Credit Cycles and Social Conflict 
 
My primary hypothesis is that the cycles of Thailands financial history are the 
result of often-violent and politically calamitous conflict over control of the banking 
system.  Accordingly, and as depicted in Table 4.2, I propose that we explain 
regulatory outcomes as the result of a negotiation -between the central bank and bank 
managers over the social distribution of the monetary and fiscal externalities 
generated by the banking system.  We should then be able to resolve Thailands 
economic history into distinct regulatory phases, depicted above in Table 4.2.  
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Accordingly, I have applied the hypothetical scenarios describe in Table 4.2 to 
a narrative description of Thailands financial history.  Between 1932 and 1973, 
Thailand was governed by succession of regimes, dominated by the monarchy, the 
military, and ambitious bureaucrats.  At the heart of the conflict for power, was 
Thailands nascent financial system.  While the monarchy and Chinese merchants 
provided the seed-capital for Thailands largest commercial banks, it was the 
nationalist revolutionaries and the military officers who held ultimate authority over 
the banking sector.  
Regulatory Prejudice:  Between 1932 and 1973, the banking system was a 
source of contention between the monarchy, the military and Chinese merchants 
because it provided rents to whoever controlled the allocation of credit.  Rents were 
created by financial repression, which meant that deposit rates were kept artificially 
low, and loan rates were higher than rates available in the advanced financial markets.  
Financial repression thereby imposed artificial limits upon commercial bank lending, 
and created rents that were distributed between the Chinese merchant class, the 
monarchy, and the military.   
Thailands security alliance with U.S. also enhanced its role as regional 
financial center.  American financial assistance heavily subsidized Thailands military 
budget, which reduced pressure upon Thai banks to provide credit to the various 
branches of the Thai military.  Within this capital friendly environment, the Sino-Thai 
families who owned the banking system were able to negotiate relatively conservative 
lending policies, and as a result Thailand experienced relatively few bankruptcies.  
The regulatory consensus negotiated between the Chinese merchant families, the 
military and the bureaucracy was enforced through a variety of institutional 
mechanisms, including the central bank, the finance ministry, the Budget Bureau, and 
other government agencies that maintained tight controls upon the banking sector.  
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Consequently, while the military regimes that governed Thailand from 1945 to 1973 
repressed the financial sector artificially, they also provided commercial banks with an 
environment that permitted them to extend their influence to every sector of the Thai 
economy.  Thus, while the era of financial repression created an opportunity for 
corruption and rent seeking by the bureaucracy and the military, the extension of 
commercial banks to all economic sectors provided the basis for the economic boom 
of the 1960s and early 1970s.   
Regulatory Failure:  Between the late 1970s and late 1990s, Thailand 
experienced boom-bust cycles, wherein periods of inflation were followed by periods 
of financial devastation.  For instance, during the late 1970s, Thailand was still 
governed by a military regime that preferred financial stability to high rates of 
financial growth.  Consequently, although Thailand maintained a fixed exchange rate 
regime, the government limited foreign capital flows to foreign direct investment, and 
foreign bank lending was largely restricted to the government-sponsored agricultural 
sector and export oriented manufacturing industries.   
 The late 1980s witnessed a period of political and financial liberalization that 
opened Thailands political system to full fledged involvement of private businesses 
and opened Thailands financial system to foreign participation.  Foreign banks were 
attracted to Thailands high growth rates as well as the stability of the exchange value 
of Thai assets on international markets, and the stability of asset values was in turn 
dependent upon the fixed exchange rate regime.   
The link between credit inflows and the stable currency meant that the exchange rate 
functioned as a distributive mechanism, permitting foreign bankers to diversify their 
asset portfolios by lending to a market they believed would remain stable.  
Furthermore, the relationship with foreign banks allowed Thai commercial banks to 
leverage and expand their position in the domestic economy.   As a result, when 
foreign banks became heavily exposed to the Thai economy, both the Thai business 
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community and the central bank became convinced that the sudden exit of foreign 
banks from Thailand would collapse the entire economy.  Thus, when the credit-
induced economic boom began in the early 1990s, there was nothing the central bank 
could do but re-double its efforts to protect the exchange rate.   
During both the 1970s and the 1990s, the central bank and bureaucracy 
tolerated high levels of financial growth and questionable lending practices, which 
inevitably caused the bankruptcy of several banks and financial institutions.  The 
central bank effectively traded off short-term credit-driven economic expansion for 
long-term debt that resulted from the failure of several firms and financial institutions.  
Despite several rounds of financial sector reforms and the strengthening of the 
regulatory system, the 1990s witnessed an even more dramatic period of credit-driven 
growth that benefited bank managers and majority shareholders, but created fiscal and 
financial burdens that were ultimately born by taxpayers and the public, in the form of 
expanding fiscal deficits, higher interest rates on commercial bank loans, and a 
deterioration in public services for the general population. 
Regulatory Discipline:  Regulatory intervention followed the financial crises of 
the mid-1980s and late 1990s.  The crisis of the mid-1980s caused the collapse of 
several financial companies and forced regulatory authorities to temporarily suspend 
operations within two major commercial banks.  Although the post-crisis reform 
process in the 1980s empowered the central bank to replace delinquent managers, but 
few punitive measures were imposed upon poorly managed financial institutions.  
Instead the government initiated a massive bailout program that helped bank re-
capitalize and thereby temporarily supported minority shareholders.   
The governments rehabilitation program may have benefited bank managers, but it 
did little to protect depositors or the t taxpayers, who were forced to tolerate 
heightened fiscal deficits that lasted well into the early 1990s.  This pattern of bailout 
for bank managers paid for by higher fiscal deficits and higher interest rates was 
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repeated in the late 1990s following the even more devastating financial crisis of 1997.  
In fact, throughout the 1990s, the government provided support for troubled financial 
institutions without replacing or penalizing the bank managers who oversaw the period 
of indiscriminate lending.  Following the crisis, the pattern of taxpayer sponsored 
bailouts continued and only a few of the bank managers and CEOs involved in 
criminal activity were actually brought to justice.  
 
4.3:  Social Conflict and the Bank of Thailand 
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, Thailand was one of the few countries in 
South East Asia that avoided occupation by a European empire.  Because European 
banks still dominated global finance, political independence could only be guaranteed 
by a preservation of monetary autonomy, and it was for this reason that Thailands 
first banks were founded.  The period between 1932 and 1973, provides a great deal of 
evidence for the importance of geopolitical events and distributional politics for the 
development of Thailands financial system, but provides little evidence for the 
importance of bureaucratic independence for maintaining the stability of the financial 
system.   
Due to the instability of domestic and regional politics, Thai banks have had to 
adapt to periods of monarchic absolutism (1904-32), nationalist paternalism (1932-
40), Japanese imperial occupation, (1940-45), as well as a series of military 
dictatorships (1947-73).  During each of these eras, political necessity determined the 
size and functions of the financial system, and institutional developments, such as the 
establishment of the Bank of Thailand in 1942, were a function of the balance of 
political power between the monarchy, the military and outside forces, rather than 
economic rationality or the requirements of institutional autonomy.  For instance, 
Thailands first banks were founded during the era of monarchic absolutism, between 
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1904 and 1932, when there was little banking regulation beyond the controls imposed 
by the financial advisors of King Rama IV.  The lax controls on royal spending 
benefited members of the royal family and the military, but also generated enormous 
public deficits. 
The fiscal and financial profligacy of the monarchy brought Thailand to the 
brink of bankruptcy and fuelled discontent amongst nationalist reformers and 
dissatisfied members of the military.  Within this uncertain environment, a revolution 
was staged in 1932 that brought left-leaning bureaucrats to power.  The reign of the 
technocrats proved to be short-lived and in 1938, a military putsch brought the first of 
many army cliques to power.  Military spending rose to one third of the national 
budget, and Thailand launched an expansionist military policy in the northeast in an 
attempt to bring parts of Cambodia and Laos under Thai control. 
The end of world war two brought a series of increasingly pro-American 
military governments to power.  And it was during the era of pro-American military 
governments between 1947 and 1973, that the majority of Thailands modern 
commercial banks were founded.  Thus, while Siam Commercial Bank was founded in 
1904, the Bank of Asia would not be founded until 1945, and what were to become 
Thailands largest banks, Bangkok Bank, Bangkok Metropolitan Bank, and the Union 
Bank of Bangkok would not be established until the 1950s.   
The nationalists, who governed Thailand between 1932 and 1938 and again 
between 1945 and 1947, also established many bureaucratic channels that enabled 
them to strictly control the lending practices of domestic commercial banks.  These 
institutions included the National Banking Bureau (founded in 1939), which under 
Japanese auspices was transformed into the Bank of Thailand in 1942.47  The 
                                                
47 Richard Doner and Ansil Ramsay, Competitive Clientelism and Economic Governance: The Case of 
Thailand, in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds. Business and State in Developing Countries, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 260; Phongpaichit and Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 
121 
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Nationalist Partys control of the banking system depended less upon formal 
bureaucratic channels than upon direct government representation on the executive 
boards of Thailands largest banks, as well as the largest public and private firms.  
Thus, twenty-seven members of the governing Peoples Party appeared regularly upon 
the executive registries of twenty-seven of Thailands largest state-owned firms, as 
well as on the board of directors of several of Thailands largest private Chinese 
owned firms. 48   
The restrained credit policies followed by the government during the 1950s 
and 1960s stand in direct contradiction to the notion that the lack of bureaucratic 
independence necessarily leads to expansive and inflationary credit policies.  Thus, 
contrary to the bureaucratic independence model, the Bank of Thailand and state 
bureaucracy was of only secondary importance to the initial phase of Thailands 
financial development.   
Between 1947 and 1973, Thailand was governed by a series of U.S. supported 
military regimes, led by the Rachakhru faction (1947-57), General Sarit (1957-63), 
and General Thanom (1963-73).  Although Thailand had declared war against the 
United States during WWII, the Americans quickly forgave any wartime infractions 
and built a long-term strategic relationship with Thailand.  Americas strategic 
partnership with Thailand grew out of both governments concerns over the 
communist victory in Mainland China (1949), the Malayan communist insurgency 
(1950), the beginning of Korean War (1950) and French losses in Vietnam (1954).  
Furthermore, by January 1950, Ho Chi Minh had seized power in Hanoi with the 
support of both Moscow and Beijing.  In response to these communist victories, 
American strategists articulated the domino theory, which justified American 
intervention in the South East Asia.  As a consequence, in 1952, Dwight Eisenhower 
announced his intent to increase the flow of resourced to anti communist governments 
                                                
48 Phongpaichit and Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 121-122 
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in South East Asia, and Thailand quickly became a chief beneficiary of American 
financial and military support.49    
Thailands alliance with the U.S. was reflected in Thailands conservative 
economic policies, but this was only possible because of a formation of a distributive 
coalition between Thailands capitalists and the military.  Thus, while geo-strategic 
factors and domestic distributional considerations played an obvious role in how the 
domestic financial system was governed, there is little evidence that bureaucratic 
independence was even an issue for either the Americans or the Thai military.   
Many have praised this period as an era of conservative economic policies 
during which the banking system remained under the stringent controls imposed by a 
largely autonomous central bank.50  However, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, this 
perspective overlooks the fact that it was during this era of bureaucratic autonomy 
that bank ownership became even more concentrated in the hands of a few Chinese 
families, and that it was also during this period of time when the Thai business sector 
became intimately connected to the leadership of the Thai military.51   
Thus, despite the neo-liberal pretensions of the Thai government during this period, 
the banking system increasingly came under control of a small number of Chinese 
                                                
49 Between 1965 and 1968, the police force increased from 51,000 to 80,000 men.  According to one 
estimate, half of all US economic aid between 1965-69 was channeled to the police force.  (pg. 277).  
Air force was modernized.  From 1951 to 1972, total US military assistance reached 1.15 
billion(average of $52 million) or 54 percent of the total defense budget.  Thai defense budget went 
from $20 million in the early 1950s to $250 million pery year in the early 1970s.  Over two decades, the 
total military budget increased seventeen times.  (pg. 277).  Between 1976 and 1982, the Thai defense 
budget expanded from $484 million to $1.5 billion and reached $2.7 billion by 1990. (pg. 331). 
50 The civilian bureaucracy grew from 75,000 in 1944 to 250,000 in 1965.    The number of government 
departments increased from 49 in 1941 to 113 in 1969, and the number of divisions from 317 to 827. 
(pg. 288) 
51 Between 1964 and 1968, the Sophonpanich family nearly doubled its ownership shares of Bangkok 
Bank from 17 percent to 32 percent.  Similarly, between 1945 and 1970, the Lamsam family increased 
its ownership shares of Thai Farmers Bank from 22 percent to 58 percent; between 1964 and 1972, the 
Ratanarak group increased their shares of Bank of Ayudhya from 26 percent to 43 percent; and finally, 
between 1950 and 1979, the Tejapaibul family increased its control of Bangkok Metropolitan bank from 
11 percent to 44 percent.  (Muscat, 115)  The banking families control over the banking sector was 
further consolidated in 1962, when the Ministry of Finance declared a moratorium on the issuance of 
any further banking licenses, which permitted Thailands four largest private commercial banks 
(Bangkok Bank, Thai Farmers Bank, Bank Ayudhya, and Bangkok Metropolitan Bank) to increase their 
share of total deposits from 33 percent in 1962 to 49 percent of total deposits in 1979. (Muscat, pg. 116) 
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families, who as a result of their close contacts with the Thai military, were allowed to 
create vast industrial conglomerate networks that were centered on the banking 
industry.   
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The bank-dominated corporate governance model that prevails in Thailand 
presumes close monitoring of the banking industry by regulatory officials and requires 
that the government exercise a high degree of public authority over the governing 
boards of the major banks.  The first source of the governments authority over the 
banking sector is statutory.  Beginning with the Bank of Thailand Act of 1942, the 
Thai government promulgated a set of laws that defined both the formal purview of 
government officials as well as the rights of bank shareholders and managers.52   
 
 
                                                
52 The statutory powers of the Bank of Thailand are augmented by the informal powers of co-option and 
moral suasion.  By exerting informal pressure, the Bank of Thailand can shape the incentives facing the 
governing boards of commercial banks without taking official action.   
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4.3 The Bank of Thailand and Crisis Management 
 
Between 1979 and 1986, Thailand experienced a set of financial problems that 
in many ways anticipated the 1997 crisis.  Thailands difficulties began with the oil 
shock of 1979.  The oil shortage led to a deterioration of the trade balance and 
accumulation of foreign debt, and Thailand entered a period of economic stabilization 
and adjustment programs under the supervision of the IMF.  The expanded demands 
of the semi-democratic governments also brought pressures to bear upon the central 
bank.  Under semi-democracy, central bank officials could not adjust to the oil shocks 
of the 1970s by de-linking the baht from the dollar.  The Bank of Thailand was also 
required to provide preferential credits to government related industries.53   
The combination of government credit activism and price controls yielded interest 
rates that were significantly negative or near zero between 1973 and 1978 although the 
credit supply expanded at 20 percent a year.  Due to the commercial codes limits on 
nominal rates, the central bank had little ability to increase lending rates, which raised 
the prospect of capital outflows and lower rates of domestic savings.  The absence of 
regulatory constraints upon the rapid growth of finance companies also led to 
unchecked stock manipulations, insider trading, and illicit loans.  At the center of the 
financial problems was the Raja Finance Company, which offered credits to its 
affiliates in order to manipulate the stock price of finance companies.  The failure of 
Raja Finance triggered the collapse of the Securities and Exchange of Thailand in 
1978 and the failure of a major finance company the following year.54   
The financial crisis of 1979 helped undermine the democratic government to 
the extent that the military was able to re-assert its political dominance.  The Prem 
government (1980-1988) remained in power by managing the differences between the 
                                                
 53 Doner and Unger, The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries, 111 
54 Doner and Unger The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries., 111-113; Pakorn 
Vichyanond, Financial Reforms in Thailand (Bangkok: TDRI, 2000), 7 
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military and the political parties.  Prem further weakened the influence of the political 
parties upon economic policy by reducing the supply of preferential credit and 
strengthened the power of government bureaucrats over domestic banks.  Prem 
distributed economic posts in the cabinet according to technocratic expertise and 
eschewed filling top bureaucratic positions with members of parliament.   
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The economic recession was succeeded by a more severe financial crisis 
starting in October 1983.  The crisis was triggered by large losses of a financial 
company and its affiliates.  The financial crisis in 1983-86 affected one-third of all 
financial institutions, which accounted for one-fourth of all financial assets.  The crisis 
was further aggravated by the ongoing recession and tight monetary policies that 
brought to the surface management flaws inherent in the banking sector as well as in 
the less well-governed finance companies.  Anticipating the 1997 crisis in many ways, 
the financial crisis was accompanied by a deterioration of the external account and 
resulted in the devaluation of the baht by 14.8 percent in November 1984.  The 
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underlying causes of the 1983 financial crisis were weak management policies, 
notably the extension of credit and guarantees to businesses with which the bank 
directors and shareholders were involved, and an over-concentration of lending to a 
few large scale and inter-related industries.55   
The financial crisis of 1983-86 caused the failure of 15 finance companies and 
forced the government to inject liquidity into 32 other companies through the 
lifeboat plan that was announced in April 1984.  The lifeboat plan was administered 
by the newly established Fund for the Rehabilitation and Development of Financial 
Institutions, which received interest free contributions from the five largest banks as 
well as from all other major financial institutions.  As a result of the crisis, three 
commercials banks faced financial difficulties for which they were later investigated 
and up to 20 finance companies had their license revoked.56   
As illustrated in Figure 4.4 below, and as predicted by the model presented in 
chapter two, these failures deepened Thailands fiscal deficit, which became more 
pronounced as the result of public bailouts.  In the aftermath of the 1983 crisis the 
central bank led the effort to impose new regulations regarding cash reserves as well 
as stricter requirements for branch expansions and minimum contributions to the 
government sponsored rehabilitation funds.  In 1985, the Commercial Banking Act 
was once again amended to empower central bank officials to enforce compliance 
with regulations through direct intervention, to order an increase in bank capital, and 
to remove bank directors and officers when deemed necessary in the public interest.57   
                                                
55 Robinson, David, et al.  Thailand: Adjusting to Success, Current Policy Issues (Washington: IMF, 1991), 
22 
56 Laurids S. Laurisden, Thailand: Causes, Conduct, Consequences, In: Jomo K.S., editor: Tigers in 
Trouble: Financial Governane, Liberalization and Crisis in East Asia (London: Zed Books, 1998), 141; 
Vichyanond, Financial Reforms in Thailand: Structure and Liberalization, (Bangkok, TDRI, 1994), 7.   
In 1984, Asia Trust Bank faced the specter of rising NPLs because the bank had overextended credit to 
affiliated firms.  In 1986, First Bangkok City Bank sustained losses from the foreign currency market, 
and in 1987 Siam City Bank was investigated for imprudent loans to provincial areas.  Finance 
companies that had their licenses revoked included Raja Finance (1978), Thanakit Credit Fonciers 
(1982), and Patana Finance Company (1983). 
57 Doner and Unger, The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries, 116 
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The Bank of Thailand Act was also amended and new legislation was passed in 
order to give government officials new tools with which to manage troubled financial 
companies.58  The 1985 legislation granted the Bank of Thailand the authority to 
conduct on-site examinations and permitted the central bank to remove incompetent 
bank officers as well as to restrict any transactions between troubled institutions and 
their directors.  The amendments also allowed the central bank to bring suit against the 
shareholders of financial institutions, a measure that targeted irresponsible board 
members for the first time.59   
It is often claimed that the Bank of Thailand reached its highest position 
relative to the other branches of government during the Prem era, and so the period 
between 1980 and 1988 is appropriately referred to as the golden age of bureaucratic 
                                                
58 Other legislation includes: The Act on the Undertaking of Finance Business, and the Securities 
Business and Credit Foncier Business Act.   
59 Pakorn Vichyanond, Thailands Financial System, 32; and, Doner and Unger, The Politics of Finance in 
Developing Countries, 116. 
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autonomy and prestige.60  However, in fact, the center of macroeconomic decision-
making gravitated between the Bank of Thailand and the Ministry of Finance; as well 
as the NESDB, the Budget Bureau, and the Fiscal Policy Office.  And so, even during 
the so-called golden age, the Bank of Thailand was only one many bureaucratic 
instruments for controlling the banking sector.  The military still figured prominently 
in bank management, both because of the existence of the Thai Military Bank and 
because several officers retained their positions on the governing boards of many 
commercial banks.  Thus, the demarcation between the 1980s, when the Bank of 
Thailand is thought to have enjoyed the highest degree of bureaucratic independence, 
and the era of the 1990s, when the central bank was supposedly captured by the 
banking sector is largely a fiction, since the central bank actually wielded more power 
in the 1990s, then at any other time in its bureaucratic history.   
 
4.33 Credit Cycles and Social Conflict in the Open Economy 
 
During the last two decades of the 20th century, the relationship between the 
political and financial systems in Thailand changed dramatically.  In the 1980s, 
Thailand was transformed from a bureaucratic polity to a semi-democracy 
(prachathippatai khrung bai), which evolved into a multiparty parliamentary 
democracy in the 1990s.  As Table 4.1 in the appendix demonstrates, every 
government formed after the 1978 electoral reforms has been a multiparty coalition.  
The 1978 constitution organized the Thai electorate into multi-member constituencies, 
which encouraged the formation of multiparty coalition governments within 
Parliament.  The regional distribution of the Thai electorate is also significant, in that 
80 percent of electoral districts are rural.  The dominance of the rural districts in the 
                                                
60 Allen Hicken, The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Compromise and Crisis, (Unpublished 
Paper, January 2003), 16. 
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electorate has elevated political entrepreneurs from the provinces to a leading position 
in the Thai parliament.61   
Coalition politics in Thailand is by no means a simple function of geography 
however, since rural constituencies do not always vote according to party loyalty.62  
Rural electors barter their vote with the politician or party that can most effectively 
funnel the largest portion of the national budget towards the province.  Party discipline 
is also weak, and as a result, 38 percent of MPs have switched party affiliation at least 
once between 1980 and 1997.63  As a consequence, every coalition government 
formed since 1988 has been a highly unstable alliance of provincial notables, Bangkok 
businessmen, and special interests, such as the military.   And by the 1990s, the 
penetration of Thai business networks into the political realm was so complete well 
over half of all members of the Thai parliament were somehow connected to the 
contracting, real estate, or banking industries.64 
The Chatichai government (1988-1991) can best be described as a semi-
democracy.  Although the Chatichai government was formed under military auspices, 
the new government initiated a set of political reforms that enabled the cabinet to 
wrest control of key bureaucracies away from the military.  Under Chatichai, the 
NESDB, the Budget Bureau and the Bank of Thailand came under the control of a 
multi-party coalition, and thus, many bureaucratic powers formerly held by these 
institutions were delegated away to individual ministries.  Ministerial portfolios were 
                                                
61 Anek Laothamatas, Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand: From 
Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 45; Baker and 
Phongpaichit, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 348; Philip Robertson, The Rise of the Rural Network 
Politician: Will Thailands New Elite Endure? Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 9 (September 1996), 937 
62 Suchit Bunbongkarn, Elections and Democratization, in R.H. Taylor ed. The Politics of Elections in 
Southeast Asia (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson School Center Press, 1996), 190 
63 Chengtian Kuo, New Financial Politics in Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia, Unpublished Paper 
(National Cheng Chi University, 1999), 39-41 
64 Paul Handley, More of the Same? Politics and Business, 1987-96, In Kevin Hewison, ed. Political 
Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation (New York: Routledge, 1997), 106  
The Thai Rak Thai party (led by business tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra), the Social Action party, Chuan 
Leekpais Democrats, the New Aspiration Party (with close relations with the notorious Bangkok Bank 
of Commerce), Chat Thai, and the Chat Pattana party were all well known to have intimate business and 
financial links.   
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also distributed according to the logic of coalition building and maintenance rather 
than professional qualifications. The erosion of bureaucratic autonomy accelerated 
following the civil disturbances of 1991 and the constitutional reform of 1992, when 
the military was finally compelled to relinquish any claim to government.  Following 
the 1992 reforms, the position of Minister of Finance, and by extension, the Governor 
of the Central Bank, became political appointments allocated by whichever party 
dominated the ruling coalition.65  
Simultaneous to the political reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, the economic 
bureaucracy initiated a series of financial and banking sector reforms that were meant 
to transform Thailand into a regional financial center.  Building upon interest rate 
reform that Thai authorities initiated in the late 1980s, in May 1991, Thailand accepted 
the terms of IMFs Article VIII that required lifting foreign exchange controls on 
current account transactions.66  In April 1991, Thailand moved to remove most 
restrictions upon capital account transactions as well.  During the third round of 
financial sector reforms in February 1994, Thai authorities liberalized outward direct 
investment and various forms of cross-border payments.67  The centerpiece of Thai 
financial reforms was the establishment of the Bangkok International Banking 
Facilities (BIBF) in March 1993.  The BIBF was intended to facilitate global financial 
transactions, thereby making Thailand a regional competitor to Hong Kong and 
Singapore.  
In retrospect, it is difficult to appreciate the exuberance with which Thai 
businessmen met the governments plans to open the financial sector.  Within a few 
years Thailand was awash in easy international credit, and instead of serving as a 
                                                
65 Hicken, The Politics of Economic Reform, 16; Phongpaichit and Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics,  
355-360 
66 Pakorn Vichyanond,   Financial Reforms in Thailand  (Bangkok: Thailand Development Research 
Institute, 2000),  8.  Interest rate ceilings on long term time deposits were abolished in June 1989, on short 
term time deposits in March 1990, on savings deposits in January 1992, and on loan rates in June 1992 
67 endorsed by the Central Bank Governor in letter. No. 545/2533, which also contains plans to commit 
to the terms of IMFs Article VIII.    
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center for internationally oriented (out-out) transactions, the BIBF served as the main 
conduit for foreign capital (out-in transactions) seeking high rates of return from the 
fastest growing of the emerging markets.  In one year, from 1993 to 1994, credit 
inflows jumped from zero to an average of 350 billion baht ($12 billion).  In 1995, net 
foreign inflows jumped another 69 percent, which implied that more money flowed 
into Thailand during 1995 than during the entire decade of the 1980s.  In all, between 
1993 and 1997, a total of $68 billion flowed into Thailand through the BIBF, and by 
mid-1997, Thailands total external debt had reached $92 billion.68   
The financial reforms required that by 1993, domestic banks adopt capital 
reserve requirements consistent with the recommendation of the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS).69  Otherwise, the reforms said little about how banks should adapt 
to the managerial and staffing pressures that would inevitably follow financial 
opening.  Thus when Thailand was inundated with credit, Thai banks were ill prepared 
to productively channel the quantity of financial flows coming in through the BIBF.  
At the height of the capital deluge in 1995, the largest commercial banks had only 
recently begun to developed techniques of modern risk management and relied instead 
upon the good name of the borrower and upon whatever collateral was offered as a 
security.   
Major decisions regarding credit allocation by each bank were the 
responsibility of the board of governors.  But the governing boards of Thai banks had 
no experience with managing credit flows at the level witnessed in the 1990s.  At best, 
governing board members who were inexperienced with allocating such large sums of 
credit made decisions that led to a higher rate of non-performing loans (NPLs).  At 
worst, as in the case of the Bangkok Bank of Commerce and Finance One Plc 
                                                
68 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailands Boom and Bust (ChagMai: Silkworm Books, 1998), 100. 
69 The 1988 BIS standards specify an 8 percent capital-asset ratio which consists of 4 percent tier 1 
capital and 4 percent of tier 2 capital.  Implicit in the BIS standards is a risk weight to each type of 
financial transaction in which depository institutions engage. 
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(formerly Thailands largest finance company), board members colluded with 
management to embezzle billions of baht from their respective financial institutions.  
And when public regulators tried to hold managers accountable, members of three 
successive coalition cabinets intervened to protect their business allies from gaze of 
regulatory scrutiny. 
As domestic banks struggled to manage capital inflows, the new political 
entrepreneurs were counting upon the Bank of Thailand to maintain the status quo; a 
booming economy characterized by easy access to credit and a stable exchange rate.  
Both politicians and businessmen alike understood that the linchpin of Thailands 
rapid economic expansion was the fixed exchange rate, and so enormous pressures 
were exerted, from both within as well as from without the Bank of Thailand, in order 
to insure that the exchange rate system would remain unaltered.  Given the magnitude 
of capital flows entering the country however, the credit expansion imperative came 
into conflict with the regulatory responsibility of the Bank of Thailand.  
As capital flows accelerated in 1995, fiscal and monetary policy, to the extent 
that they were effective, were both wielded to support the exchange rate regime.  But 
when capital flows continued unabated, the Bank of Thailand committed the fatal error 
of employing regulatory forbearance to support the exchange rate system.  Because of 
monetary and political constraints, the Bank of Thailand seemed to treat poorly 
managed banks and finance companies with unlimited tolerance.  The policy of 
unqualified forbearance was supported by an authority structure within the Bank of 
Thailand that encouraged secrecy and made policy coordination between the different 
departments difficult.  Accordingly, when the financial sector continued to deteriorate, 
the Bank of Thailand organized a massive bail-out program, wherein billions of baht 
in public funds were used to bail out troubled banks and finance companies without 
replacing delinquent managers and without implementing policies to ensure that those 
found guilty of wrongdoing would face personal liability for their misbehavior.   
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The Bank of Thailand was forced into the unenviable position of supporting a 
politically induced, but economically unsustainable level of moral hazard.  A 
succession of governments that came to power in the 1990s sacrificed the 
requirements of banking regulation in order to maintain their access to international 
credit and in order to preserve the fixed exchange rate system that was the key to the 
intricate web of alliances between politicians and businessmen.  And because financial 
institutions provided political parties with such a rich source of easy credit and 
campaign financing, the coalition governments that came to power did so with a 
mandate of protecting the banking sector from aggressive interventions by public 
regulators.  The Bank of Thailand was thus held hostage, and was forced to exert all of 
the authority that it had accumulated over decades of responsible economic 
management in order to protect the fixed exchange rate regime.  In other words, the 
Bank of Thailand was forced to pursue a policy of credibility at all costs.  By 
undermining the soundness of the banking sector however, the unstable coalitions that 
vied for political power brought down the entire financial system as well as the fixed 
exchange rate regime that they had so desperately wanted to preserve, ushering 
Thailand into an era of unprecedented crisis.  
 
4.31  Governing Banks: The Credit Expansion Imperative 
 
In 1992, Chuan Leekpai and the Democrats came to power, leading a coalition 
government consisting of five parties.  Chuan became prime minister with a popular 
mandate to consolidate democratic reforms and to promote economic liberalization.  
Chuans main backers were Bangkok businessmen, who heavily influenced his cabinet 
appointments.  In the critical post of finance minister, Chuan selected Tarrin 
Nimmanhaeminda, a former banker and an important member of the pro-business 
BMS political lobby.  And as central bank governor, Chuan selected Vijit Supinit, who 
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was well known to be friendly with many Thai bank managers.  One of Chuans chief 
financial backers was also appointed as minister of construction, whose enormous 
budget made him one of the most important men in Thailand.   
Under Chuan, who became known in the popular media as Mr. Whitewash, 
extensive financial sector reforms were carried out and the BIBF was established.70  
Indeed, Chuans choices for finance minister, central bank governor, as well as the 
economic reform platform that he adopted, sent a strong signal to the financial 
community that Thailand had entered a period of rapid financial liberalization.  In 
response, and as depicted in Figure 4.5 below, the banking sector initiated the greatest 
expansion of credit ever witnessed in Thailands history.   
The effect of the credit boom upon Thailands business community was instant 
and profound, but relative to their size, the property sector and stock market were by 
far the greatest beneficiaries from the capital bonanza.  The number of golf courses 
and other recreational facilities increased from a meager 10 courses in the 1980s to 
over 250 during the 1990s, and the number of upper end real estate projects expanded 
twenty-fold.71  The stock market index spiked from 600 following the 1991 coup to a 
stellar 1750 by January 1994 and the P/E ratio went from sixteen in 1992 to twenty-six 
and thirty in 1993.   
 However, the high concentration of stock transactions in the financial sector 
(57 percent of all transactions) and the property and telecom sectors (22 percent) 
meant that any bad news about these sectors of the Thai economy could result in a 
stock market crash.72  In percentage terms, the largest portion of the international 
capital came in the form of credit flows and so bank and finance company lending  
                                                
70 Interview by author, Bangkok, September 2000, see also: Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thailands 
Boom and Bust, 252-53 
71 Interview by author, Bangkok Thailand, July 2000  
72 Phongpaichit and Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics, 101 
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comprised approximately 60 percent of all corporate financing meant that corporate 
financing was skewed towards debt, yielding high debt/equity ratios.73  Given the type 
and volume of capital inflows, the risk assessment and management capabilities of 
Thai banks became crucial for maintaining continued economic growth and financial 
stability.   
Prior to the crisis, Thai commercial banks operated with only primitive models 
of risk management.  The only effective check upon imprudent lending by the Thai 
banks was the authority and integrity of each banks board of governors.  As Table 4.2 
in the appendix details, within Krung Thai Bank, Thai Farmers Bank and Siam 
Commercial Bank, which are among Thailands largest banks, loans above the Bt 500 
- Bt 1 billion level can only be extended with the approval of the board of governors.  
Among medium sized banks such as Bank Ayudhya, Thai Military Bank and the 
Bangkok Bank of Commerce, loans above the Bt 250 - Bt 500 million range required 
                                                
73 In 1995, bank lending totaled Bt 837.6 million, while finance companies lending totaled Bt 286.2 
million; and total corporate lending in 1995 equaled Bt 1.58 billion. 
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the approval of the board of governors.  Internally, private banks adopted and required 
semi-annual or annual performance reviews for loan officers and all bank department 
managers.  The government banks, by way of contrast, put little faith in performance 
incentives or performance related reviews.74  
According to interviews conducted at 6 Thai commercial banks and 3 finance 
companies, the dominant risk management strategy prior to the crisis was to allocate 
capital according to: 1) The reputation of the client, 2) the existence of a personal 
relationship between the loan applicant and the bank manager, and 3) the value of any 
collateral offered as a security.  Each of these methods of managing risk suffers from 
deficiencies, which in a closed economy, can lead to bankruptcy.  But in an open 
economy confronting the additional risks associated with capital inflows, adopting an 
inadequate model of risk management can have disastrous systemic consequences. 
Loan officers within commercial banks are well versed in the importance of 
credit analysis and in other technical methods, such as expected cash flow analysis.  
Yet within most banks, loan officers and branch managers could only approve loans 
within the Bt 10 million to Bt 25 million range.  The largest loans were the province of 
the board of governors, who make their decisions based upon many other factors 
beyond formal credit analysis.  For instance, Thai banks participated in large 
syndicated loans to high profile industrial projects, so that credit risk could be 
distributed among a large number of banks.  Loans to Siam Cement, the Sahara City 
                                                
74 Interviews by author, Bangkok Thailand, June-August, 2000 
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resort, or the Bangkok Monorail project were not only considered relatively safe, but 
improved the standing of the lending institution.75   
Loan syndication did manage to distribute risk among Thailands largest 
financial institutions, but involvement in huge projects also had the effect of 
concentrating loan portfolios.  Prior to the crisis, Thailands second largest bank 
(Krung Thai Bank) was involved in a series of syndicated loans to 10 industrial 
groups that totaled 48 percent of the KTBs loan portfolio.76  On average, government 
officials have estimated that prior to the crisis, the top 10 percent of each banks 
portfolio constituted up to 50 percent of the value of the entire loan portfolio.77  
The second weakness of pre-crisis risk management was the willingness of Thai 
banks to accept real estate as the primary form of collateral.  The widespread use of 
property as collateral made the real estate market a source of instant wealth.  In 
principal, real estate valuation is a highly subjective process, and in the environment 
of a financial boom, property can be easily over-valued.  The over-valuation of real 
estate prices not only inflated asset prices, but made it much more difficult for the 
central bank to estimate the true risk exposure of Thai financial institutions.  Because 
property values were skyrocketing, there was little hesitation about extending loans to 
clients who offered real estate as collateral.  In case of foreclosure, banks 
optimistically believed that loans secured by property would be easier to recover.   
For these reasons, financial institutions had loan portfolios that were concentrated in a 
few high profile mega-projects and that were exposed to the property market to an 
extent far greater than suggested by official statistics.   
The data on bank lending indicates that the majority of BIBF mediated loans 
went to large manufacturers such as the Siam Cement Company, and to loans for 
                                                
75 Interviews by author, Bangkok Thailand, June-August, 2000 
76  The White Paper, (Bangkok: Krung Thai Bank Research Department, April 1999) 
77  Interview by author, Bangkok Thailand, July 2000 
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commercial transactions, and to inter-bank facilities.  Official BIBF statistics state 
that only 3-4 percent of incoming capital flows were directed towards the property 
market.  The aggregate BIBF figures are misleading for two reasons.  First, a 
significant proportion of loans received through the BIBF were re-lent by corporate 
conglomerates to subsidiaries active in the property market and second, since much of 
the collateral provided by manufacturers and exporters was in the form of real estate, 
true BIBF exposure to the property market was at least 20 - 30 percent and private 
estimates range up to 50 percent.78  If finance companies are included, the level of 
exposure rises, due to the fact that the exposure of some financial companies to the 
property market reached levels as high as 80 percent.79 
The third defect in the risk management policies of Thai banks was a heavy 
reliance upon relationship loans.  The term relationship loans is used to cover 
three categories of credit: 1) loans extended to a bank managers personal 
acquaintances, 2) loans to affiliated firms, and 3) loans extended to major 
shareholders or members of the board of governors.  The Bank of Thailand made few 
efforts prior to financial liberalization to curb relationship loans to the extent that the 
central bank did not require banks to submit consolidated financial statements; a 
measure that would have forced banks to disclose additional information regarding 
loans to affiliated parties.80   
 
 
 
 
                                                
78  Interview by author, Bangkok Thailand, July 2000 and private interview, August 2000 
79 Interviews by author, various finance companies, Bangkok July  September 2000; TISCO Research 
Department, Bangkok, August 2000 
80 Interview by author, Bangkok Thailand, August 2000 
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Table 4.4:  Estimated Value of Relationship Loans (as a percentage of total loans) 81 
 
 
Loans based upon personal contacts:  ≥ 50 percent  
 
Loans to affiliated firms:   ≥ 20 percent 
 
Loans to shareholders: 
 
Large Banks    < 5 percent 
Medium Sized Banks    10  12 percent82 
Small Banks    10  15 percent 
  
Large Finance Companies  15  20 percent83 
Smaller Finance Companies  ≥ 60 percent 
 
The actual percentage of relationship loans is hard to estimate but it is perhaps 
the most important indicator of risk exposure.  Unofficial estimates of the magnitude 
of various types of relationship loans are displayed in Table 4.4.  The estimates imply 
that the most prominent type of relationship loans was credit extended to business 
allies or personal acquaintances of bank managers.  If true, these figures mean that 
formal risk assessment methods played only a minor role in determining the 
allocation of credit.   
Although government officials ceased holding positions on the governing 
boards of Thai banks by the 1980s, the principle of extending loans to affiliated 
parties survived the process of corporate governance reform.  Relationship loans 
continued into the era of capital flows because loans to affiliated parties compensated 
for a banks inability to fully assess the future profitability of a project and so allowed 
                                                
81 Interview by author, Bank of Thailand, Banking Supervision Department, August 2000; Interview 
by author, TISCO Research Department, Bangkok Thailand, July 2000; Interviews, various banks and 
finance companies, July - September 2000. 
These figures are calculated as percentage value of the total loan portfolio that is extended upon the 
basis of personal relations, loans to subsidiary firms and loans to shareholders and Executive Board 
members.   
82 The loan range for Medium sized banks does not include the BBC, which is reported to have up to 
90 percent loans to shareholders and to friends of the management. 
83 Estimate does not include the funds that were allegedly embezzled by the management of Finance One 
Plc. 
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Thai banks to channel capital without changing their governance model or risk 
assessment methodology.  Thai banks operate in an environment where only 40 
percent of firms that receive credit submit statements of account as part of their loan 
applications.  In such an information-poor credit market, the governing boards of Thai 
banks continued to rely heavily upon loans to personal acquaintances, loans to 
subsidiary firms and loans to shareholders as a way of managing the uncertainty of 
the credit market.   
Loans to subsidiary firms were the second most prominent type of relationship 
loan.   Loans to related firms became an important way for Thai banks to erase non-
performing loans off of their balance sheets without having to adjust their capital 
reserves or equity levels.  Bad loans could be transferred to the balance sheet of a 
subsidiary firm while the parent firm would remain solvent.  The Bank of Thailand 
was poorly informed about the extent of loans to subsidiary firms because prior to the 
crisis the central bank did not require consolidated balance sheets that would alert 
public supervisors to this type of financial transfer.   
Loans to shareholders were the least prominent type of relationship loans.  The 
Bank of Thailand imposed a 5 percent limit upon loans to shareholders in 1979, but 
there were many ways to get around the legal limitations.  The primary difficulty with 
enforcing the legal limitations was the prevalence of nominee accounts; which are 
bank accounts registered under a false name.84  Through similar accounting 
techniques, loans to shareholders could be obscured from regulatory scrutiny.  
Consequently, every category of financial institution displayed in Table 4.2 extended 
loans to shareholders beyond the legally prescribed limit.  
The fourth inadequacy of the pre-crisis risk management strategy was the use of 
short-term liabilities to finance balance sheet deficits.   By 1995, short term debt held 
                                                
84 Pedro Alba, et. al., Thailands Corporate Finance and Governance Structures: Impact on Firms 
Competitiveness (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999), 2-3 
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by Thais had reached $41.1 billion, which accounted for half of the countrys total 
external debt.  Banks held $33.7 billion in short-term debt, which accounted for 82 
percent of total external short-term liabilities.  Moreover, $23.7 billion (70 percent) of 
total short term debt came from the BIBF.85  Of all firms with foreign currency 
denominated debt, only 19 percent hedged their exposure and only 12 Thai firms in 
total fully hedged their foreign currency debt.86  Exposure of the banking sector to 
such high levels of short-term debt meant that if any doubts were to emerge regarding 
the health of the financial sector, Thailands access to international credit markets 
would quickly evaporate.    
No matter how poor the risk management strategies adopted by commercial 
banks, Thai banks managers were far more prudent than their counterparts in finance 
companies.  According to managers at three of Thailands more successful financial 
companies, the finance company sector was essentially indifferent to issues of risk 
management.87  Finance companies were deeply involved in the financial crises of 
1979 and 1983 and in fact, some of the companies that were rescued in 1983 failed 
once again in 1997.  The central banks primary method of regulating the finance 
companies was by restricting their activities, such as forbidding non-bank financial 
institutions from taking deposits. But finance companies circumvented government 
regulations by offering promissory notes to the public on terms identical to that of 
interest bearing bank accounts.88   
                                                
85 Analysing Thailands Short-Term Debt, Economic Research Department, Bank of Thailand 
Economic Research Department, Bank of Thailand Economic Focus, Vol. 1, No. 3, July-September 
1996, 11 
86 David Dollar and Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Crisis, Adjustment, and Reform in Thailands 
Industrial Firms, in The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Washington D.C.: World 
Bank, 2000), 12 
87 Interviews by author, Bangkok, June-August, 2000. One of these companies was temporarily closed 
during the pre-crisis panic in July-August 1997. 
88 Asset Price Inflation: Developments and Policy Issues, Bank of Thailand Economic Focus, Vol. 2, 
No. 1, Economic Research Department (Bangkok: Bank of Thailand, 1998), 15 
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The tactic of accepting promissory notes permitted finance companies to act as 
banks without having to adopt the equity and capital reserves levels that were 
required for all deposit taking institutions.  Access to short term international 
financing and the mimicking of commercial banks allowed the finance companies to 
expand aggressively.  With such easy access to funds the finance companies were 
seemingly fearless, constituting 60 percent of the total exposure to the property 
sector.  Aggressive expansion of the finance companies without adequate regulatory 
controls led to a 300 percent growth rate in non-bank financial sector between 1992 
and 1997.89 
The final source of institutional risk was fraud, which is inherently difficult to 
estimate and is never included in official statistics.  According to the personal 
interviews from which Table 4.3 was constructed, except in the extreme case of 
smaller finance companies, the Bangkok Bank of Commerce, and Finance One Plc., 
loans to board members were the least significant category of relationship loans.  A 
full discussion of fraud is included in section 4.6, but with regards to systemic risk, 
the consequences of financial fraud may have had a greater impact upon more 
reputable banks and finance institutions that any other single factor of the pre-crisis 
period.    The most prominent case of financial fraud is that of the Bangkok Bank of 
Commerce (BBC), whose failure in 1996 was the culmination of six or seven years of 
conspiracy by the board of governors and managing directors to embezzle funds from 
the bank and to engage in a variety of illegal money making schemes.  Another form 
of fraud was the case of strategic NPLs which is a term adopted by Thai regulators 
to describe the looting of a banks balance sheet that occurred when bank managers 
realized that financial crisis was inevitable.    As a defensive measure, and beginning 
in late 1996, Thai bank managers began moving an average of 15 percent their most 
                                                
89 World Economic Outlook, (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, March 1998) 
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valuable assets overseas, so as to protect the largest shareholders from bankruptcy 
settlement claims in the future.90 
BBC may have been the most serious case of financial distress, but that bank 
was not the only casualty of the years of easy credit.  Prior to the crisis, in 1994, 
corporate profits for the average firm listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
were 5.78 times higher than average interest expenses.  But by the end of 1995, the 
ratio of profits to interest expenses fell to 4.01, and fell further to 3.11 at the end of 
1996.  Just prior to the crisis, in mid-1997, profit-interest ratios reached a dismal 1.49.  
Thus, by the end of 1997, two thirds of all corporate profits went to cover interests 
from corporate loans.91   
As profit ratios fell, the number of firms that were illiquid or technically 
bankrupt rose proportionately.  The number of firms that could not cover the interest 
expenses rose from 18 in 1994 to 114 in early 1997, implying that by 1997 interest 
repayment became impossible for over one third (36.4 percent) of loans outstanding 
to listed corporations.92  The failure of so many Thai banks and companies was the 
consequence of a combination of factors, but as illustrated above, the manner in 
which banks governed their risk exposure was of critical importance.  However, the 
fact that Thai banks were so ill prepared for the managerial pressures of the open 
economy begs the question of why the Bank of Thailand failed to initiate bank level 
managerial reforms at an earlier phase of financial liberalization.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
90 Interviews by author, Bangkok Thailand, June-August, 2000 
91 Pedro Alba, Thailands Corporate Finance and Governance Structures, 2-3 
92 Pedro Alba, Thailands Corporate Finance and Governance Structures, 3 
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4.32 The Bank of Thailand Divided: Monetary Policy and Banking Regulation 
 
Financial liberalization imposed new political and economic constraints upon 
the Bank of Thailand.  Every ruling coalition knew the importance of preserving the 
exchange rate regime, both for economic growth as well as for maintaining political 
popularity.  The arcane world of banking regulation and supervision however, was 
comparatively less well understood by the political establishment.  Neither did Thai 
politicians fully envision the consequences of adopting a policy of unwarranted 
regulatory forbearance within the context of an open economy.  Hence, any policies 
that could alter the fixed exchange rate regime, such as aggressive intervention into 
the financial sector or the relaxation of the fixed exchange rate system, were simply 
out of the question politically.   Conflict was then inevitable, between those who 
wanted to take corrective measures against the banking sector and those who were 
willing to gamble upon the Bank of Thailands ability to support the exchange rate 
regime, whatever the regulatory consequences.  
The parliamentary democracy of the 1990s increased pressure upon the Bank of 
Thailand to adopt a regulatory posture that was viewed as business friendly.  
During the stable years of the Prem era (1980-1988) for instance, there were only 
three finance ministers appointed by the prime minister.  The following decade of 
coalition democracy (1988 to 1998) by contrast, saw the appointment of thirteen 
finance ministers.93  Within the new political environment, the central bank felt 
obliged to respond to whichever finance minister was appointed by the ruling 
coalition.  Through the ministry of finance, the prime minister and his cabinet could 
subtly influence the policy stance of the central bank, particularly with respect to its 
regulatory posture.  Furthermore, during episodes of parliamentary infighting, the 
                                                
93 Hickens, The Politics of Economic Reform, 16   
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Bank of Thailand came under attack from opposition MPs who wanted to undermine 
the governing coalition by attacking the central bank.  As a result, the Bank of 
Thailand became much more sensitive to political pressure than at any other time in 
its history. 
The first problem for the Bank of Thailand came as a result of the volume and 
maturity of the debt flows that entered Thailand through the BIBF.  By 1995, central 
bank officials realized that the high rate of capital inflows and the accumulation of 
short term debt threatened the stability of the monetary system.  Effective sterilization 
was impossible, both due to the sheer magnitude of the capital inflows and because 
the thin bond repurchasing market provided authorities with little means of monetary 
adjustment.  To mitigate the inflationary effects of capital inflows upon asset prices, 
the Bank of Thailand decided to impose a 7 percent reserve requirement upon BIBF 
transactions, as well as upon non-resident baht accounts and short-term finance 
company loans.  The central bank also adopted a policy of interest rate smoothing 
whereby incremental adjustments in the short-term interest rate were made in order to 
reduce the volatility of prices, but without affecting the overall upward trend.94  Yet 
concern over the effects of so much foreign capital entering the banking system 
persisted to the extent that for the first time since 1984, the Bank of Thailand 
considered the prospect of abandoning the fixed exchange rate system.95    
In December 1995, any plans to relax the exchange rate system were 
overwhelmed by the global consequences of the Mexican peso crisis.  And it was 
during the defense of the baht in late 1995 that, for the first time, the Exchange 
Equalization Fund (EEF) and the Banking Department employed swap transactions, 
and in fact, the Bank of Thailands success at playing the swap market ensured the 
                                                
94 Interview by author, Bank of Thailand, Bangkok Thailand,  July 2000 
95 The Nukul Commission Report: Analysis and Evaluation on Fact Behind Thailands Economic 
Crisis, (Bangkok: The Nation, 1998), 32-35  
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survival of the baht peg.96  While some within the central bank raised further 
concerns regarding the viability of the fixed exchange rate, Deputy Governor 
Chaiyawat Wibulswasdi overrode dissenting voices, pointing out that the Bank of 
Thailand had demonstrated that it could successfully defend the baht.  Chaiyawat also 
argued that any alteration of the system could result in a visitation of the Mexican 
experience upon Thailand.97   
Deputy Governor Chaiyawats confidence may have seemed reasonable in 
1995, but the Bank of Thailands exchange rate strategy proved ultimately to be 
inconsistent with the regulatory policies adopted by the three coalition governments 
who held power between 1992 and 1997.  The potential for conflict within the Bank 
of Thailand can be illustrated in Figure 4.5 below, which represents a simplification 
of the central banks internal organization.   
The pre-1997 Bank of Thailand consisted of six divisions, two of which were 
responsible for supporting the exchange rate; the Exchange Equalization Fund (EEF), 
headed by Deputy Governor Chaiyawat Wibulswasdi, and the Banking Department, 
which was headed by Director Bandid Nijathaworn.98  The EEF was responsible for 
selling or buying the amount of baht necessary to maintain the spot exchange rate 
within the announced exchange rate band (Bt 25 to 1 U.S. dollar).  The Banking 
Department by contrast, was responsible for any significant foreign exchange 
interventions carried out by the central bank.  Conflict and lack of coordination 
between the EEF and Banking Department was to prove crucial in the failure of the 
fixed exchange rate in July 1997.   
Financial supervision by the Bank of Thailand was carried out by the Bank 
Examination Department and the Financial Institutions Supervision Department, 
                                                
96 The Nukul Commission Report, 29 
97 Interviews by author, Bangkok, July-August 2000 
98 The Nukul Commission Report, 59 
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which were under the authority of Deputy Governor Jaroong Nikhawoon.  The 
examination and supervision departments were critical because the central bank 
governor made decisions regarding regulatory intervention conditioned upon the 
information collected by financial examiners.  The political importance of the central 
banks supervision capacity extended to the Ministry of Finance and the Prime 
Ministers Office, who depended heavily upon Bank of Thailand in order to gauge the 
overall health of the financial system  
Effective financial supervision during the 1990s was stifled in two ways.  
First, the central bank governor concealed embarrassing revelations about the banking 
sector.  The central banks tendency towards secrecy only exacerbated the difficulties 
associated with accurately estimating the health of domestic financial institutions.  
Banks and finance companies were also wary of providing supervisors with a full 
accounting of their risk exposures.  Given that 40 percent of firms receiving credit did 
not even submit statement accounts, even the financial institutions could not have full 
knowledge of their own risk exposures.99   
The extra operating and credit risks associated with the open economy, 
relationship lending, and the dominant collateral patterns meant that Bank of Thailand 
supervisors systematically over-estimated the capitalization levels of domestic banks 
and finance companies.  When queried regarding the BBC affair, the financial 
examiners at the Bank of Thailand staunchly defended themselves, arguing that 
examiners had warned the Bank of Thailand leadership as early as 1992 that the BBC 
was technically bankrupt.  In response to similar queries about the finance company 
sector and Finance One in particular, the financial examiners were less certain, and 
                                                
99 Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier, Crisis, Adjustment and Reform in Thailands Industrial Firms, 4 and 
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revealed that the Bank of Thailand staff had underestimated the true risk exposure of 
the finance company sector prior to the crisis.100   
The Bank of Thailands over riding commitment to defend the exchange rate 
forced the Bank of Thailand to adopt a policy of unlimited generosity towards failing 
financial institutions.  The most notorious of the Bank of Thailands policy of 
unlimited forbearance was the case of the Bangkok Bank of Commerce.  In 1992, 
central bank officials first became aware of the BBCs condition.  In accordance with 
the powers granted the Bank of Thailand by the 1962 Commercial Banking Act, the 
central bank ordered BBC management to increase capital by Bt 800 million and 
further required the BBC to formulate a rehabilitation plan.  By March 1993, 
however, a Bank of Thailand examination revealed that the BBCs NPLs had risen to 
Bt 38.5 billion or 39.6 percent of total assets, indicating that BBCs management 
continued to grant questionable loans without hesitation.  The central bank once again 
ordered BBCs CEO, Krik-kiat Jalichandra, to increase BBCs capital by Bt 3 billion.  
Although the Bank of Thailand hoped that capital injections alone could solve BBCs 
problems, another examination in 1994 established that BBCs NPLs remained above 
Bt 20 billion.101     
Once it became clear in 1995 that the BBC management was resisting the pain 
of recapitalization and management reform, the Bank of Thailand faced a moment of 
decision.  Jaroong Nookhwun, Deputy Governor for Banking Affairs, asked the 
Supervision Department to prepare a report detailing BBCs problems.  However, 
Jaroong apparently found that the evidence of fraud was so extensive that he kept the 
results confidential, out of fear of the consequences that would ensue if the truth were 
ever revealed to the public.  During post-crisis testimony, Jaroong claimed that the 
report was never submitted to the Central Bank Governor Vijit, and Jaroong also 
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testified that he had decided to deal with the BBC privately.102  Yet it is difficult to 
conceive that Governor Vijit, who was a friend of the directors of the BBC, had no 
knowledge of the corruption infesting the bank.  Even if Vijit was not formally 
informed, as central bank governor, it was Vijits responsibility to know that the 9th 
largest bank in the country was so deeply riddled with fraud.  The Bank of Thailand 
should have ordered a replacement of the BBCs management or temporarily 
nationalized the bank, but instead the central bank gambled upon resurrection, in the 
hope that the BBC could be rehabilitated without public disclosure of the extent of the 
banks troubles.    
The Bank of Thailands neglect of bank-level governance reforms prior to 
financial opening had three distinct consequences.  First, the Bank of Thailand 
underestimated the degree to which Thai financial institutions were exposed to risk, 
explaining why the central bank believed that the troubles of the Bangkok Bank of 
Commerce were unique.  Second, the lack managerial accountability meant that bail-
outs could actually retard instead of facilitate the rehabilitation of troubled financial 
institutions.  Third, insufficient information regarding the true risk exposure of 
domestic financial institutions caused the central bank to defend the fixed exchange 
rate regime for far too long in the hope that financial sector problems could be 
resolved.   
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3.33     Credibility at all Costs: The Political Economy of the Baht Defense 
 
The most intense political pressure to maintain the fixed exchange rate came 
in the form of the parliamentary elections of 1995, which brought the Chat Thai party 
and Banharn Silpa-archa to power.  Banharns power base came from his ability to 
funnel central government resources to his supporters in the rural provinces, and his 
reputation as a consummate political insider was such that he had been investigated 
for being unusually rich during the Chatichai era of the late 1980s.  The price of 
Banharns election success was $400 million, part of which his supporters were 
caught distributing to rural voters, and which thereby gained Banharn the dubious 
accolade of the walking ATM machine.103   Similarly, Banharn maintained the 
coherence of his widely based government by assuring the coalition members who 
represented the Bangkok business elite and the rural provinces that cheap 
international capital would continue flowing, which in turn, depended upon the 
maintenance of the fixed exchange rate regime.   
As finance minister, Banharn chose Surakiart Sathirathai, but had to replace 
him in early 1996 because of the public uproar that ensued after Surakiart fired the 
popular SEC chairman, Ekamol Khiriwat.104  Ekamol was threatening legal action 
against the BBC, a move that angered Banharns coalition partners, and so at the 
behest of the minister of finance, the central bank governor dismissed Ekamol.  The 
public outrage that followed Ekamols summary dismissal forced Banharn to replace 
the finance minister, but Banharn still had to accommodate his business allies, and so 
                                                
103 Banharns supporters were caught distributing 11 million baht.   It has been estimated that the price 
of each vote in the rural districts was $60 per vote.  In response to allegations of corruption, the Chat 
Thai spokesmen dismissed vote-buying as normal business practice. Phongpaichit and Baker, 
Thailands Boom and Bust, 259 
104 Danny Unger, Building Social Capital in Thailand, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 100; 
Laurisden, Tigers in Trouble, 146. 
Surakiart had actually recommended that BoT Governor Supinit should fire Ekamol, but the 
termination of Ekamol was considered to be the work of the Finance Minister. 
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the Prime Minister then selected Bodi Chunnananda to head the finance ministry.  
Bodis chief distinction was that as a budget bureau official, he had reportedly helped 
to channel large portions of the governments budget to members of Banharns 
constituency.  Because of the Ekamol affair and due to the reputation of many of 
Banharns cabinet ministers, the media dubbed the new regime the 7-Eleven 
government  composed of seven parties and eleven factions and, like a convenience 
store, was open for business twenty-four hours.105 
 
Unfortunately for the Thai economy, it was precisely during Banharns tenure 
as prime minister that bad news regarding the health of Thailands financial sector 
began to surface.  The first sign of vulnerability emerged when the rate of Thai export 
growth decelerated from the stratospheric average of 21 percent of the previous 
decade to a much more modest 7 percent in the first quarter of 1996.  The negative 
trend continued, and at the end of 1996, export growth was at zero.  In a sense, the 
deterioration of the Thai external balance and the over-valuation of the exchange rate 
were over-determined.  Increasing real wages, a weakening of the yen against the 
dollar, a slump in Japanese demand for imports, and a retraction of Japanese 
investment from the entire region, all contributed to Thailands slowing growth rate.  
Furthermore, Thailand was under increasing pressure from regional competitors in 
electronics and manufactures.106  To continue expanding, Thai firms began 
accumulating an alarming external debt profile.  Although the export slump had been 
long anticipated by many Thai economists, the combined effect of external imbalance 
and capital inflows upon the Thai financial sector had detrimental consequences far 
beyond anyones expectations.   
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In May 1996, the seemingly unlimited patience of the Bank of Thailand with the 
BBC became international news when Democrat MPs used the BBC affair to mount a 
no-confidence debate against the Banharn government.  During the debate, it was 
revealed that Newin Chidchob, the deputy minister for finance, Suchart Tancharoen, a 
deputy interior minister and two other Chat Thai MPs, had taken large loans from the 
BBC and used the loans to purchase land that was then used as collateral for 
leveraged takeovers and share speculation.107  Further damage was sustained to 
Banharns coalition when the government acknowledged that half of the project 
finance budget had been lost to corruption.108  As if this was not enough, Central 
Bank Governor Vijit and Finance Minister Surakiat were forced to resign in July 
1996 under a cloud of suspicion and recrimination for their part in the BBC scandal, 
fueling speculation about the health of the financial sector.  Banharn responded by 
reshuffling his cabinet and promising an anti-corruption campaign, which led his 
opponents to demand another no-confidence debate.  The debate turned into a three-
day impeachment trial of the prime minister that ascended to high political theatre, 
and led ultimately to a new round of elections late 1996.109  
In late November 1996, financial markets responded to the news of widespread 
corruption in the Banharn government by initiating speculative attacks against the 
baht for the first time since the Mexican peso crisis.  Moreover, the results of the 
1996 elections did little to reassure the nervous markets, as the New Aspiration Party 
came to power under the leadership of Chavalit Youngchaiyudh.  Chavalit was an ex-
general who had served as defense minister under Banharn and he had successfully 
extended the New Aspiration partys electoral base by reaching out to the Bangkok 
business elite and the rural provinces.  Chavalits political success allegedly cost the 
                                                
107 Phongpaichit and Baker, Thailands Boom and Bust, 259 
108 As one observer noted: The budget is like a popsicle thats passed around.  Everyone gets a lick at 
it.  quoted from Phongpaichit and Baker, Thailands Boom and Bust, 260 
109 Phongpaichit and Baker, Thailands Boom and Bust, 263 
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New Aspiration Party approximately $500 million in vote-buying and coalition 
building.110  Thus, another potentially unstable coalition government took power at 
precisely the moment when the Thai economy required decisive action.  Any hope of 
responsible economic policy faded when Chavalit, the self styled reformer and son 
of the rural northeast (luk isan), formed a cabinet that contained six ministers who 
had been investigated in 1991, along with Banharn, for being wealthy beyond their 
means.111   
Almost immediately following the formation of Chavalits cabinet, speculators 
began attacking the baht, increasing international concerns regarding the future of the 
fixed exchange rate system.  In order to address the emerging weakness in the 
financial sector, Chavalit appointed Dr. Amnuay Viravan, who had a reputation for 
fiscal rigor, to lead the finance ministry.  Instead of selecting a highly respected 
technocrat to head the central bank, Chavalit selected Rerngchai Marakanond, a trade 
lawyer who had little experience with banking supervision or financial sector reform, 
to be Governor of the Bank of Thailand.  Rerngchai, who served as Governor from 
July 1996 to July 1997, was obsessed with protecting the fixed exchange rate system 
and continued Vijits approach of throwing taxpayer money at any financial 
institution that had liquidity or solvency problems.  After the BBC bailout proved 
ineffective, in August 1996, the FDIF began assisting six finance companies 
including Thai Fuji Finance, which was associated with the BBC.112   
When the property bubble burst in the first quarter of 1997, the Ministry of 
Finance and the Bank of Thailand finally took decisive action in an attempt to head 
off any further bankruptcies.  In early March, the government announced the 
establishment of the Property Loan Management Organization (PLMO) which was to 
                                                
110 Laurisden, Tigers in Trouble, 147; Estimates of the total spent upon vote-buying during the 
November 1996 parliamentary elections for all Thai political parties range between $700 million - $1 
billion. 
111 Phongpaichit and Baker, Thailands Boom and Bust, 266 
112 The Nukul Commission Report, 143 
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provide 100 billion baht in five year loans to finance companies overextended in the 
property market.  But the cornerstone of the authorities financial rehabilitation plan 
was the announced merger between Finance One, Thailands largest finance company 
and Thai Danu Bank, the twelfth largest commercial bank.   In order to assure the 
success of the merger, the FDIF injected Bt 40 billion into Finance Ones balance 
sheet.  Had the Thai Danu-Finance One merger succeeded, the government would 
have proceeded with further mergers between Thailands 91 finance companies and 
18 banks.  But the merger failed in May 1997 and consequently, the governments 
financial rehabilitation strategy unraveled.113   
 
 
Figure 4.7: The Failed Defense of the Thai Baht, 1997-98 
 
 Once the governments merger plans imploded, the unforgiving markets once 
again set upon the Bank of Thailand.  As illustrated in Figure 4.7, between May 13 
and May 15, speculative pressures culminated in the most severe and sustained attack 
                                                
113 Laurisden, Tigers in Trouble, 148  
  
 
 
133
upon the baht since the fixed exchange regime was introduced in 1984.114  The 
speculative attacks against the Thai baht in mid-May caused a panic within the Thai 
banking community and it was at that point that the Bank of Thailand became 
desperate.  In a series of meetings between May 13 and May 14, the assistant 
governors met with Governor Rerngchai, and it was agreed that the Banking 
Department would engage in a set of interventions beginning with $300 million, to 
nudge the baht spot rate back into the announced EEF band.  A second intervention 
on the morning of May 14 was coordinated with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, 
which contributed $500 million in support of the baht.  By the end of the day on May 
14, the Bank of Thailand had expended a total of $ 9.7 billion to defend the baht, 
which included $ 5.4 billion committed to swap transactions.115  Yet despite the scope 
of the interventions the speculators refused to back off.   
And so came about the fateful decision on the evening of May 14th, by top 
central bank officials, to grant the Banking Department authority to engage in swap 
transactions with no limit on the amount of money used.116  Consequently, during 
the evening of May 14th and throughout the morning of May 15th, the Banking 
Department expended $10 billion in the New York and London currency markets in 
an effort that finally brought the baht back within the announced Bt 25.85  Bt 25.90 
range.117  But alas the fight to defend the baht had nearly exhausted the Bank of 
Thailand; as the central banks available reserves had fallen from the robust position 
of $24.3 billion that were held at the beginning of May, to an anemic $2.5 billion by 
the morning of May 15th.  Acting quickly, and in an effort to deny currency 
speculators ammunition for further attacks, the Bank of Thailand forbid lending of the 
Thai baht to foreign financial institutions.  The measure worked to a degree, 
                                                
114 The Nukul Commission Report, 76-80 
115 The Nukul Commission Report, 80 
116 Memo 379/1997 from Banking Department Director Bandid to Assistant Governor Siri on May 22, 
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increasing net foreign exchange reserves to $7.3 billion by May 16, a position that 
was maintained until mid-June.118    
Unfortunately the bad news was not over.  Ominously, in late May, three 
senior central bank officials were suspended for their alleged incompetence at 
handling the BBC affair, and on June 19th, Finance Minister Amnuay resigned as 
deputy prime minister and minister of finance, reportedly because Chavalit would not 
grant him sufficient power to balance the budget and discipline mismanaged finance 
companies.119  Financial markets, in turn, interpreted Amnuays resignation and the 
suspension of central bank officials as evidence that the Chavalit government was no 
different then Banharns 7-Eleven government.  Increasingly, it became apparent that 
the Chavalit government was too well connected with the business community to 
challenge the very political interests that financed New Aspirations rise to power.    
After Amnuays resignation, Chavalit appointed Thanong Bidaya as minister 
of finance, but by then there was little that Thanong or the Bank of Thailand could do 
to defend the baht from speculative attacks.  The final stroke against the fixed 
exchange rate came on June 27 when 16 finance companies were suspended for 30 
days.  In a last desperate attempt to save the baht peg, on July 1st, Prime Minister 
Chavalit declared: I will never allow the baht to devalue.  We will all become poor.  
One day later, on July 2nd 1997, after conferring with the Prime Minister, the Bank of 
Thailand announced the introduction of a managed float, and in response the baht 
fell from 26 baht to the dollar to 32 baht to the dollar in less than two weeks.120   
 The immediate reason for the bahts collapse was the Banking Departments 
mismanagement of the central banks foreign exchange reserves.  The deeper reasons 
lay in the fact that the central banks leadership, and Deputy Governor Chaiyawat 
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Wilbulswadi in particular, was unwilling to introduce flexibility into the management 
of the exchange rate system when economic and political conditions were more 
amenable.  And yet the rest of the Bank of Thailand staff was hardly blameless, as 
neither Governor Vijit nor Governor Rerngchai was willing to take effective action to 
punish the BBC and other corrupt financial institution.  Nor did the central bank 
extend support to panicking depositors; a measure that may have been costly in the 
short term, but would have ultimately calmed the markets in the long run.  Finally, the 
collapse of the baht peg was inevitable, because increasingly since 1992, whoever 
held the prime ministers office was more concerned with maintaining the elected 
coalitions access to easy credit than with preserving the stability of the Thai 
economy. 
 
4.34 Bailing out the Wealthy:  The Social Distribution of Bankruptcy Costs 
 
The social distribution of bankruptcy costs can be measured in two ways.  First, 
during the pre-crisis bailout, billions of baht in public funds were poured into illiquid 
and insolvent financial institutions without requiring that major shareholders to pay 
for the cost of their actions.  The Bank of Thailands permissive attitude during the 
failed attempt to rehabilitate the BBC was extended to the central banks response to 
the insolvent finance companies.   Prior to the floatation of the baht, public money 
was offered to the troubled finance companies without imposing discipline upon the 
management or major shareholders. And in the case of Finance One Plc., which was 
formerly Thailands largest finance company, the firms managing directors allegedly 
embezzled the central banks largesse.   
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The cost of insolvency was thus completely borne by minority shareholders and 
by the public treasury.  The second way of gauging how the costs of bankruptcy were 
distributed is by identifying the effects of the crisis upon the different segments of 
Thai society.  Through the FIDF and other means, Thai taxpayers were forced to pay 
for the bulk of the bankruptcy and rehabilitation costs.  The least fortunate members 
of Thai society also had to pay for the crisis in the form of a decline in real income 
and the contraction of employment opportunities.   
Figure 4.8 illustrates the loss to shareholders from the period of economic 
expansion and Figure 4.9 represents profits and losses in the banking sector.  While 
bank managers made a fortune extending relationship loans during the early 1990s, 
the banks minority shareholders were forced to endure a devaluation of their shares.  
From the BBC bailout of 1996 to the floatation of the baht in July 2nd 1997, the FDIF 
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poured Bt 510 billion ($10 billion) into the rescue of troubled financial sector, with Bt 
90 billion of this sum going to the failed attempt to rescue the BBC.   
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In December 1997, the publicly disclosed level of NPLs equaled Bt 1.02 
trillion, or 20.7 percent of total loans, which was an increase of 171.4 percent from 
June 1997.121  As illustrated in Figure 4.10 below, the level of NPLs became even 
greater when the new classification system was instituted in 1998.122  Using the new 
standard, NPLs reached a level of 45 percent in December 1998 and peaked at 47.7 
percent in May 1999.123  And as of September 2002, unresolved NPLs were still at Bt 
1.04 trillion which represented 21.9 percent of total lending, with nearly half of the 
                                                
121 In June 1997, the total reported percentage of NPLs was 8.52 percent, or a baht value of Bt 375 
million.  See: Tisco Thailand Research Department.  Thailand Banking Sector: The Dawn of a New 
Era (Bangkok: May, 1998). 
122 Parista Yuthamanop, New formula lifts debt total by about $20 bn, Bangkok Post, 1 July 2000. 
123 Thailand: From Crisis to Sustainable Recovery, Ministry of Finance (Bangkok: May, 2000), 16. 
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unresolved NPLs still held by banks (Bt 300 billion) and finance companies (Bt 169.2 
billion).124   
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The first and most significant bailout was the failed attempt to rescue the 
Bangkok Bank of Commerce.  By 1995, the central bank had concluded that without 
an injection of capital into BBCs balance sheet, the troubled bank would fail.  
Fearing the effects of the BBCs collapse upon the rest of the financial sector, Vijit 
Supinit, who was also known to be a personal friend of BBCs CEO Krirk-kiat 
Jalichandra, decided to marshal the resources of the Fund for Development of 
Financial Institutions (FIDF) and the Government Savings Bank (GSB) in order to 
bail out BBC.125  Krirk and his chief financial advisor, Rajesh Saxena, decided to take 
advantage of the government bailout scheme, and instead of using the funds to repair 
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125 The Nukul Commission Report, 129 
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the banks balance sheet, the BBC managers allegedly expanded the scope of their 
illegal activities.   
BBCs management proceeded to manipulate the banks share price and 
thereby increase BBCs paid-up capital.  Saxena hired Sia Song, a shadowy figure 
from Thailands financial underground who was famous for being charged, and later 
acquitted, of securities fraud in 1984.  Songs participation in BBCs management 
further attracted the attention of the Group 16, a set of Thai parliamentarians who 
were intent upon using BBC for their own financial gain.126  In sum, BBC had 
become the politicians bank par excellence and yet the Bank of Thailand failed to 
take prompt and corrective action against the banks management. 
The bailout of the BBC was also significant because the BBC rescue plan set 
the tone for the remainder of the FIDF intervention.  The first flaw of the FIDF 
assistance plan was that the BBC did not have to commit to a capital write-down, 
which would have imposed an outside assessment of the value of its assets and would 
have compelled the BBCs primary shareholders to absorb the cost of the failed 
assets.127  In failing to order a write-down, Vijit and Jaroong allowed BBCs 
management to benefit from the new injection of capital without having to bear any 
personal liability for losses and thus forced the new shareholders (the public, since it 
was a government bailout) to shoulder the entire cost of the (failed) rehabilitation 
process.  The second defect of the FIDF pre-crisis bailout was that the central bank 
made no attempt to replace Krik-kiat or any of the BBC management.  Only Rajesh 
Saxena was ordered to relinquish his position at BBC and was forced to suspend any 
dealings with the bank.128  By allowing Krik-kiat and BBCs board of directors to 
retain management control, Central Bank Governor Vijit hoped to enlist the 
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managements aid in loan recovery, but instead the Bank of Thailand reinforced the 
message that the BBC shareholders would be free from personal liability.   
The same bailout pattern continued with the attempt to rehabilitate the non-
bank financial sector.  Following the bursting of the property bubble in early 1997, 
many real estate and finance companies became insolvent.  Somprasong Land 
Company and a number of other real estate firms defaulted upon their Euro-bond 
interest payments in February 1997.  When insolvency spread to Finance One, the 
Bank of Thailand and Ministry of Finance announced a forced merger between the 
finance company and Thai Danu Bank, the 12th largest pre-crisis commercial bank.  
But the Finance One merger failed in part because there was no public interest in the 
merger and because it was revealed that many Chat Pattana and New Aspiration 
ministers were among the failed finance companies main shareholders.  Undaunted, 
the FIDF injected Bt 40 billion into Finance Ones balance sheet to prepare the 
finance company for the merger and nine other finance companies were ordered to 
raise Bt 26 billion in total as a cover for future repayments to international creditors.  
By July 1997, the Bank of Thailand had extended $8 billion (Bt 430 billion baht) 
more in public funds in order to bail out the ailing finance companies.129   
Because of the $18 billion in total pre-crisis bailouts and as a result of the 
government role in absorbing bankruptcy costs, the public debt increased four-fold 
within the four years following the crisis.  The public debt ballooned from Bt 690 
billion in 1996 to Bt 2.9 trillion in September 2001, but then settled to Bt 2.6 trillion 
in April 2002, which was equivalent to 51.9 percent of Thai GDP.130  And if the total 
losses incurred by the FIDF are included in the tally, then the public debt would rise 
to 75 percent of the 2002 GDP.131   Under the guidance of the International Monetary 
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Fund, the FIDF nationalized six banks and twelve finance companies, in addition to 
the closure of the 56 defunct financial companies.  In total, the government was 
forced to absorb approximately Bt 300 billion ($72 billion) of private sector debt 
(from mostly short term international obligations) and according to TDRI estimates, 
the government will eventually be forced to bear another Bt 110 billion ($29 billion) 
from the unrecoverable assets of the 56 closed financial firms.132   
 The outbreak of the crisis in late 1997 undermined the Chavilit government 
and brought about another round of elections.  In January 1998, voters returned the 
Democrats to power and so it was Chuan Leekpai, the defender of the Bangkok 
business elite, who administered the post-crisis distribution of bankruptcy costs.  The 
new government responded to the crisis by absorbing much of the bad loans 
generated by the failed banks and finance companies.  By contrast, government 
activism aimed at mitigating the effects of the crisis on the poorer sectors of Thai 
society yielded only mixed results.  According to the Ministry of Finance, financial 
support from the World Bank ($300 million) and the Japanese Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund (¥13.4 billion) was used to benefit 200,000 trainees and workers in 
1999 and 127,312 trainees and workers in 2000.  Another $500 million from the 
Asian Development Bank has also been disbursed in the form of unemployment, 
social welfare, and educational support.133   
 Although the Chuan government made great efforts to advertise social 
assistance programs, Thai unemployment levels increased from 2 percent in 1997 to 5 
percent in 1998, which translated to an increase from 0.6 million to 1.5 million 
unemployed workers.  By 1999, the number of unemployed reached over 2 million 
but decreased to 1.5 million in 2000.134  A sectoral analysis reveals that in late 1998, 
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one year following the crisis, the sector that was most effected by the crisis, the 
construction and real estate sector, also suffered the greatest contraction in 
employment levels (-32 percent), while the commercial and manufacturing sectors 
endured far less severe employment contractions (-3 and -2.4 percent respectively).135   
 A regional breakdown of unemployment levels is also instructive, in that the 
poorest region, the rural North East, accounted for 40 percent of total unemployment 
levels in 1998.  For instance, in 1998-1999, in the rural village of Sap poo pan in the 
Tambon province, 40 villagers out of a total village population of 260 were forced to 
return from urban area jobs because of the effects of the crisis.  In Chang Mai 
province as a whole, unemployment levels increased from 2,117 unemployed workers 
in 1996 to a staggering 55,586 in 1998 (an increase of 910 percent).136  Overall 
however, it seems that the rural households fared somewhat better than the national 
average.   
 The effect of the crisis upon real wages was significant.  Among the poor 
urban neighborhoods real wages declined at least 14 percent, while the real wages of 
the rural poor declined by 18 percent.  Between 1996 and 1998, the percentage of 
families living below the $2 per day poverty line increased from 14.9 to 16.9 in most 
rural areas.  As in the case with unemployment levels, the rural Northeast suffered the 
most, as the percentage of the poor increased from 19.3 to 22.7 percent.  The number 
of urban area poor increased more modestly from 3.8 to 4.4 percent for the same 
period.137   
 The per capita cost of the crisis also supports the view that the government 
treated bank managers kindly.  For instance, between 1997 and 2002, each taxpayer 
in Thailand paid Bt 18,000 for the government bailout, while the shareholders of the 
                                                
135 Birdsall, The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis, 195 
136 Northern Thailand Unemployment, National Trade Databank (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of State and U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000) 
137 Birdsall, The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis, 195 
  
 
 
143
failed firms have paid only Bt 10,000.  Furthermore, assuming that 65 percent of the 
NPLs still held by the FIDF will never be recovered the World Bank estimates that 
the public treasury will lose an extra Bt 1.38 trillion, which would mean that the per 
capita cost of the bailout for each taxpayer in Thailand would be Bt 37,000.  The 
costs of debt restructuring do not end there however, since a further Bt 886 billion 
remains outstanding as of 2003, which would add another Bt 9,000 to the cost borne 
by each taxpayer.138   
Bankruptcy costs were distributed according to the political power of the 
finance industry, although the government insisted that Thai firms pay for at least 
some of the costs of the crisis.  Government intervention put a great deal of stress 
upon the alliance between Thai bankers and Thai politicians, but since every coalition 
government is backed by the business community, the financial industry could easily 
reassert its influence during the bailout process.  Although the Thai financial sector 
received billions of baht in public funds, Thai banks and corporations were loath to 
face their creditors.  Bankruptcy in Thailand is a rare event and was never before 
executed on a scale required by the post-crisis settlement.  Thus, despite government 
pressures, Thai firms resisted the bankruptcy process at every turn, causing the post-
crisis cleanup process to be just as contested as the bailout procedure.   
 
4.35  The Bankers War:  Resisting Bankruptcy Settlement 
 
 Thailands default upon $190 billion in foreign debt at the end of 1997 forced 
the Chuan government to confront Thailands banking and corporate sectors directly.  
The first task facing the government was to design a settlement procedure that could 
distribute the costs of bankruptcy appropriately.  Because of there importance, the 
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new bankruptcy laws became a source of political conflict, as major shareholders and 
their political allies resisted the establishment of the New Central Bankruptcy Court.  
Chuan responded to the understandable reluctance of banking and corporate sectors 
by establishing the Financial Restructuring Agency (FRA) in July 1998 and the 
Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC) in 1998.139  But when 
many of the largest corporate debtors balked at the terms of the proposed settlement 
process, the battle for the distribution of bankruptcy costs began in earnest.   
The FRA was intended to evaluate the rehabilitation plans of the 58 suspended 
financial companies in order to determine which of the companies were irredeemably 
insolvent and would have to be closed.  Accordingly, in December 1997 the FRA 
recommended that 56 of the 58 suspended should be permanently closed, and in June 
1998, another 5 companies were to be closed.  With regards to the remaining 15 
banks and 33 finance companies that continued operating, the FIDF was charged with 
task of offering these institutions a very limited access to liquidity reserves while 
simultaneously tightening the loan classification system, strengthening capital 
provisioning rules and increasing capital adequacy requirements to more accurately 
reflect credit and market risk.140   
 Chuans strategy was to compel the large shareholders of the viable banks to 
bare the burden of recapitalization.  But due to the inability of less solvent banks to 
solicit new equity injections, taxpayers were forced to shoulder the remainder of 
Thailands bad debt.  In response to the new requirements, Thai Farmers Bank and 
Bangkok Bank succeeded in raising new equity capital, while Thai Danu Bank, Thai 
Farmers Bank, and the Bank of Asia found foreign partners to shore up their balance 
sheets and rebuild their management models.  However, Siam City Bank, First 
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Bangkok City Bank, Bangkok Metropolitan Bank and of course the Bangkok Bank of 
Commerce, were unsalvageable and were essentially nationalized under the 
administration of the FIDF.141   
In order to prepare the unsalvageable banks for future sale, taxpayers were 
forced to pay for the equity injections, re-capitalization programs and further liquidity 
support.  As a result, the cost of the public rehabilitation plan rose to 20 percent of the 
GDP by the end of 1998.  The Chuan government attempted to recoup some of the 
losses of the public treasury through a series of 11 auctions that ended in April 1999, 
in which 25 percent of the assets in the FRAs possession were sold for the relatively 
meager price of $4 billion.142  And even then, the main purchaser of the troubled 
assets was the Thailand Asset Management Corporation (TAMC).  Viable assets were 
then transferred to Ratanasin Bank, which was to serve as a government sponsored 
good bank.  These efforts, which were reasonably successful given the 
circumstances, left the taxpayers holding the bill for the FRAs auctions.143   
 The most divisive and politically charged issue for Chuans government was 
corporate debt restructuring, which had obvious implications for how the crisis-
generated debt would be distributed between taxpayers and shareholders.  To 
facilitate debt restructuring, the Chuan government established the CDRAC.  The 
CDRAC framework allowed banks and corporations to keep bad loans off of their 
balance sheets as long as these institutions were willing to engage in debt 
restructuring.  But because foreclosure laws that clearly delineated responsibility 
between debtors and creditors had yet to be passed by the Thai parliament, banks and 
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firms refused to engage in meaningful debt restructuring.  The government was then 
forced to grant an amnesty to uncooperative institutions.  To convince firms and 
banks to behave more agreeably, the Chuan government devised another plan in 
August 1998 that reduced the recapitalization requirement for distressed banks.  The 
new rules also increased the severity of the consequences for any banks that refused 
to abide by the recapitalization policy, including the threat of removal, by government 
decree, any uncooperative bank managers.   
 Banks responded by using short term financing as a means of circumventing 
government recapitalization guidelines.  Such methods were costly, but allowed 
banks to retain full control of the debt restructuring process.  Simultaneously, the 
political allies of banks and firms in parliament went on the offensive, focusing their 
attention upon the new bankruptcy and foreclosure legislation, which intended to 
make it much easier for creditors to gain access to the assets held by unresponsive 
debtors.  Not surprisingly, the strongest resistance to the new legislation came from 
senators who were major shareholders in Thai Petrochemical and NTS Steel.  
Although the lower house of the Thai parliament could have over-rode the objections 
of the Senate, the parliamentary review process attracted sufficient public attention as 
to give the senator-businessmen sufficient leverage to wring concessions out of the 
more ambitious of House committee members.  Primarily due to Senate resistance, 
the Chuan government required 15 months to pass the new bankruptcy and 
foreclosure legislation.144  The concessions forced by the business-dominated senate 
yielded a bankruptcy appeal process had successfully undermined the original 
intention of the bill.  As a consequence, by the end of 1999, the financial sector had 
filed only 37 bankruptcy petitions with the central bankruptcy court and in fact, the 
                                                
144 Haggard, The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis, 160 
  
 
 
147
most successful debt restructuring occurred privately and through the CDRAC 
framework.145 
 
4.36 Escape from Bangkok: Managerial Accountability and Law Enforcement 
 
 The post-crisis reform process could never be judged successful without a 
method to compel bank and finance company managers to accept responsibility for 
the corporate governance failures that preceded the crisis.  Legal and institutional 
reforms spearheaded by the Bank of Thailand focused upon prosecuting cases against 
former managers of the bankrupt financial institutions.  Other measures adopted by 
the SEC targeted corporate governance reform, while the Prime Ministers Office 
committed the government to reforming the bankruptcy laws, which included the 
contentious issue of the establishment of the central bankruptcy court in 1999.  The 
results so far have been mixed and while the new bankruptcy court has recently ruled 
against several of the largest delinquent debtors, the lack of progress against alleged 
embezzlers indicates how far Thailand has yet to go in order to recover fully from the 
1997 crisis.   
 The first level of institutional reforms that followed the crisis focused upon 
the Bank of Thailand.  As part of a modernization of the central banks organizational 
structure, the reform effort focused upon the departments that had been most 
responsible for aggravating the financial sectors vulnerability; the Monetary Policy 
Department, the EEF, the Financial Supervision Departments, and the Legal 
Department.  The banks overall structure has been flattened; ostensibly to help 
information flow from the lowest layer of the central banks bureaucracy to the 
Governors office.  The Court of Supervisors and External Auditing Office have been 
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strengthened and given greater powers of oversight.  Monetary policy at the Bank of 
Thailand has been refocused upon a managed float of the Thai baht and the Monetary 
Policy Board has adopted a policy of inflation targeting.  Legal restrictions have also 
been removed upon EEF operations so that the entirety of the central banks foreign 
exchange reserves can now be used, if necessary, to defend the exchange rate.  The 
departments responsible for financial supervision have been given a new system of 
loan classification that expands the types of questionable loans that supervisors 
should recognize.  Surprise visits by supervisors have also become much more 
intensive as the central bank struggles to regain its reputation as a tough regulator and 
supervisor.   Finally, the Legal Department has been granted new powers that allow 
the Bank of Thailand to prosecute alleged violators more effectively.146   
The reform campaign culminated in the establishment of the Office of Anti-
Corruption that is presided over by the prime minister.  Following the crisis, the SEC 
was given free rein to be more aggressive with Thai firms and to prosecute cases of 
misbehavior by governing board members more vigorously.  Many of these high 
profile reform measures were part of the governments marketing strategy to 
convince the world that Thailand was serious about correcting flaws within the 
corporate and financial sectors.  However, when it came to actually reforming the 
management models of banks and firms, the government faced a great deal of 
resistance.   And when the government proceeded with the criminal cases that were 
filed against bank and corporate managers, the results clearly demonstrated the 
difference between the government marketing strategy and the reality of Thai 
financial politics. 
The first set of problems centered upon prosecuting criminal cases brought by 
the Bank of Thailands legal department and by the SEC against the former 
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commercial bank executives and the managers of the 56 defunct finance companies.  
In 1998 and 1999, the Bank of Thailand (under Governor Chatu Mongol) filed 
criminal cases against over 100 former executives.   The law suits that were filed 
included 45 criminal liability cases that claimed total damages to depositors and 
shareholders equal to Bt 42.7 billion.147  Indictments were filed against Krik-kirat 
Jalichandra, Rajesh Saxena and Sia Song, the notorious managers of the BBC.  
Indictments also followed against Pin Chakkaphak, the former CEO of Finance One, 
who was accused of embezzling Bt 2.13 billion and fleeing the country.  Even Sirin 
Nimmanahaemina, who was the brother of former Finance Minister Tarrin was 
accused of being involved in financial corruption.148   
Indicting several of the more disreputable characters of the boom era proved 
to be much easier than bringing many of these cases to court.  For instance, the police 
department and attorney generals office permitted the statutory time limit for the 
prosecution of several important cases to expire, which enabled accused former 
executives to escape accountability by fleeing the country.  The most notorious of the 
neglected cases involved Sia Song and eight accomplices, who were charged by the 
SEC for share price manipulation alleged to have occurred in 1992, in association 
with Krisda Mahanakorn Plc.  The case against Sia Song and his colleagues was 
significant because the Krisda affair was the largest case of securities fraud in Thai 
history.  The accused men were delivered to the prosecutors in 1996 by the 
economics crime division and Song was later granted bail pending trial.  The pre-trial 
period gave Song the opportunity to flee to Canada where he still awaits the outcome 
of an extradition trial.  Similarly, the SEC dropped or was unable to enforce 35 out of 
61 lawsuits that it had filed over the last ten years against the former managers of 
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many prominent financial institutions and corporations, because the police and the 
attorney generals office allowed the statutory limits upon prosecution of the lawsuits 
to expire.149   
During the tenure of the Chuan government, the Bank of Thailand led to the 
successful prosecution of 15 cases of financial fraud, which represented combined 
financial damages of Bt 9.38 billion.  The successful prosecution of the 15 cases was 
due in large part because shortly following the crisis; Bank of Thailand Governor 
Chatu recruited Rattakorn Nimwattana to the position of Assistant Governor for 
Legal Affairs.150  In the post-crisis environment of anti-corruption, Rattakorn was 
given the freedom to pursue criminal cases aggressively.  Despite early court 
victories, the period of post-crisis legal activism proved to be politically 
unsustainable.   
The Bank of Thailands legal efforts came to an abrupt end with the electoral 
victory of the Thai Rak Thai party (literally: Thai loves Thai) in January 2001.  
Thaksin Shinawatra, one of the most successful businessmen in Thailand, led the Thai 
Rak Thai Party.  Thaksins choice for Bank of Thailand Governor was Pridiyathorn 
Devakula.  In August 2001, Governor Pridi announced that all of the cases against the 
former executives of the 56 closed financial companies and the cases pending against 
several former bank managers were being dropped.151  To this date, Pin Chakkaphak, 
Sia Song, Krik kirat Jalichandra and Rajesh Saxena have managed to successfully 
avoid prosecution and still await the outcome of their extradition trials in Europe and 
Canada.  And so ended the period of legal activism meant to bring bank managers 
accused of financial corruption to justice.152   
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The second set of difficulties for the government arose when the new Central 
Bankruptcy Court was established in 1999.  Political resistance against the 
establishment of the new court (discussed in section 3.35) was followed by an 
extended period when some of the largest debtors of the post-crisis era refused to 
enter into a formal settlement program with their respective creditors.  Recently 
however, on March 13th 2000, the central bankruptcy court ruled against the 
politically connected Thailand Petrochemical Industries (TPI). TPIs majority 
shareholder has been a member of parliament from 1998 to 2003, and TPI owed over 
$3.5 billion to 140 banks worldwide.153  Given the size of the settlement, the 
governments action against TPI is a reason for optimism regarding future prospects 
of disciplining debtors who default upon their commitments. 
The final set of reforms important for Thailands financial future are a product 
of the 1997 constitutional reform process.  An underlying structural reason for the 
Bank of Thailands inadequate resolve towards the financial sector was the instability 
of the ruling coalition governments.  The 1997 constitutions addressed the stability 
problem by reorganizing Thailands multi-member electoral constituencies into 
single-member electoral districts.  The electoral reforms allowed the Thai Rak Thai 
party to form a majority in the January 2001 parliament; which was only the second 
time that a single party has succeeded in forming a governing majority.  A second set 
of electoral reforms require parliamentary ministers to register with a political party at 
least 90 days prior to an election.  The registration rule is intended to increase party 
stability by forbidding defection from one party to another immediately prior to an 
election.  Third, the 1997 election qualification standards stipulate that all candidates 
must hold at least a bachelors degree.  The educational requirement targets rural 
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notables in an attempt moderate the political influence of the demographically 
dominant rural electorate.154   
Whether Thailands bank governance and more extensive political reforms 
will prove effective is as of yet unknown.  Thailands experience with financial boom 
and collapse underlines the importance of jealously protecting the authority and 
reputation of the economic bureaucracy.  The Thai story also emphasizes the link 
between bank governance and regulatory efficacy.  Financial liberalization and 
opening will inevitably prove disastrous for any country unless bank-level 
governance reforms are first rigorously applied.  The choice of an exchange rate 
regime would then depend, at least in part, upon the type of regulatory system that a 
country maintains; and under no circumstances should regulatory policy be relaxed in 
order to support the exchange rate regime.  Financial authority also requires a stable 
relationship between the executive branch of government and the regulatory agency.  
The Thai case demonstrates that rapid and simultaneous political and financial 
liberalization render the central bank and other regulatory agencies particularly 
vulnerable to political manipulation.  The problems faced by Thailand are not 
restricted to multiparty democracies however.  Authoritarian regimes can face a 
similar set of problems in the wake of financial liberalization and opening; and it is 
upon such a case that the next chapter will focus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
154 David Murray, Thailands Recent Electoral Reforms, Electoral Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 
(December 1998), 526 
  
 
 
153
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Taiwan Invulnerable 
Financial Authority and the Politics of Regulatory Discipline 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The stability of Taiwans banking system during the Asian financial crisis of 
1997 represents an important puzzle for the theory of regulatory politics.  The 
majority of the literature that seeks to explain Taiwans survival of the regional 
financial crisis focuses upon Taiwans robust macroeconomic position as well as its 
flexible industrial organization.  However, Taiwans trade balance and financial sector 
deteriorated considerably between 1997 and 2002, and yet Taiwans banking system 
recovered without the outbreak of a system-wide crisis.  Because few studies have 
researched the manner in which Taiwans regulatory system distributes the costs and 
benefits of financial regulation, most observers have ignored the fact that Taiwan has 
been confronting challenges to the stability of its financial sector from the first 
moments of its inception.   
Taiwan is an important case for testing the hypothetical expectations of the 
contract-theoretic model developed in chapter two because the model predicts that 
financial regulation will always have distributive consequences for the members of 
Taiwanese society and so any equilibrium that is negotiated between bank managers 
and government regulators, or that is imposed by government fiat, will be temporary 
and ultimately unstable.  The primary source of financial instability in Taiwans 
history was the conflict between the KMT and the native Taiwanese over control of 
the credit market, which occurred within the context of the broader conflict between 
Taiwan and mainland China.   
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As figure 5.1 illustrates, Taiwans economic growth has been punctuated by 
periods of high growth as well as frequent economic downturns.  According to the 
argument outlined in chapter two, the irregular cyclical pattern of Taiwans growth 
trajectory can in part be explained by conflict over control of the positive and negative 
externalities of the banking system.  Furthermore, I argue that distributional conflict 
over the banking system created a dynamic that forced the nationalist government, and 
later the DPP-led government, to continuously adjust their regulatory policies.  And so 
even when the financial markets were functioning most efficiently, between 1989 to 
1994, the entry of the native Taiwanese into the formal credit market resulted in a 
struggle between the native Taiwanese business community and the KMT, as each 
group sought to re-adjust the allocation of the costs and benefits of financial 
regulation in such a manner as to make a stable regulatory trajectory impossible to 
preserve.   
Taiwan is also an important case because it did not succumb to the regional 
financial crisis in 1997.  The resilience of Taiwans banking system following the 
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collapse of the regional financial system in Asia, as well as Taiwans ability to cope 
with the regulatory risks associated with capital outflows to mainland China in the 
1990s, serve as an illustration of the conditions under which the government can 
credibly commit to the observance of prudential regulatory standards in the financial 
environment of the open economy.   
A first cut overview of Taiwans regulatory history is represented in Table 
5.1.  The table reveals that Taiwan has witnessed several minor or mini-crises 
throughout its history; such as the financial disturbances that followed the diplomatic 
crisis of 1979, during the underground credit crisis in 1988, during the cross straits 
crisis in 1994, and finally, following the Asian regional crisis in 1997.  Hence, rather 
than a set of systemic mega-crises, such as those experienced Asia in 1997 or such as 
was observed in Mexico in 1982 and 1994; Taiwan instead experienced a set of 
contained implosions of parts or segments of its financial sector.  Why does the 
Taiwanese pattern of financial crisis diverge so distinctively from that of other 
economies?   
Contrary to arguments that are currently popular within the political economy 
literature, the relative ability of Taiwans regulators to preserve prudential banking 
standards was not the result of the institutional delegation of regulatory authority to an 
independent government agency.  The Taiwanese model is based instead upon the 
creation of multiple regulatory institutions, none of which claimed legal independence 
from Taiwans central government.   
In accordance with the formal model presented in chapter two, bank managers 
obeyed prudential regulatory standards when the government demonstrated its resolve 
to impose bankruptcy costs upon delinquent bank managers and further demonstrated 
that it would not hesitate to re-allocate managerial control rights when a financial 
crisis; which occurred following the diplomatic crisis of the 1970s, following the 
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bursting of the underground credit bubble in the late1980s, and following the cross 
straits crisis that occurred between 1994-95.   
Taiwans financial regulators insist that a legally independent regulatory 
agency would not have sufficient authority to insure that Taiwans bank managers 
abide by prudential standards, nor would an independent agency have the authority to 
respond to the domestic financial consequences of Taiwans unstable security 
environment.  The regulatory model that evolved and currently functions in Taiwan 
relies instead upon a pre-emptive strategy, wherein regulatory authorities intervene 
into the financial sector at the first sign of financial distress in order to prevent a 
systemic crisis.   
Pre-emptive corrective action enables Taiwans financial regulators to induce a 
contained implosion of a segment of the financial sector without threatening overall 
systemic stability.  However, pre-emption was an option for Taiwans financial 
regulators only because of the non-delegation of executive decision-making power 
over the enforcement of regulatory prescriptions.  Indeed, pre-emption in Taiwan 
often occurred during periods of violent repression of political movements led by 
native Taiwanese that challenged the financial dominance of the KMT.  And so any 
explanation of Taiwans ability to resist the fate of other Asian countries in 1997 
would require a deeper understanding of the manner in which regulatory authority was 
exerted against the remainder of society, and the precise manner in which the 
Taiwanese government allocated bankruptcy costs and managerial liability during the 
post-intervention rehabilitation process. 
The social distribution of the costs and benefits of financial regulation over the 
course of Taiwans history is represented in Table 5.1 below.  In accordance with the 
theoretical framework developed in chapter two, Taiwans regulatory history is 
resolved into six regulatory scenarios that are sub-divided into conceptual categories 
that represent the credit allocation decisions of bank managers as well as the type of 
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corrective regulatory actions taken by public authorities in response to the credit 
allocation decisions of bank managers.  As a consequence of the actions of bank 
managers and public regulators, the costs and benefits of financial regulation are 
distributed between the Taiwanese government, the taxpayers, Taiwans commercial 
bank managers, and finally, the banking sectors minority shareholders. 
 Regulatory Prejudice.  The first regulatory scenario represents the period 
between 1949 and 1979, during which Chang-Kai shek and the Kuomintang party 
(KMT) re-organized the banking system to serve the nationalist struggle against 
communism.  The nationalist government strongly believed that that financial 
regulation was imperative for Taiwans national security, and consequently, the 
governance model that evolved during the first precarious decades granted the 
government maximum control over domestic banks and over the credit allocated to 
the different sectors of Taiwanese society.  The resulting monopoly over the 
allocation of credit allowed the nationalist government to extract a rent from the 
domestic savings pool that was consistent with the financial repression paradigm 
of bank governance.   
 Regulatory Failure.  The second regulatory scenario represents the period 
between 1979 and 1987, which describes the regulatory problems that emerged 
during the presidential tenure of Chiang Ching-kuo, when Taiwan suffered the loss 
of its international legal status and during which Taiwan experienced a period of 
asset inflation and witnessed the growth of an underground credit market.  The third 
scenario depicts the distributional consequences of the financial crisis of 1988.  The 
financial crisis was the direct result of governments exclusion of the Taiwanese 
business community from the formal credit market, who responded to the 
governments credit discrimination by creating an unofficial, and ultimately 
unstable, underground credit market.  
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 Regulatory Discipline.  The fourth and fifth scenarios represented in Table 5.2, 
correspond to the periods during which Taiwans regulatory apparatus adapted to the 
challenges of the Lee Tung-hui administration, during which the government initiated 
political and financial reforms that enfranchised the native Taiwanese, both politically 
and financially, and relaxed the rules that governed capital account transactions.  The 
financial sector remained stable during the early reform period, but the entry of banks 
owned by native Taiwanese in 1991 represented the first direct challenge to the 
KMTs hold over Taiwans financial sector.  The ensuing struggle taxed the 
regulatory competence of the Central Bank of China as well as the newly created 
Bureau for Monetary Affairs, which was devoted exclusively to the examination of 
banks. 
The fifth regulatory scenario of Table 5.2 depicts the period between 1993 and 
1997, and examines how electoral reforms and financial liberalization interacted in the 
1990s created a market for electoral corruption that endangered the soundness of the 
non-bank financial sector.  As Taiwans regulators scrambled to contain the financial 
consequences of increasingly intense competition between the KMT and its electoral 
competitors, a new source of financial sector vulnerability emerged in the form of 
outward flow of investment capital to mainland China during the 1990s.  The 
magnitude of the capital outflows taxed the regulatory competence of Taiwans 
regulators and threatened to alter the security balance between Taiwan and mainland 
China.  Finally, scenario six of Table 5.2 corresponds to the rise to power of the 
Democratic Peoples Party (DPP) in 1999, which launched an anti-corruption 
campaign that successfully targeted the bank managers who were most responsible for 
the financial corruption of the KMT era.  
Taiwan was able to preserve monetary stability despite all of these challenges, 
only because the regulatory apparatus could summon the political authority of the 
executive branch of Taiwans government in order to intervene in the affairs of the 
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politically most sensitive financial institutions.  Hence, although monetary instability 
was pronounced during the cross straits diplomatic crisis of 1995 as well as during the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, the multiple institutions that perform the regulatory 
function in Taiwan were able overcome the conflict between credit expansion and the 
requirements of prudential regulation that afflicted the Bank of Thailand during the 
1990s.   
 
5.2:  Financial Authority and National Security 
 
Taiwans banking system traces its origins to financial institutions founded by the 
Japanese occupation and to banks established by Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT.  
Because the nationalist government viewed the financial sector as the primary engine 
of economic growth as well as a potential source of vulnerability, the entire banking 
system remained under government ownership until the 1970s.  As Taiwans 
diplomatic position deteriorated steadily in the 1960s and 1970s, the political conflict 
between native Taiwanese and the mainland politicians who controlled the 
government intensified.  Consequently, the pre-liberalization regulatory system was 
designed to exert maximum control over lending practices of bankers, in order to 
preserve mainlander control over the financial sector and as a way of guarding 
Taiwans economic security from the depredations of financial mismanagement.  Until 
1961, the Bank of Taiwan performed the regulatory function in Taiwan.  
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 Once the Central Bank of China was re-incorporated in 1961, the central bank 
was invested with the authority to conduct both monetary policy and banking 
regulation.  The Central Bank of China was not above internal bureaucratic struggles 
however, and in 1979, the central bank had to endure the demotion of its bureaucratic 
status.  The government was also forced to reassess the viability of excluding the 
native Taiwanese business community from the formal banking sector following 
widespread financial crisis in the 1980s.   In response to the crisis, the government 
extended public supervision over the non-bank financial sector and initiated a set of 
governance reforms that anticipated many of the challenges that Taiwan would 
ultimately have to face in the financial environment of the open economy. 
 
5.21 Power Politics and the Banking System 
 
In December 1949, the government of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) was 
exiled from mainland China to the island of Formosa.  Subsequently, the financial 
sector was re-organized and unified under the control of the KMT.  The organizational 
philosophy of the KMT as well as the existential challenge posed by communist China 
required that all banks and much of the economy remain under government control.  
Taiwans security imperative translated domestically into the dominance of KMT 
mainlanders over native Taiwanese and gave rise to a hybrid governance model that 
combined multiple channels of government control over the economy with 
performance incentives similar to those of the private sector.  Hence, until the 
economic reforms of the 1980s, all major Taiwanese banks and financial institutions 
were owned and managed by the KMT, the provincial government of Taiwan, or the 
central government of the Republic of China.  
In 1895, the Japanese founded the Taiwan Osaka Chung Li Bank, which was 
the first western style bank in Taiwan.  By 1908, when the Imperial Bank of China 
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was first established on the mainland, there were already seven banks operating in 
Taiwan.  The Japanese also authorized credit cooperatives and the credit departments 
of agricultural and fishing associations to serve the rural areas of Formosa.  In 1897 
the Japanese Parliament passed the Taiwanese Banking Law that established the Bank 
of Taiwan and authorized that bank to issue and circulate local bank notes.  Due to 
Japanese efforts, by the end of the occupation in 1945 there were five major 
indigenous banks operating in Taiwan; the Bank of Taiwan (1897), the Chang Hua 
Bank (1905), the Taiwan Commercial and Industrial Bank (1910), the Hua Nan Bank 
(1919), and the Taiwan Savings Bank (1921).  Credit cooperatives also proliferated 
during the Japanese occupation, increasing from 16 cooperatives in 1913, to 252 by 
1916, and reaching a total of 498 cooperatives by the end of 1942.      
After the Japanese withdrawal in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek transferred control of 
the financial institutions established during the Japanese occupation to the Provincial 
Administration of Taiwan.155  The reorganization of the financial sector was part of 
the nationalist governments overall grand strategy that conceived of Taiwan as a base 
for reclaiming the mainland from the Communist control.  The nationalist vision 
required that the KMT exercise preponderant control over the resources of Taiwan, 
and so the provincial government established new specialized industrial banks that 
answered only to the Provincial Council.  By the early 1950s, as the result of the 
nationalization of the Japanese era banks and through the incorporation of new banks, 
the provincial government controlled approximately 90 percent of all economic 
activity in Taiwan.156   
 
                                                
155 Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Development of Banking in Taiwan: The Historical Impact on Future 
Challenges, Occasional Papers in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 6 (149) (College Park: University 
of Maryland School of Law, 1998), 13.  On October 31, 1945, the Ministry of Finance also 
promulgated the Regulation Governing the Liquidation of the Private Financial Institutions in Taiwan 
Province (liquidation regulation).   
156 Lee, Lawrence L.C., The Development of Banking in Taiwan: The Historical Impact on future 
challenges, Occasional Papers, No. 6 (149), (University of Maryland School of Law, 1998),  
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The principal function of the financial sector in the 1950s was to support 
state-owned import substitution industries (ISI) through financing the importation 
of capital goods.  The state owned banks were the primary means of financing 
specific industries or firms associated with government policies.  Control of the 
credit market also gave the KMT an effective way of maintaining the partys 
dominance over the indigenous Taiwanese by denying local businessmen access to 
financing.  The center of the financial sector during the ISI era was the Bank of 
Taiwan, which performed the function of a commercial bank and also acted the 
central bank.  The Bank of Taiwan issued currency and was the primary instrument 
of government-directed credit policies, and when required, the Bank of Taiwan 
even operated as lender of last resort.157      
The shift from ISI policies to an export led strategy as well as the termination of 
U.S. economic aid in 1958 compelled the government to expand the financial sector.  
As part of the regimes new development strategy, the Central Bank of China was 
reopened in 1961 and new financial institutions were established to finance 
development projects.  Although preferential credit allocation diminished in the 
1960s, the government maintained authority over the reform process by granting 
foreign banks only limited access to the domestic market and by strictly controlling 
the rate of growth of private financial institutions.158  Initially, local capitalists were 
only permitted to retain control of the urban credit cooperatives that were chartered 
during the colonial period.  In the 1950s, the government licensed only 7 privately 
owned mutual loan and savings institutions.  Local entrepreneurs were permitted to 
open insurance companies in the 1960s but were not authorized to own controlling 
shares in trust and investment companies until the 1970s.159  By 1980, the seven 
                                                
157 Lee, Ibid,  
158 Tun-jen Cheng, Guarding the Commanding Heights: The State as Banker in Taiwan, in Stephan 
Haggard ed., The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
63 
159 Cheng, Guarding the Commanding Heights, 74-75 
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government commercial banks still accounted for almost 90 percent of total bank 
deposits, while the privately owned banks held only 5 percent of total deposits.160 
The earliest governance model that developed in Taiwan was a product of the 
provinces unique economic and security environment.  The nationalists conceived of 
banks as the key to economic security and so the government and ruling party 
maintained strict control over the governing boards of the major banks.  The chairman 
of the board and the senior board members of each commercial bank were often ex-
ministry of finance and central bank officials who were appointed directly by the 
premiers office or by the provincial government.  The nationalist government 
appointed the senior staff of each bank and even determined the internal salary scales 
and annual bonuses within the commercial banks that were regulated by various arms 
of the government.161  The final component of the state dominated financial sector was 
the regulatory and supervisory system, which was designed in such as manner as to 
insure the obedience of bank managers to the regimes ideological goals and 
organizational philosophy. 
 
4.21   The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Discipline 
 
Taiwans political institutions are strongly influenced by the nationalist 
struggle against communism and by the ongoing confrontation with the Peoples 
Republic of China.  The Taiwanese regulatory system is no exception.  The regulatory 
apparatus is a hybrid system that draws upon influences that are as diverse as the 
political philosophy of Dr. San Yat Sen, the nationalist governments experience with 
hyperinflation and financial crisis on the mainland during the 1930s, and even the 
                                                
160 Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 161 
161 Wade, Governing the Market, 161 
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infrastructure created by the Japanese occupation government.  The post-1949 
regulatory system is also a product of the KMTs historical obsession with political 
control of the economy, which is reflected in the labyrinthine authority structure of the 
economic bureaucracy. 162    
According to Taiwans constitution, the countrys most powerful political 
institution is the President of the Republic.  The remainder of the central government 
is organized within the five yuans, which are the branches of the national 
government.   The Legislative Yuan is the primary law making body in Taiwan, and 
among its many responsibilities, the legislative body appoints the members of the 
Executive Yuan.   The Executive Yuan consists of the Cabinet, and the Office of the 
Premier, who presides over the Executive Yuan.163  The ministries, agencies, and 
commissions responsible for economic governance are generally contained within the 
Executive Yuan, and as a general rule, the President appoints the cabinet and premier.  
The third and fourth branches of government are the Judicial Yuan and the Control 
Yuan respectively, which interpret the constitution, adjudicate civil and criminal trials, 
and in the case of the Control Yuan, applies censures against government officials 
who have behaved illegally or unethically.164   
The constitution also grants the central government the highest level of 
statutory authority over the financial sector.  The financial powers of the central 
government include legal jurisdiction over the entire banking system, control of the 
                                                
162  Cheng, Guarding the Commanding Heights, 77; The KMTs determination to directly control the banking 
sector was also informed by the memory of the treachery suffered at the hands of financiers during the civil war 
period on the mainland.  During the final years of the wartime period (1943-1945), private banks colluded with 
merchants in order to collect rents from credit allocation, to hoard commodities for speculative purposes, and to 
profit from inflationary prices.  The result the bankers conspiracy was a period of hyperinflation and financial 
crisis that undermined the nationalist governments political legitimacy.  The experience with hyperinflation on 
the mainland led the KMT regime to conclude that private bankers could not be trusted with the implementation of 
a stable monetary policy. 
163 The Premier also serves as a liaison between the executive branch of government and the Presidents Office. 
164 Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 84; Wade, Governing the 
Market, 196; The members of the Control Yuan are generally named and appointed by the provincial and city 
governments.  Until the 1999 presidential elections, the presidents position as the KMT party leader combined 
with the partys dominance of official positions gave the president powers that overwhelmed the 
formal institutional balance between the branches of government.   
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monetary and exchange rate system, as well as full managerial responsibility for the 
state-owned enterprises and financial institutions.  Although the Provincial 
Government of Taiwan is constitutionally subordinate to the central government, the 
provincial government retains administrative jurisdiction over local townships.  As 
depicted in Table 5.3, until the government privatization efforts in the 1990s, the 
provincial government also exercised controlling interest in the banks, businesses, or 
credit cooperatives that were owned by the sub-national governmental units.  
Bureaucratic controls illustrated in Figure 5.2 meant that all Taiwanese 
financial institutions are further beholden to the Executive Yuan, to which Taiwans 
regulatory institutions formally report, as well as to the Civil Code and the Banking 
Law, which are enforced by the Control Yuan, the Provincial Government, the 
Judicial Yuan, and the government offices responsible for legal prosecution.  In all, 
until the financial reforms of the late 1980s, state owned banks were monitored and 
supervised by a total of fifteen government agencies.165  
 Taiwans elaborate regulatory system succeeded in moderating risk taking by 
bank managers to the extent that many outside observers have noted that Taiwans 
state-owned banks are managed like pawn-shops.  The most severe of the 
governments regulations were associated with writing-off non-performing loans.  
Given that bank managers and their staff were legally designated as civil servants, any 
bank officers who approved loans that became non-performing were held personally 
liable for the loss and were therefore subject to administrative penalties as well as 
criminal prosecution.  
                                                
165 Until 1998, Taiwans three leading commercial banks, Chang Hwa, Hua Nan, and First Commercial 
Bank, were owned by the Ministry of Finance, managed by the Department of Finance f the Taiwan 
Provincial Government, supervised by the central bank, overseen by the Control Yuan, audited by the 
Legislative Yuan and the Provincial Assembly, budgeted by the Director General of Auditing, Budget 
and Statistics, and under the Personnel Bureau o the Executive Yuan for personnel management.  For 
every bank, the appointment of top level personnel for example the president or chairperson, need 
approval from at least six agencies, whereas budgets need approval from four agencies. 
  
 
 
169
 Prudential restrictions also limited unsecured loans to 25 percent of an 
institutions total deposits and imposed a six month maturity limit upon unsecured 
loans and a one year limit upon secured loans.  Furthermore, the central bank and 
finance ministry strictly monitored any loans with maturities beyond the one-year 
limit.  Although the statutory limitations upon the type of loans a bank could advance 
were relaxed in 1968 and largely removed in 1975, managerial constraints governing 
the internal operations of banks were strictly maintained. Prudential regulatory 
constraints also served distributive functions, which created rent-seeking opportunities 
for KMT insiders.  Until the reforms of the late 1980s, for instance, regulatory 
limitations granted the KMT government a near monopoly over the domestic credit 
market and to thereby prevent the native Taiwanese from establishing private banks.  
 Instead, the government pursued a policy that preserved the state dominance of 
the banking sector.  In order to meet increased demand for credit, in 1958, the 
government re-established four financial institutions that had once operated on the 
mainland.  The provincial government also increased the guanxiyes access to credit in 
the early 1970s by permitting native Taiwanese to establish six trust and investment 
companies (TICs).  More importantly, in 1976 the provincial government opened the 
Medium Enterprise Bank (TMEB) and between 1977 and 1979, the government 
approved seven licenses for privately owned and regionally operated medium 
enterprise banks.   
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 While more substantial native Taiwanese ownership of commercial banks 
would have to await the reforms of the late 1980s, the government cultivated foreign 
participation in the domestic banking sector more actively.  In 1972, the government 
granted a group of overseas Chinese permission to open the United World Chinese 
Commercial Bank.  Taiwans leadership also opened the domestic credit market to ten 
western banks between 1972 and 1976, eight of which were American multinational 
banks. 
 Over the 1970s, Taiwans balance of payments became consistently positive.  
Despite the oil shock of 1973, which caused a recession between 1974 and 1975, 
foreign exchange surpluses continued to accumulate.  Government stabilization 
policies and an appreciation of the Japanese yen also helped Taiwan reach a GDP 
growth rate of 4.9 percent in 1975, and by 1977, Taiwan once again enjoyed trade 
surpluses.166  In 1974, the KMT sought to stimulate economic activity by initiating 
Ten Major Construction Projects which cost the government US $5.8 billion.  The 
projects included the Kaoshiung Shipyard (4 percent), steel mills (17.6 percent), 
petrochemical facilities (15.4 percent) Taoyuan International Airport, and several 
railroad and seaport projects.167  The domestic economy responded strongly to the 
fiscal stimulus of the government infrastructure projects, and so by the late 1970s, 
Taiwan had accumulated sufficient assets to become a capital-exporting country.   
Although Taiwans economic growth rates had long outpaced nearly all of the 
developing economies, Taiwans economic success could not prevent the outbreak of 
a series of political and economic crises that were to test the limits of the countrys 
resilience.  The first crisis began on October 25th 1975, when the United Nations 
General Assembly voted to transfer the Security Council seat once held by Taiwan to 
                                                
166 Frank S.T. Hsiao and Mei-Chu W. Hsiao, Taiwanese Economic Development and Foreign Trade, 
in John Y.T. Kuark, ed, Comparative Asian Economies (London: JAI Press, 1996), 251 
167 Hsaio and Hsiao, Comparative Asian Economies, 251-252 
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the Peoples Republic of China.  Due to the loss of its international status, Taiwan was 
forced to relinquish its membership in the UNs member agencies, including the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  The loss of diplomatic recognition 
forced Taiwans leadership to develop its own economic strategy, and although the 
lack of multilateral participation denied Taiwan access to several diplomatic 
resources, Taiwan was nevertheless free to pursue its own schedule in terms of the 
sequencing and timing of financial liberalization.   
The second domestic crisis was precipitated by the death of Chiang Kai-shek on 
April 5th, 1975.  Chiang Kai-sheks son, Chiang Ching-kuo, succeeded his father and 
served the final two years of the former presidents term.   There was only weak 
domestic opposition to the succession and so Chiang Ching-kuo was re-elected to the 
presidency by the National Assembly in March 21, 1978.168  A much more severe 
blow to Taiwans international position was sustained when the United States re-
opened its diplomatic relations with Communist China.  Although the Korean War 
and the war in Vietnam had made Taiwan a valuable America ally, in December 1979, 
the United States sacrificed its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in order to achieve 
the greater geo-strategic goal of separating mainland China from the Soviet Union.169   
The political and economic crisis of the 1970s did not dampen the intensity of 
domestic political struggles however, and even the central bank was not above inter-
bureaucratic conflict.  Between 1961 and 1979, the Central Bank of China held a pre-
imminent position within the economic bureaucracy, which was signified by the fact 
that the central bank answered directly to the President of the Republic.  However, 
following the constitutional reforms of 1979, the central banks status was reduced to 
a level equal to that of the finance ministry and was thereafter required to report to the 
premiers office (Executive Yuan).  Ironically, the central banks demotion was 
                                                
168 Roy, Taiwan, 156 
169 Interview, Taipei, October 2000 
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followed by the final crisis of the Chiang Ching-kuo era, which erupted as the result of 
asset price inflation and the uncontrolled expansion of Taiwans underground 
financial sector.   
The underground financial sector emerged as a result of a loophole in the 
Banking Law, which did not clearly state the exclusive rights of banks to accept 
deposits and loan funds.  Although the state owned-banks still accounted for 90 
percent of total deposits by 1980, the native Taiwanese businesses were still excluded 
from full participation in the formal credit market, and so the guanxiye developed a 
curb market that circumvented the governments regulatory authority.  Thus, between 
1965 and 1988, the curb market supplied an average of 35 percent of total loans 
granted through the financial system.  During the 1950s, the curb market offered loans 
at rates 300 percent higher than bank loan rates, but by the 1970s, curb market lending 
rates were only 50 to 100 percent higher than the loan rates of the government 
banks.170  
The unbridled expansion of the informal credit market came to an abrupt halt in 
the mid-1980s, when the underground financial sector became a source of financial 
distress and public scandal.  The non-performing loans generated by the underground 
crisis are depicted in Figure 5.3.  The underground sector consisted of loan sharks, 
underground investment companies, post-dated check discounters, and rotating credit 
clubs; entities which were beyond the reach of the formal regulatory system.  The 
underground investment companies (UICs) achieved prominence in 1986 and 1987 
when they created major economic and financial difficulties.  Hung Yuan, the largest 
of the UICs and 170 smaller UICs were estimated to hold NT$8 billion for over one 
                                                
170 Shea, Financial Sector Development in the Republic of China, Taipei, in Financial Sector 
Development in Asian Economies (); Wade, Governing he Market, 160-161.  Between 1976 and 1981 
the private sector is estimated to have received about 60 percent of their financing from banks, while 
the public sector received 96 percent of their financing from banks.   
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million investors in Taiwan.171  The UICs also engaged in stock manipulation and 
insider trading.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend: GCB = Government Commercial Banks, FBB = Finance Bureaus,  
GSB = Government Savings Banks, PB = Public Banks 
 
The first scandal involved the Tenth Credit Coop (TCC), which was the largest 
financial crisis faced by the R.O.C. government since 1949.  The TCC was bought by 
the Tsai Wan-chun family in 1957 and was transformed into the largest credit co-op 
by the mid 1970s.  TCC even surpassed commercial and several medium enterprise 
banks in terms of deposits held.  Criminal activity began in 1966 and by 1974 it 
became obvious that TCC family enterprises were receiving an unacceptably high 
portion of total loans, despite the fact that government regulations not only forbid 
extending loans to corporations but further disallowed overextension to a single firm 
or conglomerate.172    
                                                
171 Lee, The Development of Banking in Taiwan, 19 
172 Cheng, Op. Cit., 82 
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In 1985, when TCC debt became unmanageable, the government extended a NT 
$30 billion emergency loan that failed to quell a deposit run on TCC.  When the 
Ministry of Finance discontinued its liquidity support, the TCC failed, causing the 
Cathay Plastics conglomerate to declare bankruptcy.  The failure of the TCC and 
Cathay Plastics sent shockwaves throughout the financial and corporate sectors that 
affected Cathay TIC, several industrial firms (including Tatung Electronics), and 
disrupted the operations of three Trust and Investment Companies.  Eventually, the 
TCC and several related firms and industrial conglomerates.  The collapse of TCC 
sent shock waves to three bills and finance companies and nearly bankrupted Cathay 
Trust and Investment.  The political consequences of the TCC crisis reached as high 
as the top echelons of the Ministry of Finance and also forced several government 
ministers to resign.173 
The financial devastation caused by the underground credit crisis also revealed 
weaknesses in Taiwans regulatory system as well as within the national system of 
corporate governance.  In order to redress the regulatory shortfall, the government 
established the Central Depository Insurance Corporation (CDIC) in 1985 and 
sponsored further institutional innovations that were meant to strengthen the 
governments authority over the financial sector.  By 1989, the UICs had attracted 
between NT$ 200  NT$ 300 billion in capital, which were invested in speculative 
real estate and stock ventures.  The speculative nature of the UICs meant that they 
would inevitably become a regulatory problem and so the Ministry of Finance 
engaged in a pre-emptive intervention in 1988.174   
Beyond the regulatory implications, the underground crisis demonstrated the 
danger of excluding native Taiwanese businessmen from full access to the formal 
credit market and caused the KMT to question the wisdom of the state-monopoly over 
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the banking sector.  In retrospect, there is little question that the state-dominated 
banking system was one of the primary reasons that enabled Taiwan to increase its per 
capita income from US$500 in 1950 to US$11,000 in 1990, and in fact, it was 
precisely Taiwans spectacular economic success and relative political stability that 
allowed the countrys leadership to consider systematic institutional reforms for the 
first time.   
 
5.3 Financial Authority in the Open Economy 
 
Beginning in the late 1980s, Taiwans leadership initiated a set of reforms that 
transformed Taiwan from an autocracy whose banking sector was owned and 
managed by the government into an open economy that is governed by a multiparty 
democracy.  Although political and financial reforms were implemented concurrently, 
the timing and sequencing of the reforms were constrained by Taiwans legacy of 
administrative caution, the regulatory consequences of electoral reform, and by the 
reality of Taiwans international position.  Consequently, the financial authority of the 
central government was challenged; first by the regulatory implications of electoral 
competition between the KMT and its domestic rivals, and then by the uncertainty 
generated by the unstable dynamic of Taiwans financial and security environment.  
By the mid-1980s, mainland China had adopted a policy of peaceful offense 
towards Taiwan, which contrasted sharply with the military confrontation that 
punctuated cross straits relations in the 1950s an 1960s.  Fundamental disagreements 
persisted however, regarding Taiwans legal status and the ultimate destiny of 
Taiwan-mainland relations.  Mainland China insisted upon a One China, two 
systems policy, which Taipei viewed as tantamount to the legal subordination of 
Taiwans sovereignty to the PRC.  In response to Beijings pressure, Taipei countered 
with a One China, two governments initiative, which presumably freed Taiwan to 
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seek international recognition and strengthened Taipeis bargaining position over the 
final terms of political re-unification.  Hence, the seeming relaxation of cross strait 
relations created opportunities as well as new strategic challenges for both Taiwan and 
the PRC.175   
Once détente had been established between Beijing and Taipei, Chiang Ching-
kuo initiated the most sweeping political reforms since martial law had been declared 
in 1950.  The 1986 constitutional reforms did not legitimize opposition parties, but 
Chiang did permit non-KMT members to participate in legislative elections for the 
first time in 1986, and revoked martial law in February 1987.  Soon afterwards in 
January 1988, Chiang Ching-kuo died, and after some internal KMT controversy, Lee 
Tung Hui became President of the Republic in 1988.  Lee not only accelerated the 
electoral reform process, legalizing open competition for all seats of the Provincial 
Assembly and Legislative Yuan for the first time in 1992, but furthermore, President 
Lee inaugurated a period of systematic financial liberalization with a revision of the 
primary banking law in July 1989.176   
The financial reform process culminated in July 1991, when the government-
approved licenses for the establishment of 16 new banks whose major shareholders 
were private conglomerates owned by native Taiwanese.  As part of the liberalization 
process, the government strengthened its formal statutory powers over the financial 
sector by establishing the Bureau of Monetary Affairs (BMA) in 1991 and by 
augmenting the examination capability of the CDIC and the Central Bank of China, in 
order to intensify government supervision of the financial sector.177   
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 The introduction of the new banks in 1991 created three groups of domestic 
commercial banks; the old public banks, the specialized business banks, and the new 
private banks, each of which was managed by a distinct corporate culture.  The new 
private banks in particular hired away the most talented managers from the older 
banks and adopted both personnel and management policies from the multinational 
banks.  Within the new credit market there is a great deal of variety in terms of 
management strategies, but with regards to risk assessment and internal control 
mechanisms, the overall level of non performing loans increased dramatically from an 
average of 1 percent of total loans in 1988 to an average 4.8 percent in 1998.  
Compared to the banking sector, the credit cooperatives and local credit associations 
had even fewer constraints upon irresponsible and risky lending, and therefore 
suffered from much higher levels of failed loans.178   
The deteriorating risk profile of Taiwanese financial institutions was largely a 
consequence of the erosion of the once strictly enforced firewall between financial 
regulation and legislative politics.   The electoral reforms of the 1990s allowed 
business conglomerates that were once excluded from economic policymaking to 
more directly lobby the government, through campaign contributions as well as 
through fielding candidates in the legislative elections.  In fact, Lee Tung Hui himself 
cultivated the support of Taiwanese business groups as part of his attempt to balance 
the non-mainstream elements of the KMT who staunchly opposed his presidency.  
Upon reaching legislative positions, pro-banking sector candidates were quick to gain 
seats on the powerful finance committees, enabling the banking sector to influence 
financial legislation as well as the appointment of officials to the governing boards of 
the primary regulatory institutions.179 
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Electoral competition also created a steady demand for campaign financing, 
which granted financial institutions even greater power to affect the outcome of 
legislative elections.  Taiwans largest electoral districts are multi-member 
constituencies, and electoral outcomes in all of the districts are calculated according to 
the single non-transferable vote (SNTV).  The organization of the Taiwanese 
electorate allows each party to centrally control the distribution of parliamentary seats 
but also forces candidates from the same party to compete for campaign financing and 
to vie for votes within the same district.  As electoral competition between the KMT 
and the Democratic Peoples Party (DPP) continued in the 1995 and 1999 legislative 
elections, banks and credit cooperatives became the main source of funds for 
campaign financing as well as for illicit activities such as vote buying.  Illegal election 
tactics and speculative investments associated with KMT candidates were described as 
black gold by the popular media, and increased in direct proportion to the 
intensification of electoral competition.  Hence, the supervisory demands upon 
government agencies charged with overseeing the financial sector increased 
dramatically in the 1990s, because of the expanding number of banks and also because 
of the regulatory consequences of electoral reform.   
The most significant constraint upon the economic bureaucracy however 
remained Taiwans international political reality.  The general relaxation of tensions 
between the superpowers following the end of the cold war in Europe refocused 
international attention upon the unresolved political conflict between Taiwan and the 
PRC.  Within the new security environment, the PRC adopted a global strategy that 
was designed to check Taiwan militarily, attract Taiwan economically, and blockade 
Taiwan diplomatically.180  Implicit to Beijings strategy was granting Taiwan access 
to the mainlands vast markets as a way of increasing Taiwans economic dependence 
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upon the PRC.  The Taiwanese government responded cautiously to mainland Chinas 
policy and sought to restrict cross straits investment while expanding Taipeis 
international efforts to secure diplomatic recognition.  Thus, as Taiwanese investments 
flowed to China in increasingly larger waves during the 1990s, the diplomatic 
competition between Beijing and Taipei also intensified; creating sufficient political 
tensions to precipitate the cross-straits crisis of 1995-1996.181  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 5.4 illustrates, the government was successful in dampening 
exchange rate volatility.  However, the cross-straits crisis caused widespread monetary 
instability in Taiwans asset markets as well as in the domestic credit market, which 
forced the government to rethink its financial strategy.  As an immediate response to 
the deposit runs that followed the crisis, the CDIC initiated a deposit insurance 
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program in 1995 and dramatically expanded its examination of the non-bank financial 
sector.  The government also renewed its emphasis upon financial regulation and 
supervision as a means of controlling the international investment activities of 
Taiwanese conglomerates.  In 1996, Lee Tung Hui announced a Go slow, be patient 
policy which was designed to reduce Taiwanese dependence upon Chinese markets by 
moderating the flow of investment funds to the mainland.  Finally, the government 
established four stabilization funds that were intended to insulate the financial sector 
from the effects of international shocks such as those experienced during the cross-
straits crisis.182   
The re-assertion of the economic bureaucracys authority over the financial 
sector coincided with the initial stages of the Asian financial crisis in 1996.  The 
macroeconomic strength of Taiwan was thus fortified by the governments ability, 
through the multiple regulatory agencies, to protect the banking sector from the most 
devastating effects of the regional financial crisis.  Although the monetary and 
banking system came under stress in late 1997, the central bank quickly deployed its 
US$85 billion in foreign exchange reserves in order to guard the monetary system 
against speculative pressures.  Moreover, Taiwans experience with financial crisis in 
the late 1980s and the monetary instability generated by the cross-straits crisis had 
forced the regulatory apparatus to anticipate future external shocks.  Nor were 
Taiwans banks permitted access to external debt markets to the extent of banks in 
other Asian economies.  The many years of regulatory discipline and unending 
political crisis between Taipei and Beijing had well prepared Taiwanese bank 
managers for the rigors of the open economy.  And so despite an increase in the level 
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of non-performing loans and a weakened financial sector, Taiwan remained 
invulnerable to the ultimate effects of the regional financial crisis.   
5.31 Governing Banks: Financial Liberalization and National Security 
 
In July 1988, the central committee of the KMT elected Lee Tung Hui President 
of the Republic of China.  Because of his native Taiwanese origins, Lees ascension to 
power was initially resisted by several military commanders and by the leaders of the 
party bureaucracy.183  After the 1990 presidential elections, President Lee reorganized 
the party hierarchy and encouraged electoral reform, in part to weaken the hold of the 
older party bureaucracy upon the legislative institutions. 184   The native Taiwanese 
business community, excluded from meaningful political participation since the 
foundation of the republic, enthusiastically responded to President Lees request for 
support.   Hence, the systematic financial reforms that began in 1988 were an integral 
part of Lee Tung Huis broader plan to reorganize the institutional foundations of the 
Taiwanese government.185   
Financial liberalization in Taiwan began with the gradual deregulation of interest 
rates in 1980, and so by 1989, the broad spectrum of interest rates was ostensibly 
determined within the credit market.  In 1988, the government initiated a reform of 
stock brokerage firms as the first phase of the wider liberalization effort.  The next 
step was the revision of the banking law in July 1989, which affected one third of all 
legal provisions that governed the banking sector and removed the licensing 
restrictions for opening new banks, thereby permitting native Taiwanese to participate 
fully in the banking sector for the first time.  By September 1989, nineteen 
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applications for the establishment of new banks had been submitted to the Ministry of 
Finance, which approved the licenses of sixteen new banks in early 1991.186 
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The financial reforms expanded the commercial banking sector by 50 percent 
and as a result, the introduction of the new private banks into the credit market altered 
the overall system of corporate governance.  The most immediate effect the new banks 
was a relaxation of the once strictly enforced credit constraint upon the guanxiqiye 
and the larger family owned conglomerates.187  The expansion in credit is depicted in 
Figure 5.5.  With the emergence of a new source of bank financing, private businesses 
were freed from one of the most powerful instruments that the government had once 
                                                
186 Further amendments of the bank law in 1993 allowed banks to engage in securities underwriting 
and to issue short term debt instruments, and from 1994, the regulations administering bill-financing 
companies were also relaxed.  Banks were afterwards permitted to trade in derivatives, to privately 
deal in bonds and to provide fee-based consultancy services.   
187 Fields, Karl, Enterprise and the State in Korea and Taiwan, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1995), .  In 1992, small and medium sized businesses accounted for over 97 percent of the companies 
in Taiwan and accounted for over 40 percent of total production.  Prior to the banking reforms, small 
and medium sized firms relied on domestic financial institutions for only 39 percent of their total 
external financing, which was slightly lower than the average conglomerate level of 42 percent.   
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used to contain the expansion and political influence of private business groups.  
Beyond the new banks, financial reforms also created an over-the-counter (OTC) 
market for corporate securities that allowed Taiwanese firms to raise US$27.6 billion 
in domestic asset markets and US$8.9 billion internationally.188  Consequently, the 
government could no longer easily dominate native Taiwanese business groups, and 
had to instead employ more subtle regulatory policies to influence corporate decisions.   
The looming challenges of the new credit market were not unanticipated, and 
although restrictions upon the participation of native Taiwanese in the economy and 
political system had become obsolete, the legacy of regulatory caution engendered by 
the KMTs obsession with financial security survived the liberalization process.  
Accordingly, as depicted in Figure 5.6, the economic bureaucracy and the more 
conservative legislators moved to strengthen the primary regulatory agencies.  
Simultaneous to approving new bank licenses, the Ministry of Finance upgraded its 
monetary department in July 1991 to form the Bureau of Monetary Affairs, which 
allowed the finance ministry to engage in financial examination for the first time.  The 
forty bank examiners employed by the Bureau of Monetary Affairs after 1991 focused 
exclusively upon the new private banks.  In 1991, the government announced a CDIC 
administered deposit insurance program that by 1992 was covering 68 percent of 
deposits in private institutions and 13 percent of deposits in the government owned 
banks.  Finally, the financial examination department of the Central Bank of China 
was expanded in 1991, and in 1996, the CDIC doubled the number of its financial 
examiners.189   
                                                
188 Semkow, Taiwans Capital Market Reform, pg. 22 
189 Interviews by the author, Taipei, Taiwan, October 2000 
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In 1992 the Central Bank of China moved to further strengthen its regulatory 
command over the foreign exchange system in order to neutralize external sources of 
monetary instability.  Domestic banks were now compelled to notify the central bank 
of any foreign exchange transactions in excess of US$100,000, and until the end of 
1996, the central Bank of China required all banks to limit their derivative transactions 
to a level below 33 percent of their total foreign exchange position.  The central bank 
also resisted the internationalization of the Taiwanese currency by restricting 
ownership of foreign assets and by placing limits upon the extent to which banks 
could hold foreign liabilities.190  As a result, any domestic bank that wanted to engage 
in short term foreign borrowing had to first overcome the many regulatory hurdles 
imposed by the Central Bank of China.  In fact, the central banks dominance over 
Taiwans foreign exchange market was so complete that one senior bank officer 
remarked: The central bank is the FX market.191   
As of December 1994, there were a total of 58 domestic commercial banks in 
the Taiwanese credit market; which consisted of 13 government-owned banks, nine 
specialized business banks, and the 16 new commercial banks.192  Due to the 
expansion of the banking sector, there are now a wide variety of management models 
governing the manner in which banks extend credit, manage risk, and enforce 
regulatory statutes.   
 Credit allocation within the Taiwanese credit market is based upon a graduated 
scale of authority within each bank, and as is the case of Thai banks, the board of 
governors controls the most significant loans.  Government banks include the Bank of 
                                                
190 Chu, Yun-han, Surviving the East Asian Financial Storm: The Political Foundation of Taiwans 
Economic Resilience, in T.J.Pempel, editor: The Politics of the Asian  Financial Crisis (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2000),  
191 Ho, Szu-yin and Jih-chu Lee.  The Political Economy of Local Banking in Taiwan, (Unpublished 
manuscript, National Chengchi University, 1999), 6 
192 Central Banking: Special Edition, (Taipei: Central Bank of China), 28.  By 1994, there were 483 
financial institutions, which together had 3,975 branches, and so the government was required to 
examine and supervise 4.278 financial units in total.  The central bank directly supervised 1,232 units, 
the finance ministry monitored 781 units and the CDIC was responsible for 2,265 units. 
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Taiwan, the largest of the commercial banks, and the Central Trust of China; each of 
which are 100 percent government owned.  The asset portfolios of government banks 
range in value from US$3 billion to US$55 billion (average asset value of US$25 
billion).  Within the Bank of Taiwan, the president of the bank can approve loans up 
to a NT$150 million limit, but larger loans require the approval of the board of 
governors.193  The credit allocation policies within the Central Trust of China, by 
contrast, require that loans above the NT$50 million to be approved by the banks 
board of governors.194  Until 1998, the provincial government also retained full 
ownership of the big three: Chung Hua Bank, Hua Nan Bank and First Commercial 
Bank, which together account for 20 percent of Taiwans loan market.195    Despite the 
great variety in term of overall performance within public sector banks, the share of 
the loan market held by the government banks between 1992 and 1997 fell from 74 
percent to 60 percent.196    
The specialized business banks consist of four public banks and five privately 
controlled banks, such as the International Bank of Taiwan.  Despite the financial 
reforms of the early 1990s, the government continues to impose both geographic 
limitations and credit requirements upon the specialized banks.  The Ministry of 
Finance has divided Taiwan into six banking districts and the Central Bank of China 
allows only one specialized bank per district.   Each of the specialized banks is also 
required to allocate 70 percent of their loan portfolio to small and medium sized 
enterprises, and in return, the geographic restrictions permit each specialized banks to 
                                                
193 Interview by the author, Taipei, Taiwan, September, 2000 
194 Interview by the author, Taipei, Taiwan, October, 2000 
195 According to article 7 of the banking law, the state owned banks are held accountable according to 
the Ministry of Finances strict credit policies and personal liability rules that force individual bank 
officers to take responsibility for any mistakes.  The board of governors of the Bank of Taiwan or the 
Central Trust of China, like that of all government banks, is appointed by the Ministry of Finance in 
consultation with the Premiers office. 
196 Casserley, Dominic, Banking in Asia: The End of Entitlement, (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 
1999), The state owned banks share of deposits also shrank from market share deposits for state 
owned banks dropped from 56 in 1992 percent to 47 percent by 1996 
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extract an oligopolistic rent from its respective district.197  In the wake of financial 
reforms, the nine specialized regional banks also witnessed a decline in their share of 
the loan market, from 13 percent in 1991 to 11 percent in 1997.198   
By far the most dynamic segment of the banking sector consists of the 18 new 
private banks, which include E Sun Bank, Union Bank, En Tie Bank, Bank Sinopac, 
and Cosmos Bank.  According to Table 5.3, each new bank is associated with a family 
owned conglomerate that generally controls the appointment of the managers and the 
directors of the new banks.199  Although there is a great deal of diversity in terms of 
the private banks managerial models, the bank system survey in Appendix B reveals 
that the governing boards of Taiwans private banks generally control the approval of 
any loan applications above the $NT 100 range.   For instance, according to E Suns 
management model, loans above NT$ 80 million require the approval of the central 
credit committee.  Within Union Bank, which is owned by the same conglomerate as 
E Sun bank, any secured loan greater than NT $ 70 million and any unsecured loan 
greater than NT $ 20 million, requires the approval of the credit examination 
committee.  The Taiwanese banking sector also contains banks that claim that their 
capital-asset-ratio is at least 10 percent, and a few banks, such as Bank Sinopac, even 
claim a capital-asset-ratio as high as 13 percent.  
Because of poor accounting standards and asymmetric information, the private 
banks prefer long-term relationships with the largest of the conglomerates and with 
firms with excellent market reputations.  The private banks also tend to be smaller 
than the government banks and therefore the new banks tend to engage in syndicated 
                                                
197 Interviews by the author, September, 2000; In Taipei County, for instance, the only specialized 
bank permitted to operate is the International Bank of Taiwan.  The Ho family, who holds 15 percent 
of the banks equity, and has become Taiwans wealthiest specialized bank, manages the International 
Bank of Taiwan. 
198 Casserley, Banking in Asia,  
199 However, the Ministry of Finance can still nominate certain officers to the board of each private 
bank and thus the family run conglomerates are not totally free of the governments administrative 
guidance.   
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loans to distribute risk more effectively.  Hence, the more successful of the private 
banks, including E Sun bank and En Tie bank, engaged syndicated loans that totaled 
NT$120 billion and NT$ 50 billion respectively.200  Because of financial innovation 
and aggressive lending practice, the new private banks have doubled their share of 
the loan market from 10 percent in1993 to 20 percent in 1997.201  
Interviews at a random sample of 10 institutions drawn from both government banks 
and the private banks revealed a dominant trend whereby risk management is 
conducted by each banks credit department.202  The nine limits system is an 
internal risk management system that imposes concentration limitations on credit 
allocation and a ceiling on loans to related parties.203  Although the central bank 
stipulates that cash flow analysis must be performed for any loans above the 
NT$100 million level, there is a general consensus that for loans above the NT$ 500 
million level, the quality of the collateral that is offered as a security by a 
prospective customer is far more important.   
According to internal surveys, approximately 90 percent of all loans 
extended by banks in Taiwan are fully secured by collateral.  The primary reason 
that collateral is the main criteria used to assess potential clients is that information 
asymmetries within the credit market make proper assessment of a project or 
businesses viability nearly impossible.204  The opacity of the Taiwanese corporate 
                                                
200 Interviews by the author, Taipei, Taiwan, September, 2000; see also: Semkow, Taiwans Capital 
Market Reform, Bank main customers.  Many of the conglomerates such as Formosa Group and 
Nanya Plastics had overlapping governing boards. 
201 Casserly, Banking in Asia,  
202 Interview by the author, Taipei, Taiwan, September, 2000 
203 Banks are also governed by the 9 limit system which imposes limits upon: 1) loans to related parties, 
2) loans to a single client, 3) loans to a single sector, 4) foreign exchange transactions, 5) external 
liabilities, 6) unsecured loans, 7) branch limits, 8) loans to a particular industry, and 9) loans to the 
government 
Every loan officer interviewed about credit allocation also referred to the five Ps: 1) People (i.e. 
reputation), 2) Purpose of the loan, 3) Payment (i.e. cash flow analysis), 4) Protection (i.e. collateral), and 
5) Perspective  referring to the quality of a corporations business plan.   
204 Yu, Hai-Chin, Asymmetric Information, Collateral, and Interest Rate: The Case of Taiwan, in 
J. Jay Choi and John A. Doukas, editors: Emerging Capital Markets: Financial and Investment 
Issues, (London: Quorum Books, 1998),  
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sector is due to the inadequacy of the accounting system as well as the proliferation 
of techniques, such as nominee (dummy) accounts devised to circumvent 
government supervision of corporate transactions.   
Accounting standards in Taiwan are notoriously unreliable and it is a well 
known principle that the small and medium sized firms keep three sets of books; one 
set for the tax collectors, one set for submitting to banks as part of loan applications, 
and a private set of accounting books for the firms management.  While Taiwans 
conglomerates generally release more accurate information than the smaller firms, 
the fact that Taiwans largest conglomerates own the new banks has become a 
primary regulatory concern.     
Consequently, the central bank and finance ministry are very insistent that 
banks and corporations report any loans to affiliated parties or loans to shareholders 
on a separate evaluation report that must be submitted annually.205  Nevertheless, 
some of the private banks attempt to bypass the central governments reporting 
requirements by rolling over late loans, transferring non-performing assets to 
subsidiary firms and in some cases, by engaging in outright fraud.   
 
                                                
205 Some banks claim that their related party loan procedure is more strictly regulated by internal 
standards than is required by the CBC.  The CBC limits loans to any single person to less than 15 
percent of a banks tier-1 equity and loans to any industrial group to less than 40 percent of a banks 
tier-1 equity, but there are no limits on the concentration of a banks loan portfolio to a single 
industry.  Related firms must secure collateral that is equal to 40 percent of a banks tier-1 equity.  If 
the amount of a related firm loan is greater than 1 percent of a banks tier-1 equity, then the loan 
must be approved by the banks board of governors.   
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The data on non-performing loans demonstrates clearly that increased 
competition undermined the internal control mechanism within the commercial 
banks that had once been so strictly enforced.  Following the period of regulatory 
activism of the late 1980s, the overall level of NPLs exhibited a downward trend, 
from an average of 4 percent in 1976, to an average of 1 percent in 1991.  However, 
as illustrated in Table 5.8, the competitive pressures and regulatory burdens of the 
post-liberalization era were such that non-performing loans began accumulating 
once more among the old government banks and in some of the new private banks.  
Hence, as Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 depict, the overall level of NPLs increased from 
an average of 1.5 percent in 1992 to a much higher average level of 4 percent by 
1995. 
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The rising level of NPLs reflected deep problems with the management of 
some of the old government banks and several of the new banks.  An important case 
of corruption within a government bank is that of China Trust Bank.  Before the era 
of financial reform, credit officers within the bank enjoyed sufficient social prestige 
that in order to gain access to credit, prospective customers had to first develop a 
personal relationship with the banks managers.  Due to the unofficial credit policy, 
Central Trusts managers and board members became very rich from personal 
donations from potential customers.  Despite the legal infractions perpetrated 
Central Trusts management, the judicial system was dominated by the KMT prior 
to political reforms and thus no action was taken to investigate Central Trust until 
the late 1990s.206   
                                                
206 Interview by the author, Taipei, Taiwan, October, 2000 
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A second set of regulatory difficulties involves the chaotically managed credit 
cooperatives and the poorly supervised credit departments of the agricultural and 
fishermans associations.  The credit cooperatives are based upon broad inter-
personal networks, and thus it is not surprising that among the least well managed 
coops, insider lending can constitute up to 150 percent of an institutions net worth.  
Since the 1980s, and particularly within the South and South West counties of 
Pinton, Towyin and Kaoshing, self-loans to managers and to their relatives and 
business associates have become widespread.207  The loose managerial control and 
the reluctance of regulatory authorities to intervene in the rural credit sector until the 
late 1990s made the regional financial institutions prime suspects for illicit 
campaign financing.  Indeed, until the 1999 elections, political connections between 
rural financial institutions and local KMT representatives shielded the credit coops 
and rural associations from regulatory intervention, and as a consequence, a total of 
29 institutions suffered deposit runs between 1995 and 1996.208  Inevitably, the 
managerial deficiencies within the credit cooperatives proved to be a threat to the 
stability of the rural monetary system, and so the regional credit sector eventually 
came under more intensive regulatory scrutiny. 
A third set of challenges that confronted regulatory authorities in the post-
reform era were a result of Taiwans new security environment.  In 1991, Lee Tung 
Hui adopted a Go South policy that was aimed at promoting economic and high 
level political relationships with South East Asian countries.  However, by 1994, 
Taiwanese investments to mainland China outgrew total direct investment to the 
S.E. Asian economies.209  Between 1991 and 1994, the Taiwanese government 
                                                
207 Ho and Lee, The Political Economy of Local Banking,  
208 Ho and Lee, The Political Economy of Local Banking,  
209 Jie, Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002), Taiwans new international policy represented the strongest 
diplomatic initiative since Taiwan lost its diplomatic and legal recognition 1979. Since then, it has 
cultivated a wide range of economic and diplomatic relationships with approximately 30 nations.   
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approved US$4.6 billion in direct investment to mainland China and yet official 
Chinese government statistics claim that US$24 billion in investment projects was 
negotiated between Taiwanese and Chinese businesses.210  The distinction between 
Taiwanese and PRC figures reflects a difference in statistical definition, and more 
importantly, numerical discrepancies result from fact that a substantial number of 
native Taiwanese businesses circumvent Taipeis formal investment regulations.  By 
1994, there were reportedly 21,863 firms associated with Taiwanese investment 
spread over twenty mainland provinces, and by the end of 1995, 53 percent of 
Taiwanese related investments in China were fully owned by Taiwanese citizens.211    
Taipei was highly sensitive to the strategic consequences of export dependence 
upon the mainland and to the possibility that the burgeoning value of Taiwanese 
investment could be used by Beijing to hold Taiwan hostage.  While Taipeis ability 
to deter investments outside of its formal legal purview was limited, the government 
still held powerful regulatory instruments.  In the early 1990s, Lee Tung Hui 
established the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the Straits Affairs Foundation 
(SAF), and the Department of Mainland Operations (DMO), in order to monitor 
cross-straits interactions.   
With regards to the credit market, Taiwanese banks were not allowed to open 
branch offices in China prior to the November 1995.  Of more direct importance, 
Taiwanese investors had no choice but to obtain the majority of their capital funds 
from the Taiwanese credit market (56 percent on average) that is obviously subject 
                                                
210 Leng, Tse-Kang, The Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the 
Taiwan Straits, (New York: Westview Press, 1998), 111-112.  Difference between Chinese figures 
and Taiwanese figures are due to the fact that the Chinese figures represented negotiated deals that 
did not necessarily lead to fruition and also because many Taiwanese citizens circumvented 
government regulations upon investment and whose investments were thus not officially 
acknowledge by Taipei. 
211 Leng, The Taiwan-China Connection, 112.  The investments in the 1990s increasingly involved 
medium sized and large business ventures, so that by 1994, only 23 percent of total Taiwanese 
investments had a value of US$1 million, compared to 37 percent in 1995.   
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to government regulations.212  Furthermore, in mid-1993, the Central Bank of China 
intervened aggressively in the foreign exchange market in order to bring about the 
depreciation of the NT$, which was intended to redirect Taiwanese exports from 
mainland China to the United States.  Instead of having the desired effect, exports to 
the U.S. declined 6.8 percent from 1992 to 1993, while indirect exports to China 
rose 20 percent.213  
The international investment behavior of Taiwanese firms would eventually 
become the target of more substantive policy interventions, but by the mid 1990s, 
cross strait investment was but one of the many worries of the economic 
bureaucracy.  For by the mid 1990s, the regulatory consequences of electoral 
reforms had begun to emerge.   And although the Control Yuan and Ministry of 
Justice set strict penalties for illegal financing practices, the lack of proper 
enforcement mechanisms helped create a widespread market for electoral 
corruption that taxed the competence of the regulatory institutions even further. 
 
5.32 Banks and Ballots: Regulatory Consequences of Electoral Reform 
 
The system-wide reforms initiated by Chang Ching-kuo and accelerated by 
Lee Tung-hui were eventually adopted by the KMT as the ruling partys formal 
platform. As the KMTs historical mission to re-conquer the mainland became less 
of a concrete possibility, it became increasingly difficult to justify the extraordinary 
powers of the President as well as the KMTs monopoly over the bureaucracy and 
Taiwans legislative institutions.  Consequently, the KMT had to formulate a reform 
strategy that would address the demands of native Taiwanese for greater access to 
political and economic resources without completely relinquishing the partys 
                                                
212 Chang and Chang, The Limits of Statecraft, pg. 20 
213 Chang and Chang, Ibid, pg. 20  
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dominant position.  Yet because the electoral and constitutional revisions 
successfully altered the manner in which political power and economic resources 
were distributed, the KMT was unable to control of the long-term outcome of the 
reform process. 
The regulatory consequences of the political and financial reforms were 
predictable; the state-owned and party-owned financial institutions became the 
primary sources of massive vote-buying schemes and politically motivated loans as 
the KMT sought to maintain the partys dominance over local and national 
elections.  The illicit and politically motivated financial activities became known as 
black gold in the local media, and due to the growth of a market for illegal 
campaign financing, the intensification of political competition between the KMT 
and its adversaries led to a general deterioration of the asset quality of the 
government and party-owned financial sector.  Consequently the era of 
liberalization was also a period of distributional conflict, whose regulatory 
consequences were sufficiently severe to threaten the overall stability of Taiwans 
financial sector. 
Political reform proceeded incrementally, due to the fact that each stage of 
the process was violently contested, both within the KMT hierarchy as well as 
between the KMT and its electoral rivals.  Agitation for electoral reform in Taiwan 
dated back to the 1970s tangwai movement, but formal recognition of the principle 
of competitive elections did not occur until the May 1990 decision by Taiwans 
Council of Justices, that required the retirement of the legislators who had been 
elected on the mainland and thereby opened the way for competitive elections for 
Taiwans primary legislative bodies.  Consequently, competitive elections were 
held for the National Assembly in 1991, followed by another round of elections in 
the Legislative Yuan in 1992, and a third round of elections for the Control Yuan in 
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1993.214  The results of the national assembly and legislature elections are depicted 
in Table 5.4, Table 5.5, and Table 5.6.215   
 
Table 5.4: Popular vote and seats in Taiwan elections, 1991-1996 (% of total vote) 
 
 KMT DPP New Party    Independent 
1991 National Assembly Election        
Popular vote  71.17 23.94 n.a. 4.89 
Seats (percent) 78.2 20.3 n.a. 1.5 
 
1992 Legislative Yuan Election 52.51 30.79 n.a. 16.70 
Seats (percent) 62.7 31.7 n.a. 5.6 
 
1995 Legislative Yuan Election 46.06 33.17 12.95 7.82 
Seats (percent) 51.8 32.9 12.8 2.4 
 
1996 National Assembly Election 49.68 29.85 13.67 6.80 
Seats (percent) 54.8 29.6 13.8 1.8 
 
 
                                                
214 The National Assembly also reduced its size and also shortened the term of legislators from six 
years to four years.  According to the new laws, 225 of National Assembly members and 135 
members of the Legislative Yuan would be elected directly.  While 80 members of the National 
Assembly and 20 seats within the Legislative Yuan were appointed (as nationwide representatives) 
and 20 seats in the National Assembly and 6 seats in the Legislative Yuan ere reserved for members 
of the overseas Chinese community.  Seats in the Control Yuan and the Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
however, were distributed according to proportional representation.   
215 The DPP entered the elections with a platform that demanded the immediate declaration of 
Taiwanese independence and further constitutional revisions that would permit direct election of the 
president, thereby removing the last vestige of the KMTs dominance.  However, the DPP seems to 
have misread the electorates desire for an immediate declaration of independence which must have 
seemed radical compared to the dominant mainstream faction within the KMT led by Lee Tung-
hui.   
  
 
 
202
Table 5.5: Distribution of the popular vote in the 1994 Taiwan elections  
(% of total vote) 
 
Executive offices KMT  DPP  New Party    Independent 
Taiwan area  52.05  39.42  7.70  0.83 
Taiwan Governor 56.22  38.72  4.31  0.75 
Taipei Mayor  25.89  43.67  30.17  0.28 
Kaohsiung Mayor 54.46  39.29  3.45  2.80 
 
Representative offices KMT  DPP  New Party    Independent 
Taiwan area   49.16  31.71  6.09  13.04 
Provincial assembly  51.03  32.54  3.74  12.69 
Taipei City Council  39.48  30.41  20.83  9.28 
Kaohsiung City Council 46.28  24.85  4.82  24.06 
 
Table 5.6: Popular vote in the 1996 Taiwan presidential election (% of total vote) 
 
   KMT  DPP  New Party Independent 
   (Lee-Lien) (Peng-Hsieh) (Lin-Hau) (Cheng-Wang) 
 
Total   54.00  21.13  14.90  9.98    
Taipei City  38.90  24.34  24.87  11.89 
Taiwan Province 56.76  20.13  13.42  9.68  
Kaohsiung City 50.62  27.32  12.77  9.29 
Kinmen-Matsu 41.31  1.59  30.64  26.4 
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The DPP launched a campaign platform that called for Taiwanese 
independence, which would have at a stroke nullified Taiwans claim to represent 
the entirety of the Chinese people and would have certainly brought retaliation from 
Beijing.   The KMT, by contrast, sought to represent the ruling party as moderate 
and centrist, adopting a platform that promised reform but was conservative on the 
issue of Taiwanese independence.  The KMTs electoral strategy yielded mixed 
results, for while the ruling party to maintain majority control of Taiwans 
legislative institutions; including 78 percent of the open seats within the National 
Assembly, the KMT was only able to secure 62 percent of the open seats in the 
Legislative Yuan. 216    
 An explanation of the election outcome patterns displayed in Tables 5.4  
5.6 can be found in the fact that Taiwans electorate is divided into twelve multi-
member constituencies, and elections are governed by the single non-transferable 
vote.  Electoral outcomes and the subsequent distribution of legislative seats are 
distributed according to the principle of proportional representation, which favors 
smaller parties and creates an incentive for competition within the same party, as 
well as competition across parties, for votes within a single district.  Consequently, 
although the KMTs early electoral success guaranteed the partys short term 
position, the legislative elections of the early 1990s transformed the manner in 
which political patronage was allocated, which proved ultimately devastating to the 
KMTs hold over Taiwanese politics.   
                                                
216 Although the first step in the political transition process was complete by 1992, Taiwan had yet to 
replace the temporary provisions of the martial law era with a fully articulated constitutional 
framework.  The subsequent constitutional debate, which was inaugurated by a special session of the 
National Assembly convened from March to May 1992, yielded eight new constitutional 
amendments that permitted direct popular election of the provincial governor, county chief 
executives, as well as the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung cities.   However, despite the fact that the 
KMT mainstream and the DPP supported the idea of direct presidential elections, the convention 
failed to establish a method for electing the president of the republic, largely due to the unflagging 
resistance from conservative KMT members to the idea of direct and popular presidential elections.   
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Prior to the reforms of the 1990s, the KMT had used its vast corporate and 
financial resources to sponsor local patronage networks that provided a wide array 
of services, contracts, and favors to local constituents and private businesses.  The 
market for political patronage was thus captured by the KMT, and as a 
consequence, the party could simply allow local factions to compete for the partys 
favor, which produced a dynamic if centrally-administered system of local 
elections.  With the advent of more open elections in the early 1990s, Taiwans 
opposition groups and private business lobbies no longer had to court the KMT and 
could access political power more directly, thereby increasing the number of 
claimants upon fiscal resources and expanding the number of actors who could 
influence monetary policy.  Hence, from a centrally controlled KMT-dominated 
system, access to political power under the new electoral rules was allocated 
according to a more competitive market for political patronage that increased the 
number of claimants upon the resources that were distributed by the central 
government.   In response to the new competitive environment, the KMT expanded 
its vote-buying capacity, and some of the ruling partys local representatives even 
extended their relations with organized crime.  Particularly as the DPP and other 
rival parties became more adept at calibrating their messages towards the electorate, 
the cost of gaining an electoral victory, both organizationally and financially, 
increased dramatically.  
The first and most obvious regulatory externality generated by competitive 
elections was an expansion of the market for vote buying within the primary 
electoral districts, through which the KMT hoped to maintain its hold on power.    
The evidence of vote buying is only partial and impressionistic, but the overall 
pattern suggests that spending at the local level multiplied, particularly in Taipei 
and Kaoshing district.  For instance, during the 1991 and 1992 legislative elections, 
the average KMT candidate is reported to have offered between NT$500 to 
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NT$2,000 to secure the support of an individual voter.  More specifically, during 
the 1991 National Assembly elections, an average KMT candidate is reported to 
have spent between NT$10 million and NT$20 million (US$400,000  800,000) to 
secure votes.  Informally, it is also estimated that a Taipei district candidate 
required a minimum of NT$30 million (US$1.2 million) to secure a seat in the 
National Assembly through vote buying.  However, other estimates state that the 
amount required to buy a seat in the National Assembly or Legislative Yuan ranged 
from NT$50 million to NT$100 million (US$2million to US$4 million). (Chao and 
Myers, pg. 235).     
The KMT dominated market for legislative votes also extended to the level 
of the township and county magistrates.  In the fourth district, which is dominated 
by Xinyuan township, each vote was sold at a price between NT$200 for non-KMT 
candidates to NT$600 (US$23), for KMT candidates.  In Wandan township, the 
winner of the executive office election bought last minute votes for as much as 
NT$1,000.  On average, each candidate is reported to have spent NT$3.8 million 
(US$150,000) just prior to the township election. And in Wandan township in total, 
NT$10 million (US$370,000) was spent on race for the townships executive office, 
which translates into an average of NT$400 per vote.217  
The KMTs victories were not only a product of black gold politics, but 
were also due to the organizational capacity of the partys extensive local patronage 
network.  The local networks were critical for the KMTs electoral performance 
because the patronage system not only supplied huixuan, which were direct 
monetary benefits (such as vote buying) but also provided guanxi, which consisted 
of various forms of favors, services and access to connections.  According to the 
rules governing campaign financing, Taiwanese political candidates are permitted 
                                                
217 Bosco, 129  130 
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to spend only NT$ 300,000 within each election and vote buying was of course 
illegal.  However, prior to the electoral reforms the ruling party dominated the 
courts and Control Yuan, the institutions responsible for enforcing campaign 
finance rules, and thus there was no incentive for the courts to block the KMTs 
illegal campaign activities.  The conflict of interest meant that the KMT could 
openly flout the anti-vote buying rules at will without any risk of accountability.  
Enforcement of campaign financing rules was also made difficult by the 
proliferation of dummy accounts, which allowed banks and political parties to 
transfer of funds to candidates and to local powerbrokers without detection.  Since 
the issue of dummy accounts was not addressed until the late 1990s, enforcing the 
campaign financing laws was operationally intractable.   
The relationship between political parties and Taiwans business 
conglomerates comprised a second form of conflict of interest that proliferated 
during the elections of the early 1990s, which resulted in a second set of regulatory 
challenges that arose from the competitive elections.  For instance, following the 
1992 Legislative Yuan elections, a total of twenty-seven legislators had formal 
relationships with banks or credit unions. Among the twenty-seven legislators, 
twenty were shareholders of the new banks; sixteen were directors or supervisors of 
banks, credit unions, or other financial institutions. The trend diminished somewhat 
in the 1995 elections, after which only fifteen legislators were directors or 
supervisors of financial institutions, and in the 1998 legislative elections seated 
twenty-one legislators who had interests in the financial sector.218 
The total holdings of the KMT are depicted in Figure 5.8, and if the total 
involvement of private conglomerates in the 1992 Legislative Yuan is taken into 
consideration, then the overall penetration of private enterprise into legislative 
                                                
218 Chian 
gtian Kuo, The New Financial Politics in Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia, 22 
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politics is far more extensive.  For instance, local factions supported 78.3 percent of 
all KMT candidates participating in the 1992 elections, and 82 percent of KMT 
candidates that were elected were associated with local factions.  In fact, by the 
early 1990s, four members of the KMT Central Standing Committee (CSC) were 
leaders of the conglomerates; Koo Chen-fu of Koos Group, Chen Tien-mao of the 
Kaohsiung Chen family, Kao Ching-yuan of the President Group, and Wang Yu-
tseng of the China Rebar Group. (Leng, pp. 86-87).  Other firms hedged their 
electoral chances by supporting both the KMT as well as the DPP candidates.  The 
Evergreen Group, one of Taiwans largest conglomerates, supported more than 
thirty legislators with donations ranging from US$20,000 to US$200,000, which 
included members of the dominant KMT mainstream faction as well as their 
primary DPP challengers.  The Hualon Group is reported to have spent a total of 
US$40 million to support a single candidate (Ho Chih-huei) during the 1993 county-
level elections in Miaoli County.219 
The main source of the KMTs illicit campaign finance activities were the 
party owned firms and financial institutions, which are summarized in Table 5.10.  
However, the private firms also engaged in financing that went beyond the 
NT$300,000 per candidate limit.  Relative to their size however, the local factions 
that vied for power at the township and county level were by far the best financed 
of all the candidates of the elections of the early 1990s.  Government and party 
banks suffered the highest level of NPLs.  The most severe deterioration of asset 
quality occurred in the local fisherman and farmers associations, which were the 
main sources of election financing at the local level, and were often the primary 
beneficiaries of legislative arbitrage once the candidates were successful.  
                                                
219  Up to 70 percent of candidates at the 1989 Legislative Yuan and county magistrate elections 
were supported by business groups.  (Leng, pg. 86) Up to 70 percent of candidates at the 1989 
Legislative Yuan and county magistrate elections were supported by business groups.  (Leng, pg. 86) 
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Total Assets: US$ 20-50 billion 
 
     KMT Central Committee 
 
    
Business Management    Finance Committee 
 Committee     KMT Budget: NT$ 5 billion 
 
 
Central Investment  Petrochemical/Environ. 
 Holding Company (57 Companies) 
    
 
 Kwang Hwa Investment HighTech/Energy/Finance 
 Holding Company (42 Companies) 
 
 
 Chi Sheng Chang Construction 
 Investment Company (8 Companies) 
    
  
 Yueh Sheng Chang Overseas Ventures 
 
 
 Chien Hwa Investment Co. Special Projects 
  
  
 Hwa Hsia Investment News Media 
 
  
 Ching The Investment Insurance 
 Holding Company 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10:  KMT Party Assets and Affiliated Corporations 
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In the central and southern regions, NPLs reached as high as 50 percent.  According 
to these statistics, a large part of the local non-bank financial system is technically 
insolvent. By exploiting loopholes in the regulatory system, political conflict had 
caused deterioration of financial sector.  The Presidential elections caused an equal 
amount of political conflict because the stakes were so high.  The regulatory duties 
were compounded by the financial consequences of the cross crisis straits.   
 
5.53  Taiwan Invulernable: Surviving a Regional Financial Crisis 
 
The presidential election of 1996 was held in the midst of the most severe 
cross straits diplomatic crisis that Taiwan had experienced since the direct military 
confrontations with mainland China in the 1960s.  The domestic financial fallout 
from the 1995-1996 cross straits crisis included deposit runs on Taiwans weaker 
banks, an intensification of stock market volatility, a brief episode of capital flight, 
as well as a forced devaluation of the $NT.   Undaunted by cross straits tensions, 
Taiwans largest corporations continued to expand their investments in mainland 
China, which exposed Taiwan financial sector to internal Chinese politics and thus 
created another source of potential geostrategic vulnerability.   
As part of the governments struggle to contain the overseas investment 
behavior of Taiwans business conglomerates, legislators and regulators engaged in 
yet another round of institutional reforms that were designed to constrain the 
unprecedented rate of credit growth that followed the financial reforms of the 
1990s.  The reassertion of the governments control over the banking sector was 
intended to curtail the rising power of the native Taiwanese business community, 
but the governments efforts also meant that on the eve of the Asian financial crisis, 
Taiwan had already completed a set of regulatory and institutional reforms that 
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were designed to shield domestic financial markets from externally generated 
shocks. 
The cross-straits crisis of 1995-96 brought to an end a decade of 
rapprochement between Taiwan and mainland China.  At a regional level, the cross-
straits crisis was driven by both Taipei and Beijing, as each country sought to 
improve its relative bargaining position with regards to Taiwans ultimate political 
status.  For Beijing, Taiwans future status was non-negotiable, and so in January 
1995, Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin announced an Eight Points Plan that invited 
Taipei to participate in immediate unification talks.  Lee Tung-hui responded to 
Beijings new initiative in March of 1995 with an alternative plan that called upon 
the PRC to accept the reality of an independent Taiwan.  However, Lee Tung-huis 
abrupt rejection of Jiangs proposal served only to convince Beijing of Taiwans 
intention to more openly pursue formal independence.220  Thus, when President Lee 
visited the United States in June 1995, Beijing concluded that unless the PRC 
responded aggressively, Taiwans movement towards independence would be 
difficult if not impossible to counteract.221   
 In response to President Lees assertive policy, Beijing adopted a 
stance that was intended to demonstrate that mainland China would take direct 
military action in order to forestall any formal moves towards Taiwanese 
independence.  Beijings first move came in July 1995, when the Peoples 
Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a series of missile tests within Taiwans 
territorial boundaries.  The U.S. responded to the escalating cross-straits tensions by 
sending the aircraft carrier Nimitz through the Taiwan Strait as a way of 
demonstrating Americas unflagging commitment to Taiwans security.  The 
                                                
220 Roy, pp. 196-7 
221 Zhao, Suisheng, Introduction: Making Sense of the 1995-96 crisis in the Taiwan strait, In 
Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge 
Press, 1999, 7) 
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American intervention gave Beijing only temporary pause however, and in March 
1996, Beijing ordered a second round of military exercises near Taiwans Penghu 
Island.  The United States responded by sending both the Nimitz and the 
Independence battle groups to Taiwans vicinity.222   Undaunted, mainland China 
launched yet another round of military exercises within the Taiwan Strait, and 
further conflict was averted only after delicate diplomatic negotiations assuaged the 
PRCs fears regarding Taiwans future diplomatic intentions.   
The financial fallout of the cross-straits crisis was largely domestic.  In the 
months of August and September 1995 as well as March 1996, Taiwan witnessed a 
level of capital flight that was sufficient to precipitate a fall in the value of the NT 
dollar.  Second order financial disturbances were also felt as a result of the decline 
in stock market and real estate prices.  The Central Bank of China tried to quell 
expectations of any future devaluation by supplying large amounts of foreign 
exchange reserves to meet the increased demand in the foreign exchange market.  
During the crisis the stock market lost one third of its total value and US$10 billion 
in capital flowed out of Taiwan.  As illustrated in Figure 5.11 below, capital 
outflows caused speculative pressures to build upon the NT dollar, which 
eventually stabilized at NT27.5 to the US dollar.    
The March 1996 missile tests also caused widespread panic selling in the 
securities and foreign exchange markets and also resulted in US$ 10 billion in 
capital outflows.223  To forestall further monetary contraction, the CBC lowered the 
banking sectors reserve requirement in order to expand M2.  Simultaneously, the 
CBC intervened in the foreign exchange market to quell speculative pressures and 
further depreciation of 
                                                
222 Roy, 199-200 
223 Roy, 197 
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the NT$, but the CBCs intervention in March 1996 also reduced foreign exchange 
reserves to a three year low of US$82.5 billion.224   
The level of accumulated reserves and corrective monetary measures did 
little to overcome the fears that domestic actors felt as a result of the cross strait 
tensions.  Taiwans stock exchange was the first to feel the impact of the capital 
flight that occurred during the diplomatic crisis as stocks plummeted to 50 of there 
pre-crisis levels and the financial sector as particularly hurt, experiencing the worst 
of the stock market collapse.  The crisis most devastating impact upon the financial 
sector derived not from the stock market, but from the depositors reaction to the 
negative financial news.  Furthermore, as Table 5.9 above reveals, 10 financial 
institutions experienced deposit runs during 1995.  The troubles brought about by 
the cross-straits crisis further led to managerial steps to protect owners by looting 
their own institutions, which unlike other Asian countries, brought down immediate 
                                                
224 The highest levels of reserves were US$100.4 billion, which was reached in June 1995, and 
which exceeded Taiwans total annual import requirements.    
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government intervention.  Thus, majority shareholders and managers were forced to 
pay for their mismanagement both in financial terms as well as in stiff fines and jail 
sentences imposed by the central government. 
The most profound effect of the cross-straits crisis was that it demonstrated 
Taiwans vulnerable geostrategic position, which further emphasized in the mind of 
Taiwans regulators that the greatest threat to Taiwans domestic financial stability 
was its increasing dependence upon Chinas vast markets.  The nightmare scenario 
that most preoccupied Taiwans regulators was that at sometime in the future, China 
could use Taiwans investments in the mainland as a way of holding up Taiwan 
diplomatically.  As a result, the Lee tung-hui government believed that its primary 
responsibility was to reduce Taiwans vulnerability to the markets of mainland China 
and to protect domestic financial markets from any future diplomatically induced 
economic disturbances.  Insulating domestic markets was not costless however, and 
the priority of protecting Taiwans financial markets meant that reforms that targeted 
political corruption, nominee accounts, and more fundamental institutional reform 
would have to be postponed.   
In order to reduce Taiwans vulnerability to external shocks, the government 
attempted with little success, to reduce the magnitude of investment flows and to 
intensify regulatory surveillance over the flows that were approved by the 
government.  However, instead of delegating the central governments powers to 
independent agencies, Lee tung-hui sought to concentrate regulatory powers within 
the Executive Yuan, and in 1994, Lee announced the go slow, be patient policy 
which imposed a new set of constraints upon outward investment flows to China.  
The new policy sought to prohibit any participation in the infrastructure sector on the 
mainland and to restrict investment in high tech industries that would be largely 
irreversible.  The new policy also subjected investments proposals of over $50 
million to a case-by-case basis approval process.    
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The second component of Lees overall policy was to employ the Mainland 
Affairs Commission (MAC) and the Straights Exchange Foundation (SEF) to monitor 
the outward investment flows more carefully.  The government also established four 
stabilization funds that would bail out the real estate and stock market in case of 
externally induced shocks.  Finally, Lee sought to reduce the likelihood of deposit 
runs upon domestic financial institutions by expanding the powers of the CDIC over 
the non-bank financial sector.  Although the ultimate source of the corruption at the 
regional cooperatives and credit bureaus was political, Lee sought to increase public 
trust in the non-bank financial sector by increasing the number of examiners at the 
CDIC by 50 percent.   
The distributive consequences of Lees new policies proved to be difficult to 
manage, because the large business conglomerates such as Formosa Plastics, 
Evergreen Taiwan Semiconductors and The President business group officially 
obeyed the new polices but lobbied both publicly and privately for a relaxation of the 
policy.  In order to compensate the business leaders for the restrictions imposed upon 
investment to China by announcing a Go South policy that encouraged trade with 
and investment in South East Asia, primarily in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.  
South East Asian investment did increase from US$2 billion to $4 billion from 1994 
to 1999, but this did little to stem the flow of money to China.  Hence, instead of 
stifling investments to the mainland, outward investment flows to China actually 
increased in 1996 to $30 million and rose to $35 billion by 1999.    
Although the governments policies did not reduce Taiwans exposure to the 
mainland, the new regulatory measures designed to minimize the domestic financial 
fallout from external shocks proved instrumental in mitigating the overall effects of 
the Asian financial crisis upon Taiwan.  Ironically, because the Asian financial crisis 
occurred immediately after the cross straits crisis, Taiwanese regulators were by this 
time well practiced at managing crisis.  As a result of their continuous practice at 
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crisis management, Taiwans regulators had been forced to adopt a forward-looking 
approach to crisis management and so dealing with the financial fallout of an 
externally generated crisis had now become standard operating procedures.  Even the 
distributional struggle between government regulators and the Taiwanese 
corporations, over enforcement of restrictions upon investments to the mainland, had 
forced the government regulators create new institutions to monitor and investigate of 
the banking system.  Thus, while Taiwans regulators had not predicted the precise 
timing of the crisis and were as surprised as other public officials throughout Asia, 
Taiwans response to the crisis suggests that public regulators anticipated yet another 
crisis at some future date.   
At the beginning of the Asian financial crisis, the Central Bank of China tried 
to maintain a stable exchange rate of NT$28.6 per US dollar.  But as the crisis gained 
momentum by October, the central bank ceased its intervention on the 17th of 
October and allowed the value of the NT$ dollar to float.  By the end of 1997, the NT 
dollar had devalued by 14.8 percent against the dollar, by March 1998, 14.9 percent.  
Stock prices were actually 4 percent higher by March 1998 than in June 1997.  
Interest rates were only moderately affected by the crisis and were not used to support 
the NT dollar.  
Although Taiwans macroeconomic and industrial policy were superior to the 
countries beset by financial crisis, the fact that Taiwan engaged in $29 billion with 
the ASEAN countries, which represented 13% of Taiwans exports in 1997, created a 
trade channel through which the losses of the other Asian economies could effect 
Taiwan.  As a consequence, the CBC was forced to expend $5 billion to defend the 
par value of the $NT in early July 1997.  Due to speculative pressures, the $NT 
depreciated 8 percent, from $NT 30.5 per dollar, which was the lowest level in a 
decade.  Between July and October 1997, the CBC spent a total of $7 billion to keep 
the $NT at 28.6 to $1 US dollar.  After the Korean won devalued, the $NT 
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depreciated a further 19 percent, from $NT 28 to a dollar to $NT 34.5 to one dollar.  
In U.S. dollar terms the Taipei stock index fell 0.4 percent as compared to 42 to 75 
percent that were experienced by other Asian markets.  However, during the second 
half of 1997, the Taipei index fell by 28 percent. 
 The forced devaluation of the NT$ had a sufficient effect upon Taiwans 
financial markets so that many observers wondered openly if Taiwan would be the 
next country to experience financial crisis.  However, the balance sheets of Taiwans 
banks were far better managed than those within the banks of other Asian economies 
and Taiwanese firms were far less leveraged with debt than their Asian competitors. 
At the end of 1997, foreign exchange reserves were US$83.5 billion, while public 
foreign debt as only US$0.1 billion.  Private sector foreign debt was US$30 billion at 
the end of June 1997, but foreign assets were US$35.5 billion, leaving the private 
sector in the position of an overall international net creditor.225   
Most accounts of Taiwans performance during the Asian financial crisis 
stress macroeconomic strength, industrial structure, and the CBCs vaunted foreign 
exchange reserves; all which undoubtedly helped Taiwan successfully weather the 
1997 crisis.  However, most authors have overlooked the regulation of banks and the 
differences between the management policies of Taiwanese banks and their less 
successful counterparts in other parts of Asia.  For instance, instead of a single 
regulatory agency, three public institutions devoted to financial regulation have 
evolved in Taiwan; the BMA, the CBC, and the CDIC; as well as the various arms of 
the central government who can enforce the banking law.  And even the KMT 
management culture that inspired corruption within Taiwans major banks also 
instilled an extreme degree of risk averseness among Taiwans bank managers.  The 
same is not true of Taiwans non-bank financial sector however, and had Taiwans 
                                                
225 Kuo and Liu, 186 
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commercial banks suffered from the same practices as the non-bank sector, fallout 
from crisis could have been much more severe, even without the large external debt.   
Governance tradition of new banks came out of old banks and multinational 
banks and so risk profile of new banks reflected conservative corporate culture.  Bank 
governance is also distinguished in Taiwan by the fact that only in the mid 1990s was 
external borrowing permitted.  At the microeconomic level, small firms that can 
adjust quickly to alterations in global trading environment dominate Taiwans 
industrial structure.  Thus, in 1997, credit demand by manufacturers and construction 
industry actually grew by 15.4 percent and 9.1 percent respectively, which was the 
highest levels since 1993.  Furthermore, overdue loan rates at the big three banks was 
significantly higher at the end of 1997, than 1996.  At First Commercial bank, for 
instance, the overdue loan rate was 4.3 percent, while the overdue rate was 5.7 
percent at Chung Hwa bank.  Together the big three banks set aside NT$ 5.2 billion to 
cover bad debts in the second half of 1997, and the overdue loan ratio at all banks in 
Taiwan actually fell in 1997 to 3.4 percent from 4 percent in 1996. 
The new banks, such as Sun E. and Entie bank did belong to larger family 
owned conglomerates, but these banks received particular attention from the 
examiners at the CBC and the BMA in order to minimize the ability of firms to 
transfer bad assets to their cognate banks and in order to assure that banks could not 
improve their capital levels by transferring bad assets to associate firms.  
Furthermore, as a general rule, stocks are set by banks at 60 percent of their market 
price and at the end of 1997, loans secured by stocks accounted for only 3.7 percent 
of total loans for financial institutions.  CBC regulations limit real estate exposure to 
20 percent of a banks portfolio, so asset volatility is not as damaging to Taiwanese 
banks.   
Non-bank financial institutions such as bills finance companies and securities 
firms, which were the source of so much inflationary pressure in Thailand, were 
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leveraged at a level lower than the official limits in Taiwan.  The financial structure 
of non-financial companies was also sound.  The ratio of liabilities to net worth of all 
listed non-financial companies was only 78 percent on average in September 1997, 
and even if financial institutions are included the ratio of liabilities to net worth is 
only 145 percent. (Kuo and Liu, 186-7).  The capital to asset ratio was relatively high 
by regional and international standards, despite rising NPLs.226 
The stabilization funds and more responsible regulatory measures were thus 
intended to pre-empt any future diplomatically induced financial crisis.  Furthermore, 
because Taiwans macroeconomic and financial strength could never be taken for 
granted, the regulatory system that evolved after the cross straits crisis reflected a 
certain level of redundancy and as well as a division of labor between regulatory 
institutions.   
The governance relationship between banks and firms was also different in Taiwan in 
comparison to the Asian crisis economies.   Because of government regulations, most 
Taiwanese banks did not belong to a holding company structure, which allowed 
powerful families to concentrate economic power in their hands by using family 
owned banks to branch out into the non-financial sectors of the economy.   
Despite the moral hazard created by the stabilization funds, the spread of 
nominee accounts, and the attendant problem of black gold, Taiwans uncertainty 
regarding its geo-strategic position meant that financial stability would have to take 
precedence over the requirements of prudential regulation.  Despite the moral hazard 
created by the stabilization funds, the spread of nominee accounts, and the attendant 
problem of black gold, Taiwans uncertainty regarding its geo-strategic position 
meant that financial stability would have to take precedence over the requirements of 
prudential regulation.    
                                                
226 Kuo and Liu, 188 
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5.34 Discipline and Punish: Banks and the Politics of Anti-Corruption 
 
Chen Shui-bian came to power in March 2000, after only the second direct 
presidential elections in Taiwans history.  Chens administration immediately came 
under diplomatic pressure from mainland China, which threatened war should Chen 
follow-through on his campaign promise to hold a referendum on Taiwanese 
independence.   Chen also came under domestic political pressure from the KMT, 
who had lost the presidency but still maintained a majority control over the 
Legislative Yuan and the military, as well as the administrative bureaucracy.227   
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As the ruling party, the DPP was forced to confront Taiwans deteriorating 
fiscal position, which is depicted in Figure 5.12 above.  Thus, despite the DPPs 
minority position in the Legislative Yuan, Chen pushed through measures designed to 
reinforce pre-existing anti-corruption laws and established new anti-corruption 
agencies.  The new administrations policies were not simply motivated by financial 
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prudence, but targeted the illicit financial infrastructure that supported the KMTs 
black gold network of electoral fraud and political racketeering.   
Chen Shui-bians campaign to impose new regulatory constraints upon 
Taiwans financial sector were frustrated by the extension Taiwans banks to 
mainland China, which put them beyond government controls.  Domestically 
however, Chens administration required many of Taiwans weaker domestic banks to 
re-capitalize, and the Ministry of Justice even issued arrest warrants against several of 
Taiwans most prominent bankers.  The new regulations and draconian enforcement 
measures had a dampening effect upon the overall supply of credit in 2002-2003, but 
the new measures compelled banks to reduce their level overdue loans and forced 
many banking industry executives to accept personal responsibility for the financial 
mismanagement of the 1990s.   
By the time Chen Shui-bian ascended to the office of President in June 2000, 
Taiwans external economic environment had deteriorated beyond the immediate 
after affects of the Asian financial crisis.  By 2000, financial crisis and corporate 
governance failure had extended to American markets, and Japan still showed little 
sign of economic or financial recovery.  Because of the bursting of the American high 
tech bubble in particular, Taiwans industrial exports collapsed and several 
associated industries suddenly faced an uncertain future.  Furthermore, Taiwans 
Asian trading partners were in the midst of post-crisis reforms and even the strongest 
of the emerging markets, Russia, Brazil and Argentina, experienced successive 
financial crises between 1999 and 2001, creating a decidedly negative sentiment 
among multinational bankers and global investors.  The global recession was 
reflected in the compression of Taiwans trade surplus, persistent budget deficits, and 
the rise in unemployment level to 4.5 percent.  Domestic financial markets responded 
predictably, and so after just one year of Chen Shui-bians administration, the Taipei 
  
 
 
223
Index had lost half of its overall value and Taiwan had to face the most severe 
recession that had been recorded in nearly a quarter century.  
To add to Chen Shui-bians problems, the DPP had only secured 39.3 percent 
of the presidential vote and held only one-third of the seats in the Legislative Yuan.  
Hence, the KMT was able to postpone any financial reforms that disadvantaged 
KMT-associated financial institutions and corporate assets.  The inability of any one 
party to dominate both the presidency and the legislature led to pre-election and post-
election coordination between the various parties.  The KMT and PFP formed a pan 
Blue coalition to counter the pan-Green coalition between the DPP and the 
TSU.228  The DPP improved its position within the Legislative Yuan in December 
2001, by increasing the number of its seats from 66 to 87, while the potential ally, the 
TSU won 13 seats.  The KMT was the biggest loser, going from 110 seats to 68, but 
Soongs PFP gained 46 seats.  Together, the pan-Blue bloc controlled 114 seats, 
which enabled them to veto the power of the DPPs plurality in the Legislative 
Yuan.229  
Two main challenges, beyond the always precarious cross straits relations, 
was black gold and the deteriorating economic condition, which included an ever-
weakening financial system.  The problems caused by the banking sectors 
deteriorating circumstances can be seen in the depressed share prices of Taiwans 
financial sector, which is depicted in Figure 5.13.   
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To address the weaknesses and to relieve some of the budgetary deficits, 
which by 2002 had reached US$ 8 billion (NT$291 billion), the government planned 
to finally privatize shares in the largest of Taiwans publicly owned banks.  Taiwan 
now had a total of 52 banks and over 300 credit cooperatives in 2002, and a reported 
NPLs of NT$1.03 trillion, or US$30 billion (Finance Asia, Jackie Horne).  However, 
actual NPLs were probably twice the officially stated amount.  At the end of 2002, 
NPLs were reported at 8,86 percent but unofficial figures placed total NPLs at 11.47 
percent of total loans.  The underestimation of NPLs occurred are for two reasons.  
The first is that the pre-2003 reporting rules allowed banks to designate loans as non 
performing a full 6 months after the last payment, while international standards 
designated loans as non-performing after just 3 months of non-payment.   
To redress the NPL problem, the government announced target 258 
provision that required all banks must reduced their NPLs to less than 5 percent of 
their total loan portfolios and reach the 8 percent capital ratio by early 2004.  The 
authorities have thus issued an implied threat that any banks that fail to meet the 
target 258 measures will be forced to merge with stronger rivals.  Prior to the 
government policy, in December 2001, Taiwanese banks reported an average CAR 
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level of domestic banks was 10.4 percent.  These reported figures were probably 
over-estimated for many banks.230  Estimates of banks NPL figures for the end of 
2001 were 11.74 percent, which fell to 8.86 percent by the end of 2002.  However, in 
2002 huge NPL write-offs reached US$11.88 billion according to government 
estimates.  Banks also increased their tier-2 capital by boosting their subordinated 
debt.  As a result of target 258 policies, the average CAR ratio dropped an average of 
3 to 4 percentage points.  In 2002, it is estimated that banks offloaded up to NT$185 
billion (US$ 5.3 billion) in bad debts, while a similar amount has been deleted from 
the balance sheets of domestic banks in 2003.   
On August 2003, two former managers of Chang Hwa Hsinhsing branch, Lin 
Ching-tien and a former manager of Pan Asias Southern Kaohsiung branch, Lin Yu-
fu, were taken into custody for their involvement in the Chang Hwa bank loan 
scandal.  A third man, Lee Kun-hu, the nephew of former Chang Hwa bank chairman 
M.H. Tsai.  The two branch managers bypass the proper procedure for securing a 
NT$810 million loan for Fu You Group.   The Fu You development project never got 
under way and payments on the loan were irregular.231  The Ministry of Finance 
banned a high profile visit by bankers to China as part of a crackdown on financial 
irregularities.  The crackdown focused on three banks and six listed 
companies.(Taiwan News, September 14, 2000)  Companies in trouble include Hung 
Kuo conglomerate, Tuntex, and Ever Fortune Construction, who have had to 
downsize or deal with liquidity problems and accusations of improper financial 
transactions. (The China Post).  Stock market eroded due to government crackdown, 
but was not sufficient to cause government intervention through four stabilizations 
funds.  
                                                
230 Beyond the 6 month rule for designating a loan as non-performing, Taiwanese banks underestimate 
the true levels of NPLs because they report NPLs net the expected recovery which underestimates the 
true level because collateral disposals have often failed to realize valuation prices. 
231 The China Post 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
 Chien Shui-bian was re-elected to the Presidency on May 20th, 2004.  Chiens 
re-election was surrounded by controversy and drama, and Chien was even shot in a 
failed assassination three days prior to the election.  Following his re-election, Chien 
made further moves to separate Taiwan from the PCR by renouncing for the first time 
in Taiwans history that the ROC no longer represented the legitimate government of 
both Chinas.  By February of 2006, Chien even abolished the National Unification 
Council as further evidence of his intention to test the PCRs resolve regarding 
Taiwanese independence.   
 Chens new diplomatic strategy has been severely undermined by recent 
allegations regarding his own financial dealings as well as those of his wife and 
confidants.  Financial corruption has again taken center stage in Taiwan and has 
practically crippled the Chen government.  Finance and national security have come 
together yet again to threaten Taiwans stability and that of its financial markets.   
 Taiwans regulatory system will have to adapt to Taiwans still perilous 
relationship with mainland China and Taiwans divisive internal politics.  As 
Taiwans financial sector grows, the governments diplomatic freedom of action will 
be constrained by its burgeoning financial interests in mainland China and the greater 
Asia region.  However, the growth of native Taiwanese financial interests will also 
push the government to act more like an independent republic and less like a legally 
unrecognized trading state.  Consequently, as the PRC and Taiwan struggle over the 
ultimate fate of Taiwan, the financial struggles within Taiwan will undoubtedly play a 
central role in determining the countrys future. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Retrospective 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The central argument of my thesis is that the contract theoretic model presented in 
chapter two can explain instances of regulatory discipline as well as cases of 
regulatory failure.  The underlying theoretical framework is based upon the insight 
that iniquitous distributions of the monetary and fiscal outputs of the banking sector 
lead to distributional conflict, which undermines the stability of the banking sector.  
Consequently, any theory of regulatory success or failure has to consider the 
distributional consequences of financial regulation upon society.   
In order to fully assess the success and theoretical potential of the contract 
theoretic approach to distributional conflict, the current chapter is divided into two 
sections; the first section is a theoretical retrospective of chapters two and three, and 
the second section is an empirical assessment of the application of the theory 
contained in chapters three and four.  Chapter six will then address the primary 
theoretical and empirical weakness of the previous chapters and will make suggestions 
regarding future research possibilities that could yield a more complete theory as well 
as a more rigorous empirical test of the claims made throughout the preceding 
chapters. 
The theoretical claims made in chapter two and chapter three can be 
summarized in terms of the following four points: 
 Hypothesis 1) Regulatory actions have monetary and fiscal consequences; 
which are distributed among the taxpayers, bank managers, and the banks minority 
shareholders.   
 Hypothesis 2) Because of the inevitable monetary and fiscal consequences of 
regulatory actions, the delegation of regulatory powers to an independent government 
agency does not eliminate the incentive for distributional conflict between the 
different sectors of society. 
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 Conclusion) The solution to the regulatory contract yielded three sets of pure 
strategy Nash equilibria.  Furthermore, there exists one subset of pure strategy Nash 
equilibria which Pareto dominates a second subset of equilibria, but which is Pareto 
non-comparable to a third set of pure strategy Nash equilibria.   
 Assessment) A Pareto improving (equitable) policy is feasible under very 
limited conditions, and in all other cases, regulatory action privileges one set of actors 
and discriminates against another set of social actors in terms of the monetary and 
fiscal consequences of regulatory policy.  The model also generated four sets of 
empirically testable predictions 
Prediction 1) In a credit boom, bank managers and minority shareholders are 
privileged, while taxpayers and shareholders must ultimately bear the burden of any 
bankruptcy costs at some future date. 
Prediction 2) In a credit crunch, minority shareholders are privileged and bank 
managers are relatively unhurt, while the public must bear a reduction in the rate of 
credit expansion. 
Prediction 3) Bank managers will abide by prudential regulatory standards 
only if the government can credibly enforce a threat of regulatory intervention, in 
terms of the equitable allocation of decision-making authority and in terms of the 
distribution of bankruptcy costs. 
Prediction 4) No specific political or bureaucratic configuration, in terms of 
regime type, electoral rules, or legally prescribed relationship between the executive 
branch and the regulatory agency can fully eliminate the incentive for distributional 
conflict over the allocation of the costs and benefits of financial regulation.   
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6.2 Theoretical Critique 
 
The positive political economy literature explains policy credibility in terms 
of a governments resolve to sustain an announced policy, but the notion of resolve 
remains theoretically under-analyzed.  As I have argued in chapters two through five, 
a governments regulatory authority is a function of the more fundamental 
distribution of decision-making authority and the monetary and fiscal outputs of the 
banking sector.  A credible policy must equitably reflect the interests of the social 
actors whose welfare will be influenced by the announced policy.  Compensating the 
social actors who will lose as a result of newly announced policy will thus be 
insufficient to sustain a policy, since the compensation of losers by winners does not 
take into consideration the loss of decision making power regarding the future 
distribution of resources which results from the current social allocation of wealth 
and power.   
Thus, costly measures designed to signal a government commitment to a 
reform process may not be sufficient to sustain that process in the long run, because 
credibility is not only predicated upon the will to govern but is rather a function of 
the underlying social order that can either support or deny the governments 
legitimate right to make decisions that impinge upon the welfare and future actions of 
the relevant social actors.  Hence, unless the instrumental definition of credibility is 
supplemented by an understanding how policies effect the dominant social order, the 
literature will continue to underestimate the extent to which disadvantaged groups 
have an incentive to either change or overthrow the new social order that is implied 
by an economic reform program.  
Furthermore, the bulk of the political economy literature continues to ignore 
the possibility that an ideal social distribution of resources and decision making 
power may not be feasible, and we may instead by forced to choose between Pareto 
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non-comparable outcomes.  If a government must make a choice between Pareto non-
comparable outcomes, a stable policy trajectory may be impossible to assure in the 
long run, as disadvantaged groups seek to impose an order that would disadvantage 
rival groups that enjoy a dominant or privileged position in the current period.  The 
lack of a clear Pareto optimal policy could thus render impossible the goal of 
achieving a policy trajectory that is credible in the long-term.   
The difficulty of achieving a Pareto optimal policy raises potentially 
devastating problems for the claim that a stable and efficient policy outcome can be 
achieved through the institutional delegation of regulatory powers to an independent 
government agency.  In other words, the delegation of the regulatory function to an 
independent government agency may neither achieve a stable nor an efficient policy 
trajectory.  Furthermore, the existence of Pareto non-comparable equilibria in the 
overall solution set would mean that distributional decisions are left unresolved by the 
delegation of regulatory power.  Given that such ultimate distributive decisions are 
beyond the legislative and constitutionally mandated authority of government 
agencies, the ultimate distributive decisions would have to be performed by a higher 
governmental authority.   
Hence, executive intervention may thus be necessary in order to determine 
which of the many Pareto non-comparable outcomes will ultimately be selected as the 
official policy.  Institutional delegation, under these circumstances, would not solve 
the problem of distributional conflict, which would have to be resolved by another 
branch of government (i.e. the dominant party, the legislature, the judiciary, or 
executive branch of government).   
Instead of providing a convincing demonstration of all of the conclusions 
referred to in the theoretical section above, the model presented in Chapter two should 
be viewed as a first cut, or a preliminary attempt to outline a set of theoretical issues 
and conclusions that can be achieved by a more fully specified model.   In retrospect, 
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the model presented in chapter two fails to fully exposit the theoretical claims of 
chapter two for four distinct reasons: 
Problem 1) The regulatory contract does not incorporate a distribution of risk 
between bank managers and the public regulator, nor does the model incorporate the 
feature of asymmetric information, which would be required in order to engage in any 
meaningful discussion regarding moral hazard.   
Problem 2) The regulatory contract is not dynamic and so any interpretation 
regarding future distributive decisions is technically impossible to support.   
Problem 3) The model does not adequately specify the liability side of the 
banks balance sheet, with regards to depositors and with regards to the effects of 
reserves upon the transformation of liquidity from deposits to assets, which would 
render a discussion of the monetary consequences of regulatory actions impossible.   
Problem 4) The model is indeterminate regarding the ultimate relationship 
between the organization of government and the delegation of regulatory power.  
Even if the theoretical goal of the model is to demonstrate that there is no optimal 
relationship between the other branches of government and the public regulator, this 
has to be incorporated in the model explicitly and not simply assumed as a general 
implication of the model.  We can now consider the four sets of theoretical objections 
to the contract theoretic model presented in chapter two in detail.  
 
Risk Distribution and Asymmetric Information 
 
A primary weakness of the regulatory contract outlined in chapter two was 
that the social distribution of the costs and benefits of financial regulation occurred 
only at the end of the game and this distribution was not a direct result of the models 
dynamics.  Incorporating the distributive process more explicitly would require that 
the utility of all social actors be specified directly as part of the contract.  A full 
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justification of each actors utility function would also require that, in principle, each 
social actor should have a move in the game.   
Hence, I have modified the game to include a move by the BM (bank 
manager), as well as the CB (public regulator) and the SH (shareholders).  
Intervention into the affairs of an insolvent bank would now imply that control of the 
banks future capital-asset decisions has been transferred to the banks shareholders, 
who now have a move in the game.   
However, a revised regulatory would rely on the fact that the CBs utility is 
divided between the taxpayers and the banks shareholders at the end of the game, 
which implies that the central bank is left with a net income of zero.  A more realistic 
model would include a way of motivating the central bank.  For instance, if the 
central banks is paid a linear wage, we can motivate the regulator to behave in 
accordance with the regulatory contract regardless of the consequences for the 
contracting parties.  However, if the regulators utility is a state-dependent, i.e. upon 
the rate of credit expansion, then the public regulator would still face an incentive 
problem, since the benefit derived from practicing unwarranted forbearance could 
outweigh any deduction from the regulators wages from allowing an insolvent bank 
to continue operating.  Hence, modulating the mathematical characteristics of the 
regulators utility function will determine the ultimate distribution of the costs and 
benefits of financial regulation. 
 The third feature that is missing from the specification of the regulatory 
contract is asymmetric information regarding the initial capital-asset allocation of the 
bank manager in the first period.  The capital asset decision discussed in chapter two 
is also non-stochastic and thus no distribution of risk is possible between the bank 
manager and the public regulator.  In order to engage in any meaningful discussion of 
moral hazard, at least one of the capital-asset combinations should involve a 
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probabilistic function that varies the value of the capital asset decision in the second 
period.  
 
Inter-temporal Allocation of Costs and Benefits 
 
The model can be modified to include a second period in which the new 
owners can make allocative decisions in the case wherein the central bank has 
intervened in the operations the bank.  Hence the second period of asset allocation 
captures the possibility that the public regulator can alter the future distribution of 
credit to the economy.  A multiple period, or infinite horizon model can be used to 
demonstrate the instability of equilibria in the long run.  A series of decisions that are 
rational given the local institutional and structural constraints, but that cumulatively 
have a disastrous macro-outcome.  Requires some form of scaling effect to be 
incorporated into the model. 
 
Balance Sheet Specification 
 
In order to account for the different states of the world predicted by the model, 
a complete specification of the banks balance sheet is necessary, as well as a more 
explicit treatment for the effect of the bank managers decisions upon the macro 
credit market.  According to the credit view of monetary policy, the credit channel 
operates through the banks managements decisions to modulate the banks reserves 
levels, which would enable the bank to increase or decrease its deposits (liabilities) 
and thereby increase or decrease its loans to the public (asset portfolio).  The banks 
balance sheet should also be altered to include the risk of asset failure, which means 
that the revenue yielded by the banks asset portfolio must vary with some well-
defined probability distribution. 
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Institutional Specification 
 
A more precise institutional specification can be represented in the case in 
which delegation occurs and a case wherein regulatory powers are wielded directly by 
the executive branch of government (non-delegation).   
 
       Government 
 
 
 
 
 
Delegate       Non-delegation 
 
6.3 Empirical Critique 
 
Empirically, the research design implemented in chapters four and five suffers 
from the methodological flaws inherent to any small sample study.  Including other 
case studies may help, but unless the case studies become sufficiently large, the 
interpretations implied by the model will remain speculative.  The parameters are 
insufficiently specified empirically and there is no way to clearly measurement of 
these parameters implied by the model.  Large samples of banking and regulation 
related data are now available from the World Bank project devoted to the 
comparative study of regulatory systems.   
According to chapters two and three, there are three primary hypothetical 
claims that are generated by the formal model:  
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H (1):  Each regulatory action has distinct and measurable monetary and fiscal 
consequences. 
H (2):  There is no specific regime type or government-regulator relationship that has 
a measurable effect upon the incidence of bank crisis 
H (3) Bank managers abide by prudential regulatory standards only if the central bank 
equitably allocates bankruptcy costs and managerial liability. 
The problems associated with testing this hypothesis empirically are many.  
First, monetary and fiscal consequences refers to the consequences of regulatory 
actions upon monetary policy, as well as the costs and benefits borne by the 
taxpayers, bank managers (in terms of pay) and shareholders (returns on investment).  
Hence, not only are the terms monetary and fiscal consequences vague and 
somewhat inaccurate, but the various meanings captured by these terms need to be 
analyzed separately 
Furthermore, fiscal consequences may be readily measurable in terms of the 
effect of regulatory-bank events upon government debt as well as per capita 
contributions to the debt that is generated during a financial crisis.  However, the 
effects of regulatory actions upon bank managers pay and upon shareholder returns 
maybe somewhat more difficult to measure.  Although bank manager data may exist, 
it may be highly confidential and publicly unavailable, while the return on investment 
data should be readily available from each countrys stock exchange.  
The second hypothesis maybe even more controversial as it would contradict 
the insights of the literature that is devoted to banking regulation as well as at least 
the spirit of the central bank independence literature.   
As was argued in chapter three, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong contain 
highly competent regulatory agencies that are not independent of the central 
authorities, although countries that have experienced banking crises repeatedly 
contain both independent as well as non-independent regulatory agencies.  Nor is 
  
 
 
237
regime type of importance to the incidence of banking crisis or regulatory failure, 
since democracies seem to be just as prone to regulatory failure as non-democracies.  
Political instability and regime change seems to be more important, as political unrest 
would influence the efficacy of regulatory agencies by making the future less certain 
with regards to a governments policies.    
A more rigorous test could employ data from all countries that release such 
data, which is available in the World Bank banking regulation data set.   This data set 
suffers from its own problems however, such as a lack of a common definition for 
many regulatory categories as well as inconsistent regulatory laws across countries, 
which makes it very difficult to measure the independent causal effects of a particular 
rule or set of institutions. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
 The model presented in chapter two and the empirical investigations 
included in chapters four and five should be considered a first step in a broader 
research project.  A more precise model can now be constructed to include various 
institutional and economic features that were not included in the model due to time 
and resource constraints.  However, various refinements, both theoretical and 
empirical, can now be added to more fully explore the main hypotheses presented in 
chapter two and three.  Finally, an open economy component can be developed in 
order to investigate the relationship between distributional conflict within the 
domestic credit market and the sustainability of various exchange rate regimes. 
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